Disclaimer: All the opinions expressed herein are my own. #140friday <http://140friday.com> » Business <http://140friday.com/?cat=3>» Politics <http://140friday.com/?cat=6> » Technology<http://140friday.com/?cat=8>» Kenya’s PKI Destined for Failure? March 20, 2013 Kenya’s PKI Destined for Failure? Today I had the opportunity to attend a seminar organized by the Ministry of Information & Communications and Samsung SDS as part of the implementation of Kenya’s National Public Key Infrastructure (NPKI). The project is undertaken within the framework of the Kenya Transparency & Communications Infrastructure Project (KTCIP), a World Bank funded initiative that will help Kenya achieve a number of the goals under the ICT pillar of Vision 2030. The presentations from the team from Korea consisted of representatives of Samsung SDS (who won the International tender for Kenya’s NPKI implementation) as well as representatives from some of the key actors in Korea’s own NPKI. The Korean presentations were interesting, informative and very well prepared. Over the period of a few hours they were able to take the relatively complex subject of National Public Kenya Infrastructure and unpack it in a way that was both easy to understand as well as clear and straightforward. They left no shadow of doubt as to whether Samsung SDS can successfully implement this project. They also shared the organizational structure for the project, which is as follows: [image: CAM00454]<http://140friday.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/CAM00454.jpg> During the course of their presentations the team from Korea shared the high level plan for the implementation of Kenya’s SDS. They made it clear that they had spent a good deal of time working closely with Government officials responsible from the Kenyan side. In describing the structure and hierarchy that has proven successful in Korea for the implementation and operation of their NPKI, the team shared the following diagram. [image: CAM00455]<http://140friday.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/CAM00455.jpg> At the very top, there is the Ministry responsible for the NPKI, they provide the legal and regulatory framework, national authentication plan and other high level functions. Below them is the “Root Certification Authority” an organization known as the Korea Internet Security Agency (KISA), which provides operation of the National Authentication system, licensing/accreditation of certificate authorities (CA) to provide service to the public as well as development of technical standards. Below them are the accredited CAs of which Korea has 5 who provide certificate issuance and management services to the public. In a presentation which came later, the Korean team shared the proposed structure for the Kenyan implementation which had been arrived at after consultations with Government. The diagram is as follows. [image: CAM00457]<http://140friday.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/CAM00457.jpg> In this structure, Government who will be responsible for legal and regulatory framework, national authentication plan, other high level functions as well as licensing and auditing are to be represented by the Communications Commission of Kenya (CCK). Below them and responsible for operation of the Root Certification Authority is CCK. Below that are a proposed “Government CA” which will issue certificates for Government agencies and employees and a proposed “Private Sector CA” which will issue certificates to the rest of the country. I have a big problem with this structure. First and foremost because CCK is being proposed as BOTH the licensing authority as well as the licensed operator of the Root Certification Authority. The potential for conflict of interest is immediately evident, not to mention the fact that the end-to-end integrity of a structure that ensures top-down accountability is rendered completely void. Even worse was the mumbled suggestions by some of the government participants at the seminar that CCK might also act as the Government CA. In addition that is the fact that a project as crucial as this has not gone through a proper stakeholder consultative process and is seemingly being shoved down our throats. In his closing remarks a director a the E-Government directorate asked the ICT Board to engage stakeholders further and receive input before moving too far. I raised this point as a question during the Q & A session at the end of the seminar and would like to emphasise that it would be *very wrong* for CCK to be the Root Certification Authority for a number of reasons: 1. *Conflict of Interest:* As per the proposed structure the representative of Government, CCK needs to serve as the top level entity that handles the legal and regulatory framework and the national authentication plan. Adding a subsidiary role would not only compromise their integrity but would also expose them to all manner of challenges with regards to operation of an infrastructure that is supposed to be based on trust. 2. *Procurement Issues:* In sharing to a certain level of detail the complexity of the Root Authority setup, it became evident that there would be a continuous need for procurement of various goods and services. As a government agency, CCK is subject to public procurement regulations, this means that even very basic, small and simple items could take months if not years to procure. The problems with our public procurement are well known. Subjecting the Root Authority to this kind of environment is in itself a major risk for successful implementation and operation. 3. *Human Resource Issues:* Several times in their presentations the Koreans complained that they had observed a critical lack of human resources. They emphasized that they were not referring to *skilled*human resources but simply to *enough people* for the project requirements. Shock of shocks! With the incredible numbers of well educated Kenyans who are unemployed or underemployed? They could obviously have only been referring to what they had seen as far as the people available for the project from the Ministry and CCK. It is no secret that CCK has extremely limited human resources in their ICT division and those few are oveworked, stretched beyond measure and juggling multipe roles. Isn’t adding additional responsibilities into this mix a formula for disaster? 4. *Inertia*: CCK has proven to be very poor at the timely execution of functions that fall outside their core mandate of licensing, regulation and resource management. A perfect example is the implementation of the Universal Service Fund, which CCK insisted on handling as an inhouse function instead of facilitating the setup of a dedicated entity to handle the task. It has been over 6 years since regulation and legislation regarding the USF came into place and there is still nothing to speak of. I will reserve this as a subject for another day (it is a long and detailed one!) *Recommendations* The Government should immediately consider adopting a *Public Private Partnership* approach for the implementation of Kenya’s NPKI. This is especially timely because we now have a fully ratified Public Private Partnership Policy that provides a variety of models for project implementation. This will not only ensure involvement from crucial stakeholders but also free the Root Authority from the problems highlighted above (and probably many others) while at the same time ensuring that enough private sector energy and enthusiasm is infused into the project so that it moves with speed and determination. Success stories such as KENIC and TEAMS show that it is not only possible but that it can be done with ease.
