Disclaimer: All the opinions expressed herein are my own.
Kenya’s PKI Destined for Failure?
Today I had the opportunity to
attend a seminar organized by the Ministry of Information &
Communications and Samsung SDS as part of the implementation of Kenya’s
National Public Key Infrastructure (NPKI). The project is undertaken
within the framework of the Kenya Transparency & Communications
Infrastructure Project (KTCIP), a World Bank funded initiative that will
help Kenya achieve a number of the goals under the ICT pillar of Vision
2030.
The presentations from the team from Korea consisted of
representatives of Samsung SDS (who won the International tender for
Kenya’s NPKI implementation) as well as representatives from some of the
key actors in Korea’s own NPKI. The Korean presentations were
interesting, informative and very well prepared. Over the period of a
few hours they were able to take the relatively complex subject of
National Public Kenya Infrastructure and unpack it in a way that was
both easy to understand as well as clear and straightforward. They left
no shadow of doubt as to whether Samsung SDS can successfully implement
this project. They also shared the organizational structure for the
project, which is as follows:
During the course of their presentations the team from Korea shared
the high level plan for the implementation of Kenya’s SDS. They made it
clear that they had spent a good deal of time working closely with
Government officials responsible from the Kenyan side.
In describing the structure and hierarchy that has proven successful
in Korea for the implementation and operation of their NPKI, the team
shared the following diagram.
At the very top, there is the Ministry responsible for the NPKI, they
provide the legal and regulatory framework, national authentication
plan and other high level functions. Below them is the “Root
Certification Authority” an organization known as the Korea Internet
Security Agency (KISA), which provides operation of the National
Authentication system, licensing/accreditation of certificate
authorities (CA) to provide service to the public as well as development
of technical standards. Below them are the accredited CAs of which
Korea has 5 who provide certificate issuance and management services to
the public.
In a presentation which came later, the Korean team shared the
proposed structure for the Kenyan implementation which had been arrived
at after consultations with Government. The diagram is as follows.
In this structure, Government who will be responsible for legal and
regulatory framework, national authentication plan, other high level
functions as well as licensing and auditing are to be represented by the
Communications Commission of Kenya (CCK). Below them and responsible
for operation of the Root Certification Authority is CCK. Below that are
a proposed “Government CA” which will issue certificates for Government
agencies and employees and a proposed “Private Sector CA” which will
issue certificates to the rest of the country.
I have a big problem with this structure. First and foremost because
CCK is being proposed as BOTH the licensing authority as well as the
licensed operator of the Root Certification Authority. The potential for
conflict of interest is immediately evident, not to mention the fact
that the end-to-end integrity of a structure that ensures top-down
accountability is rendered completely void. Even worse was the mumbled
suggestions by some of the government participants at the seminar that
CCK might also act as the Government CA. In addition that is the fact that a project as crucial as this has not gone through a proper stakeholder consultative process and is seemingly being shoved down our throats. In his closing remarks a director a the E-Government directorate asked the ICT Board to engage stakeholders further and receive input before moving too far.
I raised this point as a question during the Q & A session at the
end of the seminar and would like to emphasise that it would be very wrong for CCK to be the Root Certification Authority for a number of reasons:
- Conflict of Interest: As per the proposed structure
the representative of Government, CCK needs to serve as the top level
entity that handles the legal and regulatory framework and the national
authentication plan. Adding a subsidiary role would not only compromise
their integrity but would also expose them to all manner of challenges
with regards to operation of an infrastructure that is supposed to be
based on trust.
- Procurement Issues: In sharing to a certain level
of detail the complexity of the Root Authority setup, it became evident
that there would be a continuous need for procurement of various goods
and services. As a government agency, CCK is subject to public
procurement regulations, this means that even very basic, small and
simple items could take months if not years to procure. The problems
with our public procurement are well known. Subjecting the Root
Authority to this kind of environment is in itself a major risk for
successful implementation and operation.
- Human Resource Issues: Several times in their
presentations the Koreans complained that they had observed a critical
lack of human resources. They emphasized that they were not referring to
skilled human resources but simply to enough people
for the project requirements. Shock of shocks! With the incredible
numbers of well educated Kenyans who are unemployed or underemployed?
They could obviously have only been referring to what they had seen as
far as the people available for the project from the Ministry and CCK.
It is no secret that CCK has extremely limited human resources in their
ICT division and those few are oveworked, stretched beyond measure and
juggling multipe roles. Isn’t adding additional responsibilities into
this mix a formula for disaster?
- Inertia: CCK has proven to be very poor at the
timely execution of functions that fall outside their core mandate of
licensing, regulation and resource management. A perfect example is the
implementation of the Universal Service Fund, which CCK insisted on
handling as an inhouse function instead of facilitating the setup of a
dedicated entity to handle the task. It has been over 6 years since
regulation and legislation regarding the USF came into place and there
is still nothing to speak of. I will reserve this as a subject for
another day (it is a long and detailed one!)
Recommendations
The Government should immediately consider adopting a Public Private Partnership
approach for the implementation of Kenya’s NPKI. This is especially
timely because we now have a fully ratified Public Private Partnership
Policy that provides a variety of models for project implementation.
This will not only ensure involvement from crucial stakeholders but also
free the Root Authority from the problems highlighted above (and
probably many others) while at the same time ensuring that enough
private sector energy and enthusiasm is infused into the project so that
it moves with speed and determination. Success stories such as KENIC
and TEAMS show that it is not only possible but that it can be done with
ease.
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