Nothing new to most of us but interesting dossier all the same.. http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2007/10/07NAIROBI4246.html Viewing cable 07NAIROBI4246, KENYA - DOING BUSINESS THE CHINESE WAY Reference ID: 07NAIROBI4246 Created: 2007-10-30 08:08 Released: 2011-03-01 21:09 Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Origin: Embassy Nairobi UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 NAIROBI 004246 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS STATE PASS USTR - BILL JACKSON STATE FOR AF/E, AF/EPS AND EB/CIP E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: ECON ECPS EFIN KCOR CH KE SUBJECT: KENYA - DOING BUSINESS THE CHINESE WAY REF: NAIROBI 4202 NAIROBI 00004246 001.2 OF 002 Sensitive-but-unclassified. This cable is not for release outside USG channels. ¶1. (SBU) Summary: Chinese firms selling into Kenya's information and communications technologies (ICT) sector are throwing a lot of money around, according to industry contacts. Indeed, Chinese influence may be so great that it is distorting important investment decisions in the country. Putting aside corruption, Chinese ICT vendors are difficult to beat on price and quality, and therefore often win government procurement tenders. However, companies that buy Chinese equipment often find that they end up paying the piper later due to poor after-sales service. End summary. ¶2. (U) In the course of gathering information for reftel report on developments in Kenya's information and communications technology (ICT) sector, interesting anecdotes emerged about the way Chinese firms do business in Kenya. ---------------------------- China "Re-Colonizing Africa" ---------------------------- ¶3. (SBU) "The Chinese are re-colonizing Africa for natural resources," according to Michael Joseph, the Amcit CEO of Safaricom, Kenya's largest and most successful mobile phone company, speaking to U.S. Mission staff on October 18. Joseph diverged from his brief on Kenyan efforts to build FONN, a new terrestrial national fiber optic network (reftel), to say the project is an example of how "the Chinese are driving the ICT agenda in Kenya." FONN, he said, was poorly planned - consciously so, in his view, so that Chinese companies could get fatter contracts. As noted reftel, FONN will extend all the way to the borders of Kenya's neighbors, which means it will traverse vast tracts of virtually empty land in Kenya's northern and western reaches. Two Chinese firms and one French firm have been awarded contracts to construct the network. According to Joseph: "We don't need fiber to Garissa (in sparsely populated Northeast Province), we need it in Nyeri" (a bustling market town just north of Nairobi). --------------------------------------------- ---- Chinese Stuff: Good and Cheap, But Service Stinks --------------------------------------------- ---- ¶4. (SBU) Joseph went on to describe the use by Chinese ICT vendors of concessional credits from the Chinese government to lock up contracts - nothing new there. Echoing the views of many industry contacts, he said the quality of the ICT equipment provided by companies like Huawai and ZTE is pretty good, and their prices are low. But he used a monosyllabic expletive beginning with "S" to describe after-sales service. When there are equipment problems later, he said, the Chinese run for the door, and matters are made worse by the language barrier. Safaricom purchased equipment last year from Huawei, but the deal was too good to be true. Huawei effectively reneged and only delivered half the equipment promised in the contract. Joseph went to China personally, eventually got the Huawai CEO to admit that the company had lied, and then forced it to cancel the contract. ---------------------------------------- Chinese Buying Politicians and Influence ---------------------------------------- ¶5. (SBU) More insidious, said Joseph, is that "the Chinese" (by this we believe he meant Chinese firms, not the government) are "funding the political agenda" of Kenyan politicians and ministers. When he returned from China after cancelling the Huawei contract, he was summoned to the office of Mutahi Kagwe, the Minister of Information and Communication, and told the cancellation put all Chinese foreign assistance to Kenya at risk. He also received phone calls from different ministers with no responsibility for ICT who insisted that he reconsider the cancellation. One was the Minister of Immigration, who hinted that Joseph, a foreigner, might have work permit problems if he cancelled the contract. He held his ground. Joseph said that whenever he meets with a Chinese firm, "within 20 minutes" he receives calls from various Kenyan ministers or members of parliament lobbying on behalf of the company. ¶6. (SBU) Another likely manifestation of the undue influence and NAIROBI 00004246 002.2 OF 002 unfair play by the Chinese, said Joseph, was the recent Phase II expansion of the CDMA fixed wireless service being rolled out by Kenya's monopoly fixed line phone company, Telkom Kenya (see reftel). Because of Telkom Kenya's state-owned status, the project by law should have been put out for public tender. But instead, the Kenyan government quietly and unilaterally awarded the contract to Huawei, the Chinese company that did Phase I. Separately in August, the CEO of one of the country's largest internet service providers confirmed the details of the deal, which he said raised eyebrows throughout the industry. --------------------------------------------- ---- Telkom Kenya Looking for Non-Chinese Tech Partner --------------------------------------------- ---- ¶7. (SBU) Asked about China's influence in the ICT sector on October 18, the more restrained CEO of Telkom Kenya, Sammy Kirui, insisted that the Chinese "can't throw their weight around too much." He echoed Joseph's assessment that Chinese equipment is decent quality and low price. But like Joseph, he complained that "you pay down the line" in terms of poor after-sales service. As a state-owned entity, he said, Telkom has to follow government procurement procedures, and "the Chinese always do well on government tenders." After Telkom is privatized (reftel), however, it will have more flexibility to procure equipment on the basis of factors beyond price, such as network compatibility. The company already counts Huawei as a "strategic technical partner", but has issued an expression of interest for a second such partner. Huawei rival ZTE, also a Chinese company, is pressing hard, but Kirui insists that the company's second strategic tech partner must be non-Chinese. ------------------------------------------ Finding Ways Around the Chinese Juggernaut ------------------------------------------ ¶8. (SBU) More emphatic is the Permanent Secretary of Information and Communications, Dr. Bitange Ndemo. Ndemo, a talented former U.S.-resident business executive, has repeatedly lamented the inability of U.S. firms to win Kenyan government tenders. A strong proponent of U.S. technology, he is resorting to creative ways to circumvent a tender process which he sees as handcuffing the country by virtually guaranteeing that it is forced to buy low-cost Chinese equipment, without heed to other important factors, such as after-sales service and network compatibility. Ndemo recently signed a memorandum of agreement for a public-private partnership with a Saudi firm that for the most part sells and services U.S.-made equipment. The deal calls for the construction of at least one $30 million data center that will complement the roll-out of the national fiber network. By structuring the relationship in this way, Ndemo believes he can legally buy the equipment and technology most appropriate for Kenya, without having to pander only to the lowest price seller. ¶9. (SBU) More generally, Ndemo regularly expresses concern about the influence of China in the ICT sector. Without providing details, he has told Econ/C many times that he and other senior technocrats are under constant pressure from their own ministers and the country's senior political leadership to buy Chinese. ------- Comment ------- ¶10. (SBU) The views and anecdotes conveyed by people like Joseph and Ndemo put a bit flesh on the bones of the oft-repeated (but seldom proven) contention that Chinese companies play dirty. Most disturbing in this case is the idea that Chinese influence is so great that it's actually distorting critical investment decisions in Kenya's all-important ICT sector. For further investigation is the role of the Chinese government. We wonder if it simply turns a blind eye to the dirty work of Chinese firms, or if it actively contributes to the problem. Ranneberger ...