@Brian, thnx for the heads-up on this one. I am glad at least YOU got to be invited. Evans K. has been planning to invite me over the last 1year this project has been cooking but without success :-) Either way, it is a good development but will require fine-tuning as we move it forward. walu. ________________________________ From: Brian Munyao Longwe <blongwe@gmail.com> To: jwalu@yahoo.com Cc: KICTAnet ICT Policy Discussions <kictanet@lists.kictanet.or.ke> Sent: Wednesday, March 20, 2013 6:06 PM Subject: [kictanet] Kenya’s PKI Destined for Failure? Disclaimer: All the opinions expressed herein are my own. #140friday » Business » Politics » Technology » Kenya’s PKI Destined for Failure?March 20, 2013 Kenya’s PKI Destined for Failure? Today I had the opportunity to attend a seminar organized by the Ministry of Information & Communications and Samsung SDS as part of the implementation of Kenya’s National Public Key Infrastructure (NPKI). The project is undertaken within the framework of the Kenya Transparency & Communications Infrastructure Project (KTCIP), a World Bank funded initiative that will help Kenya achieve a number of the goals under the ICT pillar of Vision 2030. The presentations from the team from Korea consisted of representatives of Samsung SDS (who won the International tender for Kenya’s NPKI implementation) as well as representatives from some of the key actors in Korea’s own NPKI. The Korean presentations were interesting, informative and very well prepared. Over the period of a few hours they were able to take the relatively complex subject of National Public Kenya Infrastructure and unpack it in a way that was both easy to understand as well as clear and straightforward. They left no shadow of doubt as to whether Samsung SDS can successfully implement this project. They also shared the organizational structure for the project, which is as follows: During the course of their presentations the team from Korea shared the high level plan for the implementation of Kenya’s SDS. They made it clear that they had spent a good deal of time working closely with Government officials responsible from the Kenyan side. In describing the structure and hierarchy that has proven successful in Korea for the implementation and operation of their NPKI, the team shared the following diagram. At the very top, there is the Ministry responsible for the NPKI, they provide the legal and regulatory framework, national authentication plan and other high level functions. Below them is the “Root Certification Authority” an organization known as the Korea Internet Security Agency (KISA), which provides operation of the National Authentication system, licensing/accreditation of certificate authorities (CA) to provide service to the public as well as development of technical standards. Below them are the accredited CAs of which Korea has 5 who provide certificate issuance and management services to the public. In a presentation which came later, the Korean team shared the proposed structure for the Kenyan implementation which had been arrived at after consultations with Government. The diagram is as follows. In this structure, Government who will be responsible for legal and regulatory framework, national authentication plan, other high level functions as well as licensing and auditing are to be represented by the Communications Commission of Kenya (CCK). Below them and responsible for operation of the Root Certification Authority is CCK. Below that are a proposed “Government CA” which will issue certificates for Government agencies and employees and a proposed “Private Sector CA” which will issue certificates to the rest of the country. I have a big problem with this structure. First and foremost because CCK is being proposed as BOTH the licensing authority as well as the licensed operator of the Root Certification Authority. The potential for conflict of interest is immediately evident, not to mention the fact that the end-to-end integrity of a structure that ensures top-down accountability is rendered completely void. Even worse was the mumbled suggestions by some of the government participants at the seminar that CCK might also act as the Government CA. In addition that is the fact that a project as crucial as this has not gone through a proper stakeholder consultative process and is seemingly being shoved down our throats. In his closing remarks a director a the E-Government directorate asked the ICT Board to engage stakeholders further and receive input before moving too far. I raised this point as a question during the Q & A session at the end of the seminar and would like to emphasise that it would be very wrong for CCK to be the Root Certification Authority for a number of reasons: 1. Conflict of Interest: As per the proposed structure the representative of Government, CCK needs to serve as the top level entity that handles the legal and regulatory framework and the national authentication plan. Adding a subsidiary role would not only compromise their integrity but would also expose them to all manner of challenges with regards to operation of an infrastructure that is supposed to be based on trust. 2. Procurement Issues: In sharing to a certain level of detail the complexity of the Root Authority setup, it became evident that there would be a continuous need for procurement of various goods and services. As a government agency, CCK is subject to public procurement regulations, this means that even very basic, small and simple items could take months if not years to procure. The problems with our public procurement are well known. Subjecting the Root Authority to this kind of environment is in itself a major risk for successful implementation and operation. 3. Human Resource Issues: Several times in their presentations the Koreans complained that they had observed a critical lack of human resources. They emphasized that they were not referring to skilled human resources but simply to enough people for the project requirements. Shock of shocks! With the incredible numbers of well educated Kenyans who are unemployed or underemployed? They could obviously have only been referring to what they had seen as far as the people available for the project from the Ministry and CCK. It is no secret that CCK has extremely limited human resources in their ICT division and those few are oveworked, stretched beyond measure and juggling multipe roles. Isn’t adding additional responsibilities into this mix a formula for disaster? 4. Inertia: CCK has proven to be very poor at the timely execution of functions that fall outside their core mandate of licensing, regulation and resource management. A perfect example is the implementation of the Universal Service Fund, which CCK insisted on handling as an inhouse function instead of facilitating the setup of a dedicated entity to handle the task. It has been over 6 years since regulation and legislation regarding the USF came into place and there is still nothing to speak of. I will reserve this as a subject for another day (it is a long and detailed one!) Recommendations The Government should immediately consider adopting a Public Private Partnership approach for the implementation of Kenya’s NPKI. This is especially timely because we now have a fully ratified Public Private Partnership Policy that provides a variety of models for project implementation. This will not only ensure involvement from crucial stakeholders but also free the Root Authority from the problems highlighted above (and probably many others) while at the same time ensuring that enough private sector energy and enthusiasm is infused into the project so that it moves with speed and determination. Success stories such as KENIC and TEAMS show that it is not only possible but that it can be done with ease. _______________________________________________ kictanet mailing list kictanet@lists.kictanet.or.ke https://lists.kictanet.or.ke/mailman/listinfo/kictanet Unsubscribe or change your options at https://lists.kictanet.or.ke/mailman/options/kictanet/jwalu%40yahoo.com The Kenya ICT Action Network (KICTANet) is a multi-stakeholder platform for people and institutions interested and involved in ICT policy and regulation. The network aims to act as a catalyst for reform in the ICT sector in support of the national aim of ICT enabled growth and development. KICTANetiquette : Adhere to the same standards of acceptable behaviors online that you follow in real life: respect people's times and bandwidth, share knowledge, don't flame or abuse or personalize, respect privacy, do not spam, do not market your wares or qualifications.
Brian, you are right on your observations. But one thing that I disagree with you is the bit regarding human resource capacity. This is what you have said: * "Human Resource Issues:* Several times in their presentations the Koreans complained that they had observed a critical lack of human resources. They emphasized that they were not referring to *skilled* human resources but simply to *enough people* for the project requirements. Shock of shocks! With the incredible numbers of well educated Kenyans who are unemployed or underemployed?" Unfortunately they are right and I agree with them. One of the biggest problems we have in Kenya is the lack of adequate advance skills in IT. This should be pretty obvious even in this case as we have to now depend on Koreans to implement PKI for us, as sensitive as this project is. Implementing PKI is not a walk in the park, and am sure the number of professionals who can do this in Kenya may be in the handfulls, not in the thousands. I stand to be corrected. what we have in Kenya is thousands of youth who have basic IT skills, and a small group who have managed to get the advanced skills that matter. The talent is there, but it needs to be developed and equipped with the very advanced skills that make a difference. Please also connect this with our BPO initiatives. What the Koreans are doing here is making money by outsourcing their knowledge to us. So how did they get there? 5 years ago Korea used to make nearly twice our current annual budget just from Software services. I wonder how much they make now. Their Government implemented a strategy that offers advanced software development skills to its youth, ensuring that they have the capacity to compete on the global scale. My take is that we are collectively underskilled when it comes to advanced IT skills. Evans On Wed, Mar 20, 2013 at 6:06 PM, Brian Munyao Longwe <blongwe@gmail.com>wrote:
Disclaimer: All the opinions expressed herein are my own.
#140friday <http://140friday.com> » Business<http://140friday.com/?cat=3>» Politics <http://140friday.com/?cat=6> » Technology<http://140friday.com/?cat=8>» Kenya’s PKI Destined for Failure? March 20, 2013 Kenya’s PKI Destined for Failure?
Today I had the opportunity to attend a seminar organized by the Ministry of Information & Communications and Samsung SDS as part of the implementation of Kenya’s National Public Key Infrastructure (NPKI). The project is undertaken within the framework of the Kenya Transparency & Communications Infrastructure Project (KTCIP), a World Bank funded initiative that will help Kenya achieve a number of the goals under the ICT pillar of Vision 2030.
The presentations from the team from Korea consisted of representatives of Samsung SDS (who won the International tender for Kenya’s NPKI implementation) as well as representatives from some of the key actors in Korea’s own NPKI. The Korean presentations were interesting, informative and very well prepared. Over the period of a few hours they were able to take the relatively complex subject of National Public Kenya Infrastructure and unpack it in a way that was both easy to understand as well as clear and straightforward. They left no shadow of doubt as to whether Samsung SDS can successfully implement this project. They also shared the organizational structure for the project, which is as follows:
[image: CAM00454]<http://140friday.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/CAM00454.jpg>
During the course of their presentations the team from Korea shared the high level plan for the implementation of Kenya’s SDS. They made it clear that they had spent a good deal of time working closely with Government officials responsible from the Kenyan side.
In describing the structure and hierarchy that has proven successful in Korea for the implementation and operation of their NPKI, the team shared the following diagram.
[image: CAM00455]<http://140friday.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/CAM00455.jpg>
At the very top, there is the Ministry responsible for the NPKI, they provide the legal and regulatory framework, national authentication plan and other high level functions. Below them is the “Root Certification Authority” an organization known as the Korea Internet Security Agency (KISA), which provides operation of the National Authentication system, licensing/accreditation of certificate authorities (CA) to provide service to the public as well as development of technical standards. Below them are the accredited CAs of which Korea has 5 who provide certificate issuance and management services to the public.
In a presentation which came later, the Korean team shared the proposed structure for the Kenyan implementation which had been arrived at after consultations with Government. The diagram is as follows.
[image: CAM00457]<http://140friday.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/CAM00457.jpg>
In this structure, Government who will be responsible for legal and regulatory framework, national authentication plan, other high level functions as well as licensing and auditing are to be represented by the Communications Commission of Kenya (CCK). Below them and responsible for operation of the Root Certification Authority is CCK. Below that are a proposed “Government CA” which will issue certificates for Government agencies and employees and a proposed “Private Sector CA” which will issue certificates to the rest of the country.
I have a big problem with this structure. First and foremost because CCK is being proposed as BOTH the licensing authority as well as the licensed operator of the Root Certification Authority. The potential for conflict of interest is immediately evident, not to mention the fact that the end-to-end integrity of a structure that ensures top-down accountability is rendered completely void. Even worse was the mumbled suggestions by some of the government participants at the seminar that CCK might also act as the Government CA. In addition that is the fact that a project as crucial as this has not gone through a proper stakeholder consultative process and is seemingly being shoved down our throats. In his closing remarks a director a the E-Government directorate asked the ICT Board to engage stakeholders further and receive input before moving too far.
I raised this point as a question during the Q & A session at the end of the seminar and would like to emphasise that it would be *very wrong* for CCK to be the Root Certification Authority for a number of reasons:
1. *Conflict of Interest:* As per the proposed structure the representative of Government, CCK needs to serve as the top level entity that handles the legal and regulatory framework and the national authentication plan. Adding a subsidiary role would not only compromise their integrity but would also expose them to all manner of challenges with regards to operation of an infrastructure that is supposed to be based on trust. 2. *Procurement Issues:* In sharing to a certain level of detail the complexity of the Root Authority setup, it became evident that there would be a continuous need for procurement of various goods and services. As a government agency, CCK is subject to public procurement regulations, this means that even very basic, small and simple items could take months if not years to procure. The problems with our public procurement are well known. Subjecting the Root Authority to this kind of environment is in itself a major risk for successful implementation and operation. 3. *Human Resource Issues:* Several times in their presentations the Koreans complained that they had observed a critical lack of human resources. They emphasized that they were not referring to *skilled*human resources but simply to *enough people* for the project requirements. Shock of shocks! With the incredible numbers of well educated Kenyans who are unemployed or underemployed? They could obviously have only been referring to what they had seen as far as the people available for the project from the Ministry and CCK. It is no secret that CCK has extremely limited human resources in their ICT division and those few are oveworked, stretched beyond measure and juggling multipe roles. Isn’t adding additional responsibilities into this mix a formula for disaster? 4. *Inertia*: CCK has proven to be very poor at the timely execution of functions that fall outside their core mandate of licensing, regulation and resource management. A perfect example is the implementation of the Universal Service Fund, which CCK insisted on handling as an inhouse function instead of facilitating the setup of a dedicated entity to handle the task. It has been over 6 years since regulation and legislation regarding the USF came into place and there is still nothing to speak of. I will reserve this as a subject for another day (it is a long and detailed one!)
*Recommendations*
The Government should immediately consider adopting a *Public Private Partnership* approach for the implementation of Kenya’s NPKI. This is especially timely because we now have a fully ratified Public Private Partnership Policy that provides a variety of models for project implementation. This will not only ensure involvement from crucial stakeholders but also free the Root Authority from the problems highlighted above (and probably many others) while at the same time ensuring that enough private sector energy and enthusiasm is infused into the project so that it moves with speed and determination. Success stories such as KENIC and TEAMS show that it is not only possible but that it can be done with ease.
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The Kenya ICT Action Network (KICTANet) is a multi-stakeholder platform for people and institutions interested and involved in ICT policy and regulation. The network aims to act as a catalyst for reform in the ICT sector in support of the national aim of ICT enabled growth and development.
KICTANetiquette : Adhere to the same standards of acceptable behaviors online that you follow in real life: respect people's times and bandwidth, share knowledge, don't flame or abuse or personalize, respect privacy, do not spam, do not market your wares or qualifications.
-- *---------------------------------------------------- Kind Regards, Evans Ikua,* lanetconsulting.com, lpi-eastafrica.org, ict-innovation.fossfa.net, Skype: @ikuae Cell: +254-722-955831
Listers Let me attempt to paraphrase the questions raised in the email discussion. 1. Is CCK the best place to locate the root Certification Authority for Public Key infrastructure for Kenya? 2. Should all projects be subjected to a multi-stakeholder process in their implementation? I dont want to propose answers prematurely because the spirit of the discussion seems to that we keep an open an lively discussion that educates our stakeholders. When it comes to very technical projects, those of us that understand them better will invariably drive the discussion. Perhaps a starting point would be to ask. Do all the stakeholders feel they fully understand what we are trying to achieve? I have asked my team at the office to re-circulate the press release we issued yesterday. we need to carry everyone along. Indeed that' is the very essence of the workshop we had yesterday. One thing I did mention during the launch of the National Cybersecurity Masterplan a few weeks ago was that it is now time for stakeholders to re-formalise their approach to providing input. ICT is a broad subject and covers many varied sub-fields. It might help for a formal body of the private and development sector to be consulted formally on certain aspects of projects. This way this formal body can also be held accountable to members with respect to the inputs they provide. The current approach works well when there is expertise on a certain subject. But the weakness is there is a risk. opinion takes the place of active engaged discovery. when the opinions are well informed we are better for it. But sometimes we also need to feel that as public officials we can call upon a structured group on an issue. Brian Longwe's email comments are noted. He proposes proposes a separate body to manage the Root CA. More views are welcome. Indeed that was the very reason the meeting was convened. Asante Sana Paul Kukubo CEO, Kenya ICT Board Paul Kukubo Chief Executive Officer, Kenya ICT Board PO Box 27150 - 00100 Nairobi, Kenya 12th Floor, Teleposta Towers Koinange Street Tel +254 20 2089061, +254 20 2211960 Fax: +254 20 2211962 website: www.ict.go.ke local content project: www.tandaa.co.ke, www.facebook.com/tandaakenya twitter:@tandaaKENYA BPO Project: www. doitinkenya.co.ke Digital Villages Project: www.pasha.co.ke personal contacts _______________ Cell: + 254 717 180001 skype: kukubopaul googletalk: pkukubo personal blog: www.paulkukubo.co.ke personal twitter: @pkukubo ____________________ Vision: Kenya becomes a top ten global ICT hub Mission: To champion and actively enable Kenya to adopt and exploit ICT, through promotion of partnerships, investments and infrastructure growth for socio economic enrichment On Wed, Mar 20, 2013 at 6:06 PM, Brian Munyao Longwe <blongwe@gmail.com>wrote:
Disclaimer: All the opinions expressed herein are my own.
#140friday <http://140friday.com> » Business<http://140friday.com/?cat=3>» Politics <http://140friday.com/?cat=6> » Technology<http://140friday.com/?cat=8>» Kenya’s PKI Destined for Failure? March 20, 2013 Kenya’s PKI Destined for Failure?
Today I had the opportunity to attend a seminar organized by the Ministry of Information & Communications and Samsung SDS as part of the implementation of Kenya’s National Public Key Infrastructure (NPKI). The project is undertaken within the framework of the Kenya Transparency & Communications Infrastructure Project (KTCIP), a World Bank funded initiative that will help Kenya achieve a number of the goals under the ICT pillar of Vision 2030.
The presentations from the team from Korea consisted of representatives of Samsung SDS (who won the International tender for Kenya’s NPKI implementation) as well as representatives from some of the key actors in Korea’s own NPKI. The Korean presentations were interesting, informative and very well prepared. Over the period of a few hours they were able to take the relatively complex subject of National Public Kenya Infrastructure and unpack it in a way that was both easy to understand as well as clear and straightforward. They left no shadow of doubt as to whether Samsung SDS can successfully implement this project. They also shared the organizational structure for the project, which is as follows:
[image: CAM00454]<http://140friday.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/CAM00454.jpg>
During the course of their presentations the team from Korea shared the high level plan for the implementation of Kenya’s SDS. They made it clear that they had spent a good deal of time working closely with Government officials responsible from the Kenyan side.
In describing the structure and hierarchy that has proven successful in Korea for the implementation and operation of their NPKI, the team shared the following diagram.
[image: CAM00455]<http://140friday.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/CAM00455.jpg>
At the very top, there is the Ministry responsible for the NPKI, they provide the legal and regulatory framework, national authentication plan and other high level functions. Below them is the “Root Certification Authority” an organization known as the Korea Internet Security Agency (KISA), which provides operation of the National Authentication system, licensing/accreditation of certificate authorities (CA) to provide service to the public as well as development of technical standards. Below them are the accredited CAs of which Korea has 5 who provide certificate issuance and management services to the public.
In a presentation which came later, the Korean team shared the proposed structure for the Kenyan implementation which had been arrived at after consultations with Government. The diagram is as follows.
[image: CAM00457]<http://140friday.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/CAM00457.jpg>
In this structure, Government who will be responsible for legal and regulatory framework, national authentication plan, other high level functions as well as licensing and auditing are to be represented by the Communications Commission of Kenya (CCK). Below them and responsible for operation of the Root Certification Authority is CCK. Below that are a proposed “Government CA” which will issue certificates for Government agencies and employees and a proposed “Private Sector CA” which will issue certificates to the rest of the country.
I have a big problem with this structure. First and foremost because CCK is being proposed as BOTH the licensing authority as well as the licensed operator of the Root Certification Authority. The potential for conflict of interest is immediately evident, not to mention the fact that the end-to-end integrity of a structure that ensures top-down accountability is rendered completely void. Even worse was the mumbled suggestions by some of the government participants at the seminar that CCK might also act as the Government CA. In addition that is the fact that a project as crucial as this has not gone through a proper stakeholder consultative process and is seemingly being shoved down our throats. In his closing remarks a director a the E-Government directorate asked the ICT Board to engage stakeholders further and receive input before moving too far.
I raised this point as a question during the Q & A session at the end of the seminar and would like to emphasise that it would be *very wrong* for CCK to be the Root Certification Authority for a number of reasons:
1. *Conflict of Interest:* As per the proposed structure the representative of Government, CCK needs to serve as the top level entity that handles the legal and regulatory framework and the national authentication plan. Adding a subsidiary role would not only compromise their integrity but would also expose them to all manner of challenges with regards to operation of an infrastructure that is supposed to be based on trust. 2. *Procurement Issues:* In sharing to a certain level of detail the complexity of the Root Authority setup, it became evident that there would be a continuous need for procurement of various goods and services. As a government agency, CCK is subject to public procurement regulations, this means that even very basic, small and simple items could take months if not years to procure. The problems with our public procurement are well known. Subjecting the Root Authority to this kind of environment is in itself a major risk for successful implementation and operation. 3. *Human Resource Issues:* Several times in their presentations the Koreans complained that they had observed a critical lack of human resources. They emphasized that they were not referring to *skilled*human resources but simply to *enough people* for the project requirements. Shock of shocks! With the incredible numbers of well educated Kenyans who are unemployed or underemployed? They could obviously have only been referring to what they had seen as far as the people available for the project from the Ministry and CCK. It is no secret that CCK has extremely limited human resources in their ICT division and those few are oveworked, stretched beyond measure and juggling multipe roles. Isn’t adding additional responsibilities into this mix a formula for disaster? 4. *Inertia*: CCK has proven to be very poor at the timely execution of functions that fall outside their core mandate of licensing, regulation and resource management. A perfect example is the implementation of the Universal Service Fund, which CCK insisted on handling as an inhouse function instead of facilitating the setup of a dedicated entity to handle the task. It has been over 6 years since regulation and legislation regarding the USF came into place and there is still nothing to speak of. I will reserve this as a subject for another day (it is a long and detailed one!)
*Recommendations*
The Government should immediately consider adopting a *Public Private Partnership* approach for the implementation of Kenya’s NPKI. This is especially timely because we now have a fully ratified Public Private Partnership Policy that provides a variety of models for project implementation. This will not only ensure involvement from crucial stakeholders but also free the Root Authority from the problems highlighted above (and probably many others) while at the same time ensuring that enough private sector energy and enthusiasm is infused into the project so that it moves with speed and determination. Success stories such as KENIC and TEAMS show that it is not only possible but that it can be done with ease.
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Unsubscribe or change your options at https://lists.kictanet.or.ke/mailman/options/kictanet/pkukubo%40ict.go.ke
The Kenya ICT Action Network (KICTANet) is a multi-stakeholder platform for people and institutions interested and involved in ICT policy and regulation. The network aims to act as a catalyst for reform in the ICT sector in support of the national aim of ICT enabled growth and development.
KICTANetiquette : Adhere to the same standards of acceptable behaviors online that you follow in real life: respect people's times and bandwidth, share knowledge, don't flame or abuse or personalize, respect privacy, do not spam, do not market your wares or qualifications.
Listers, Thank you all for the very healthy discussions regarding this important subject. I was privileged to attend a Technical workshop at ICT Board on the PKI Master Plan and it was informative to be taken through the technical process of the Master Plan and the implications its setup. Indeed Brian's concerns are valid and at this time it will be good to interrogate various options in order to arrive at a suitable arrangement that will work for Kenya. Some of the key considerations in the setup of a Root CA would include the following: - the PKI infrastructure is related to a country's security and as such would be a sensitive infrastructure that ideally should be operated and owned by Kenyans through whatever appropriate vehicle. This would be a national security candidate much as guarding our borders. - The business dynamics of PKI is closely linked to growth in use of ICT and especially as the government comes on board with e-gov services and the commerce becomes mainstream. As such we would not see a dramatic uptake of Certificates by organizations and individuals until we reach a critical mass in computing devices both conventional and smart phones. We may need to combine both marketing and some level of legislation in key areas such as banking to encourage users to come on board. - KPI has very high Setup and operational costs (more than $8m initially). The viability of such a project would be a major consideration and as such a suitable vehicle with sufficient financing would need to be setup bearing in mind that it may not initially make much money and would rely heavily on funding from its shareholders. -Security is an evolving issue and there will be a need for research and development of cryptography to meet the changing needs of the country. A linkage with Academia will be important, and the setup of research centers on security would wean us off reliance on foreign expertise going forward. My two cents. Kind regards Sammy From: Paul Kukubo <pkukubo@ict.go.ke> Date: Thursday, March 21, 2013 4:06 PM To: <buruchara@mac.com> Cc: KICTAnet ICT Policy Discussions <kictanet@lists.kictanet.or.ke> Subject: Re: [kictanet] Kenya¹s PKI Destined for Failure? Listers Let me attempt to paraphrase the questions raised in the email discussion. 1. Is CCK the best place to locate the root Certification Authority for Public Key infrastructure for Kenya? 2. Should all projects be subjected to a multi-stakeholder process in their implementation? I dont want to propose answers prematurely because the spirit of the discussion seems to that we keep an open an lively discussion that educates our stakeholders. When it comes to very technical projects, those of us that understand them better will invariably drive the discussion. Perhaps a starting point would be to ask. Do all the stakeholders feel they fully understand what we are trying to achieve? I have asked my team at the office to re-circulate the press release we issued yesterday. we need to carry everyone along. Indeed that' is the very essence of the workshop we had yesterday. One thing I did mention during the launch of the National Cybersecurity Masterplan a few weeks ago was that it is now time for stakeholders to re-formalise their approach to providing input. ICT is a broad subject and covers many varied sub-fields. It might help for a formal body of the private and development sector to be consulted formally on certain aspects of projects. This way this formal body can also be held accountable to members with respect to the inputs they provide. The current approach works well when there is expertise on a certain subject. But the weakness is there is a risk. opinion takes the place of active engaged discovery. when the opinions are well informed we are better for it. But sometimes we also need to feel that as public officials we can call upon a structured group on an issue. Brian Longwe's email comments are noted. He proposes proposes a separate body to manage the Root CA. More views are welcome. Indeed that was the very reason the meeting was convened. Asante Sana Paul Kukubo CEO, Kenya ICT Board Paul Kukubo Chief Executive Officer, Kenya ICT Board PO Box 27150 - 00100 Nairobi, Kenya 12th Floor, Teleposta Towers Koinange Street Tel +254 20 2089061, +254 20 2211960 Fax: +254 20 2211962 website: www.ict.go.ke <http://www.ict.go.ke> local content project: www.tandaa.co.ke <http://www.tandaa.co.ke> , www.facebook.com/tandaakenya <http://www.facebook.com/tandaakenya> twitter:@tandaaKENYA BPO Project: www. doitinkenya.co.ke <http://doitinkenya.co.ke> Digital Villages Project: www.pasha.co.ke <http://www.pasha.co.ke> personal contacts _______________ Cell: + 254 717 180001 skype: kukubopaul googletalk: pkukubo personal blog: www.paulkukubo.co.ke <http://www.paulkukubo.co.ke> personal twitter: @pkukubo ____________________ Vision: Kenya becomes a top ten global ICT hub Mission: To champion and actively enable Kenya to adopt and exploit ICT, through promotion of partnerships, investments and infrastructure growth for socio economic enrichment On Wed, Mar 20, 2013 at 6:06 PM, Brian Munyao Longwe <blongwe@gmail.com> wrote:
Disclaimer: All the opinions expressed herein are my own.
#140friday <http://140friday.com> » Business <http://140friday.com/?cat=3> » Politics <http://140friday.com/?cat=6> » Technology <http://140friday.com/?cat=8> » Kenya¹s PKI Destined for Failure? March 20, 2013 Kenya¹s PKI Destined for Failure?
Today I had the opportunity to attend a seminar organized by the Ministry of Information & Communications and Samsung SDS as part of the implementation of Kenya¹s National Public Key Infrastructure (NPKI). The project is undertaken within the framework of the Kenya Transparency & Communications Infrastructure Project (KTCIP), a World Bank funded initiative that will help Kenya achieve a number of the goals under the ICT pillar of Vision 2030.
The presentations from the team from Korea consisted of representatives of Samsung SDS (who won the International tender for Kenya¹s NPKI implementation) as well as representatives from some of the key actors in Korea¹s own NPKI. The Korean presentations were interesting, informative and very well prepared. Over the period of a few hours they were able to take the relatively complex subject of National Public Kenya Infrastructure and unpack it in a way that was both easy to understand as well as clear and straightforward. They left no shadow of doubt as to whether Samsung SDS can successfully implement this project. They also shared the organizational structure for the project, which is as follows:
<http://140friday.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/CAM00454.jpg>
During the course of their presentations the team from Korea shared the high level plan for the implementation of Kenya¹s SDS. They made it clear that they had spent a good deal of time working closely with Government officials responsible from the Kenyan side.
In describing the structure and hierarchy that has proven successful in Korea for the implementation and operation of their NPKI, the team shared the following diagram.
<http://140friday.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/CAM00455.jpg>
At the very top, there is the Ministry responsible for the NPKI, they provide the legal and regulatory framework, national authentication plan and other high level functions. Below them is the ³Root Certification Authority² an organization known as the Korea Internet Security Agency (KISA), which provides operation of the National Authentication system, licensing/accreditation of certificate authorities (CA) to provide service to the public as well as development of technical standards. Below them are the accredited CAs of which Korea has 5 who provide certificate issuance and management services to the public.
In a presentation which came later, the Korean team shared the proposed structure for the Kenyan implementation which had been arrived at after consultations with Government. The diagram is as follows.
<http://140friday.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/CAM00457.jpg>
In this structure, Government who will be responsible for legal and regulatory framework, national authentication plan, other high level functions as well as licensing and auditing are to be represented by the Communications Commission of Kenya (CCK). Below them and responsible for operation of the Root Certification Authority is CCK. Below that are a proposed ³Government CA² which will issue certificates for Government agencies and employees and a proposed ³Private Sector CA² which will issue certificates to the rest of the country.
I have a big problem with this structure. First and foremost because CCK is being proposed as BOTH the licensing authority as well as the licensed operator of the Root Certification Authority. The potential for conflict of interest is immediately evident, not to mention the fact that the end-to-end integrity of a structure that ensures top-down accountability is rendered completely void. Even worse was the mumbled suggestions by some of the government participants at the seminar that CCK might also act as the Government CA. In addition that is the fact that a project as crucial as this has not gone through a proper stakeholder consultative process and is seemingly being shoved down our throats. In his closing remarks a director a the E-Government directorate asked the ICT Board to engage stakeholders further and receive input before moving too far.
I raised this point as a question during the Q & A session at the end of the seminar and would like to emphasise that it would be very wrong for CCK to be the Root Certification Authority for a number of reasons: 1. Conflict of Interest: As per the proposed structure the representative of Government, CCK needs to serve as the top level entity that handles the legal and regulatory framework and the national authentication plan. Adding a subsidiary role would not only compromise their integrity but would also expose them to all manner of challenges with regards to operation of an infrastructure that is supposed to be based on trust. 2. Procurement Issues: In sharing to a certain level of detail the complexity of the Root Authority setup, it became evident that there would be a continuous need for procurement of various goods and services. As a government agency, CCK is subject to public procurement regulations, this means that even very basic, small and simple items could take months if not years to procure. The problems with our public procurement are well known. Subjecting the Root Authority to this kind of environment is in itself a major risk for successful implementation and operation. 3. Human Resource Issues: Several times in their presentations the Koreans complained that they had observed a critical lack of human resources. They emphasized that they were not referring to skilled human resources but simply to enough people for the project requirements. Shock of shocks! With the incredible numbers of well educated Kenyans who are unemployed or underemployed? They could obviously have only been referring to what they had seen as far as the people available for the project from the Ministry and CCK. It is no secret that CCK has extremely limited human resources in their ICT division and those few are oveworked, stretched beyond measure and juggling multipe roles. Isn¹t adding additional responsibilities into this mix a formula for disaster? 4. Inertia: CCK has proven to be very poor at the timely execution of functions that fall outside their core mandate of licensing, regulation and resource management. A perfect example is the implementation of the Universal Service Fund, which CCK insisted on handling as an inhouse function instead of facilitating the setup of a dedicated entity to handle the task. It has been over 6 years since regulation and legislation regarding the USF came into place and there is still nothing to speak of. I will reserve this as a subject for another day (it is a long and detailed one!) Recommendations
The Government should immediately consider adopting a Public Private Partnership approach for the implementation of Kenya¹s NPKI. This is especially timely because we now have a fully ratified Public Private Partnership Policy that provides a variety of models for project implementation. This will not only ensure involvement from crucial stakeholders but also free the Root Authority from the problems highlighted above (and probably many others) while at the same time ensuring that enough private sector energy and enthusiasm is infused into the project so that it moves with speed and determination. Success stories such as KENIC and TEAMS show that it is not only possible but that it can be done with ease.
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The Kenya ICT Action Network (KICTANet) is a multi-stakeholder platform for people and institutions interested and involved in ICT policy and regulation. The network aims to act as a catalyst for reform in the ICT sector in support of the national aim of ICT enabled growth and development.
KICTANetiquette : Adhere to the same standards of acceptable behaviors online that you follow in real life: respect people's times and bandwidth, share knowledge, don't flame or abuse or personalize, respect privacy, do not spam, do not market your wares or qualifications.
_______________________________________________ kictanet mailing list kictanet@lists.kictanet.or.ke https://lists.kictanet.or.ke/mailman/listinfo/kictanet Unsubscribe or change your options at https://lists.kictanet.or.ke/mailman/options/kictanet/buruchara%40mac.com The Kenya ICT Action Network (KICTANet) is a multi-stakeholder platform for people and institutions interested and involved in ICT policy and regulation. The network aims to act as a catalyst for reform in the ICT sector in support of the national aim of ICT enabled growth and development. KICTANetiquette : Adhere to the same standards of acceptable behaviors online that you follow in real life: respect people's times and bandwidth, share knowledge, don't flame or abuse or personalize, respect privacy, do not spam, do not market your wares or qualifications.
Sammy,Listers The NATIONAL PKI in my view(technology aside) is simply a trusted ID system in the on-line environment which will be particularly useful when offering on-line services especially e-government.. Kenyans and their institutions trust the NATIONAL ID so much that ,even banks despite having issued their own IDs still insist on National ID before offering service at their counters.Kenyans have trusted the Government with that system which in fact has very advanced technology.So why would you doubt them in the e-environment ,especially considering Sammy's comments Let the debate continue John ________________________________ From: Sammy Buruchara <buruchara@me.com> To: ngethe.kariuki2007@yahoo.co.uk Cc: KICTAnet ICT Policy Discussions <kictanet@lists.kictanet.or.ke> Sent: Thursday, 21 March 2013, 16:48 Subject: Re: [kictanet] Kenya¹s PKI Destined for Failure? Listers, Thank you all for the very healthy discussions regarding this important subject. I was privileged to attend a Technical workshop at ICT Board on the PKI Master Plan and it was informative to be taken through the technical process of the Master Plan and the implications its setup. Indeed Brian's concerns are valid and at this time it will be good to interrogate various options in order to arrive at a suitable arrangement that will work for Kenya. Some of the key considerations in the setup of a Root CA would include the following: - the PKI infrastructure is related to a country's security and as such would be a sensitive infrastructure that ideally should be operated and owned by Kenyans through whatever appropriate vehicle. This would be a national security candidate much as guarding our borders. - The business dynamics of PKI is closely linked to growth in use of ICT and especially as the government comes on board with e-gov services and the commerce becomes mainstream. As such we would not see a dramatic uptake of Certificates by organizations and individuals until we reach a critical mass in computing devices both conventional and smart phones. We may need to combine both marketing and some level of legislation in key areas such as banking to encourage users to come on board. - KPI has very high Setup and operational costs (more than $8m initially). The viability of such a project would be a major consideration and as such a suitable vehicle with sufficient financing would need to be setup bearing in mind that it may not initially make much money and would rely heavily on funding from its shareholders. -Security is an evolving issue and there will be a need for research and development of cryptography to meet the changing needs of the country. A linkage with Academia will be important, and the setup of research centers on security would wean us off reliance on foreign expertise going forward. My two cents. Kind regards Sammy From: Paul Kukubo <pkukubo@ict.go.ke> Date: Thursday, March 21, 2013 4:06 PM To: <buruchara@mac.com> Cc: KICTAnet ICT Policy Discussions <kictanet@lists.kictanet.or.ke> Subject: Re: [kictanet] Kenya’s PKI Destined for Failure? Listers Let me attempt to paraphrase the questions raised in the email discussion. 1. Is CCK the best place to locate the root Certification Authority for Public Key infrastructure for Kenya? 2. Should all projects be subjected to a multi-stakeholder process in their implementation? I dont want to propose answers prematurely because the spirit of the discussion seems to that we keep an open an lively discussion that educates our stakeholders. When it comes to very technical projects, those of us that understand them better will invariably drive the discussion. Perhaps a starting point would be to ask. Do all the stakeholders feel they fully understand what we are trying to achieve? I have asked my team at the office to re-circulate the press release we issued yesterday. we need to carry everyone along. Indeed that' is the very essence of the workshop we had yesterday. One thing I did mention during the launch of the National Cybersecurity Masterplan a few weeks ago was that it is now time for stakeholders to re-formalise their approach to providing input. ICT is a broad subject and covers many varied sub-fields. It might help for a formal body of the private and development sector to be consulted formally on certain aspects of projects. This way this formal body can also be held accountable to members with respect to the inputs they provide. The current approach works well when there is expertise on a certain subject. But the weakness is there is a risk. opinion takes the place of active engaged discovery. when the opinions are well informed we are better for it. But sometimes we also need to feel that as public officials we can call upon a structured group on an issue. Brian Longwe's email comments are noted. He proposes proposes a separate body to manage the Root CA. More views are welcome. Indeed that was the very reason the meeting was convened. Asante Sana Paul Kukubo CEO, Kenya ICT Board Paul Kukubo Chief Executive Officer, Kenya ICT Board PO Box 27150 - 00100 Nairobi, Kenya 12th Floor, Teleposta Towers Koinange Street Tel +254 20 2089061, +254 20 2211960 Fax: +254 20 2211962 website: www.ict.go.ke local content project: www.tandaa.co.ke, www.facebook.com/tandaakenya twitter:@tandaaKENYA BPO Project: www. doitinkenya.co.ke Digital Villages Project: www.pasha.co.ke personal contacts _______________ Cell: + 254 717 180001 skype: kukubopaul googletalk: pkukubo personal blog: www.paulkukubo.co.ke personal twitter: @pkukubo ____________________ Vision: Kenya becomes a top ten global ICT hub Mission: To champion and actively enable Kenya to adopt and exploit ICT, through promotion of partnerships, investments and infrastructure growth for socio economic enrichment On Wed, Mar 20, 2013 at 6:06 PM, Brian Munyao Longwe <blongwe@gmail.com> wrote: Disclaimer: All the opinions expressed herein are my own.
#140friday » Business » Politics » Technology » Kenya’s PKI Destined for Failure?March 20, 2013 Kenya’s PKI Destined for Failure?
Today I had the opportunity to
The presentations from the team from Korea consisted of representatives of Samsung SDS (who won the International tender for Kenya’s NPKI implementation) as well as representatives from some of the key actors in Korea’s own NPKI. The Korean presentations were interesting, informative and very well prepared. Over the period of a few hours they were able to take the relatively complex subject of National Public Kenya Infrastructure and unpack it in a way that was both easy to understand as well as clear and straightforward. They left no shadow of doubt as to whether Samsung SDS can successfully implement
During the course of their presentations the team from Korea shared
In describing the structure and hierarchy that has proven successful in Korea for the implementation and operation of their NPKI, the team shared the following diagram. At the very top, there is the Ministry responsible for the NPKI, they provide the legal and regulatory framework, national authentication
In a presentation which came later, the Korean team shared the
In this structure, Government who will be responsible for legal and regulatory framework, national authentication plan, other high level functions as well as licensing and auditing are to be represented by the Communications Commission of Kenya (CCK). Below them and responsible for operation of the Root Certification Authority is CCK. Below that are a proposed “Government CA” which will issue certificates for Government agencies and employees and a proposed “Private Sector CA” which will issue certificates to the rest of the country. I have a big problem with this structure. First and foremost because CCK is being proposed as BOTH the licensing authority as well as the
attend a seminar organized by the Ministry of Information & Communications and Samsung SDS as part of the implementation of Kenya’s National Public Key Infrastructure (NPKI). The project is undertaken within the framework of the Kenya Transparency & Communications Infrastructure Project (KTCIP), a World Bank funded initiative that will help Kenya achieve a number of the goals under the ICT pillar of Vision 2030. this project. They also shared the organizational structure for the project, which is as follows: the high level plan for the implementation of Kenya’s SDS. They made it clear that they had spent a good deal of time working closely with Government officials responsible from the Kenyan side. plan and other high level functions. Below them is the “Root Certification Authority” an organization known as the Korea Internet Security Agency (KISA), which provides operation of the National Authentication system, licensing/accreditation of certificate authorities (CA) to provide service to the public as well as development of technical standards. Below them are the accredited CAs of which Korea has 5 who provide certificate issuance and management services to the public. proposed structure for the Kenyan implementation which had been arrived at after consultations with Government. The diagram is as follows. licensed operator of the Root Certification Authority. The potential for conflict of interest is immediately evident, not to mention the fact that the end-to-end integrity of a structure that ensures top-down accountability is rendered completely void. Even worse was the mumbled suggestions by some of the government participants at the seminar that CCK might also act as the Government CA. In addition that is the fact that a project as crucial as this has not gone through a proper stakeholder consultative process and is seemingly being shoved down our throats. In his closing remarks a director a the E-Government directorate asked the ICT Board to engage stakeholders further and receive input before moving too far.
I raised this point as a question during the Q & A session at the end of the seminar and would like to emphasise that it would be very wrong for CCK to be the Root Certification Authority for a number of reasons: 1. Conflict of Interest: As per the proposed structure the representative of Government, CCK needs to serve as the top level
2. Procurement Issues: In sharing to a certain level of detail the complexity of the Root Authority setup, it became evident
3. Human Resource Issues: Several times in their
4. Inertia: CCK has proven to be very poor at the timely execution of functions that fall outside their core mandate of
Recommendations The Government should immediately consider adopting a Public Private Partnership approach for the implementation of Kenya’s NPKI. This is especially timely because we now have a fully ratified Public Private Partnership Policy that provides a variety of models for project implementation. This will not only ensure involvement from crucial stakeholders but also free the Root Authority from the problems highlighted above (and
entity that handles the legal and regulatory framework and the national authentication plan. Adding a subsidiary role would not only compromise their integrity but would also expose them to all manner of challenges with regards to operation of an infrastructure that is supposed to be based on trust. that there would be a continuous need for procurement of various goods and services. As a government agency, CCK is subject to public procurement regulations, this means that even very basic, small and simple items could take months if not years to procure. The problems with our public procurement are well known. Subjecting the Root Authority to this kind of environment is in itself a major risk for successful implementation and operation. presentations the Koreans complained that they had observed a critical lack of human resources. They emphasized that they were not referring to skilled human resources but simply to enough people for the project requirements. Shock of shocks! With the incredible numbers of well educated Kenyans who are unemployed or underemployed? They could obviously have only been referring to what they had seen as far as the people available for the project from the Ministry and CCK. It is no secret that CCK has extremely limited human resources in their ICT division and those few are oveworked, stretched beyond measure and juggling multipe roles. Isn’t adding additional responsibilities into this mix a formula for disaster? licensing, regulation and resource management. A perfect example is the implementation of the Universal Service Fund, which CCK insisted on handling as an inhouse function instead of facilitating the setup of a dedicated entity to handle the task. It has been over 6 years since regulation and legislation regarding the USF came into place and there is still nothing to speak of. I will reserve this as a subject for another day (it is a long and detailed one!) probably many others) while at the same time ensuring that enough private sector energy and enthusiasm is infused into the project so that it moves with speed and determination. Success stories such as KENIC and TEAMS show that it is not only possible but that it can be done with ease.
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The Kenya ICT Action Network (KICTANet) is a multi-stakeholder platform for people and institutions interested and involved in ICT policy and regulation. The network aims to act as a catalyst for reform in the ICT sector in support of the national aim of ICT enabled growth and development.
KICTANetiquette : Adhere to the same standards of acceptable behaviors online that you follow in real life: respect people's times and bandwidth, share knowledge, don't flame or abuse or personalize, respect privacy, do not spam, do not market your wares or qualifications.
_______________________________________________ kictanet mailing list kictanet@lists.kictanet.or.ke https://lists.kictanet.or.ke/mailman/listinfo/kictanet Unsubscribe or change your options at https://lists.kictanet.or.ke/mailman/options/kictanet/buruchara%40mac.com The Kenya ICT Action Network (KICTANet) is a multi-stakeholder platform for people and institutions interested and involved in ICT policy and regulation. The network aims to act as a catalyst for reform in the ICT sector in support of the national aim of ICT enabled growth and development. KICTANetiquette : Adhere to the same standards of acceptable behaviors online that you follow in real life: respect people's times and bandwidth, share knowledge, don't flame or abuse or personalize, respect privacy, do not spam, do not market your wares or qualifications. _______________________________________________ kictanet mailing list kictanet@lists.kictanet.or.ke https://lists.kictanet.or.ke/mailman/listinfo/kictanet Unsubscribe or change your options at https://lists.kictanet.or.ke/mailman/options/kictanet/ngethe.kariuki2007%40y... The Kenya ICT Action Network (KICTANet) is a multi-stakeholder platform for people and institutions interested and involved in ICT policy and regulation. The network aims to act as a catalyst for reform in the ICT sector in support of the national aim of ICT enabled growth and development. KICTANetiquette : Adhere to the same standards of acceptable behaviors online that you follow in real life: respect people's times and bandwidth, share knowledge, don't flame or abuse or personalize, respect privacy, do not spam, do not market your wares or qualifications.
Here's a concern raised on an article on PKI on CIO East Africa. Wondering about the bit on keys being expensive, and how much that is likely to be an issue here. KPI is a very expensive security infrastructure to implement and operate. Most of the early adopters of PKI have abandoned the technology and have are using other more open, efficient and easier to operate technologies to secure online transactions. One of the biggest complaint and the source of failure in most countries has been the lack of uptake by private sector who fine it expensive to procure and maintain KPI certificates/keys. Kenya may want to explore this more and see if there are alternatives that could work better.
sorry, forgot to post the link to the story. Here is the link - it also gives a few possible applications of PKI http://www.cio.co.ke/news/main-stories/kenya's-pki-likely-to-catalyse-e-business-growth On 23 March 2013 21:58, Dennis Kioko <dmbuvi@gmail.com> wrote:
Here's a concern raised on an article on PKI on CIO East Africa. Wondering about the bit on keys being expensive, and how much that is likely to be an issue here.
KPI is a very expensive security infrastructure to implement and operate. Most of the early adopters of PKI have abandoned the technology and have are using other more open, efficient and easier to operate technologies to secure online transactions. One of the biggest complaint and the source of failure in most countries has been the lack of uptake by private sector who fine it expensive to procure and maintain KPI certificates/keys. Kenya may want to explore this more and see if there are alternatives that could work better.
-- with Regards: blog.denniskioko.com <http://www.denniskioko.com/>
participants (7)
-
Brian Munyao Longwe -
Dennis Kioko -
Evans Ikua -
John Kariuki -
Paul Kukubo -
Sammy Buruchara -
Walubengo J