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western media bias...Africa -------- Original Message -------- Subject: Pambazuka News 338: Heart of darkness in Western Media Date: Tue, 22 Jan 2008 22:26:13 +0000 From: Firoze Manji <fmanji@mac.com> To: pambazuka-news@pambazuka.gn.apc.org PAMBAZUKA NEWS 338: HEART OF DARKNESS IN WESTERN MEDIA The authoritative electronic weekly newsletter and platform for social justice in Africa Pambazuka News (English edition): ISSN 1753-6839 With nearly 500 contributors and an estimated 500,000 readers Pambazuka News is the authoritative pan African electronic weekly newsletter and platform for social justice in Africa providing cutting edge commentary and in-depth analysis on politics and current affairs, development, human rights, refugees, gender issues and culture in Africa. To view online, go to http://www.pambazuka.org/ To SUBSCRIBE or UNSUBSCRIBE – please visit, http://www.pambazuka.org/ en/subscribe.php CONTENTS: 1. Features, 2. Comment and analysis, 3. Pan-African Postcard Please note that views expressed in articlea published in Pambazuka News reflect those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of Pambazuka News or the publishers, Fahamu. Support the struggle for social justice in Africa. Give generously! Donate at: http://www.pambazuka.org/en/donate.php /\/\//\/\/\//\/\/\//\/\/\//\/\/\//\/\/\//\/\/\//\/\/\//\/\/\//\ Highlights from this issue FEATURE: - John Barbieri on media coverage of the Kenya crisis - Pambazuka editors on the word “tribe” COMMENT & ANALYSIS: - Emma Mawdsley on British coverage of China in Africa - John Lonsdale on ethnicity, tribe and state in Kenya - Antony Ong'ayo on the Kenya case and media bias PAN-AFRICAN POSTCARD: George Ogola on parachute journalism and the Kenyan crisis /\/\//\/\/\//\/\/\//\/\/\//\/\/\//\/\/\//\/\/\//\/\/\//\/\/\//\ 1 Features WHAT IS IN THE WORD TRIBE? Africa Focus, Africa Action and H-Net Africa contributors on Western media coverage of Africa Pambazuka editors Pambazuka editors give you the war on the word "tribe" What’s in a word? What does the word “tribe” carry? Here below Pambazuka Editor’s give you a few snippets of what is a long struggle to get US Mainstream media to stop using a racist and stereotypical lens in its coverage of Africa. You can find the fascinating discussion at www. http://www.h-net.org/~africa We end with an excerpt from an Africa Action essay on the word tribe. You can see the full essay at: http://www.africaaction.org/bp/ethall.htm Africa Focus (http://www.africafocus.org/docs08/ethn0801.php) narrates that Jeffrey Gettleman for the New York Times in his December 31 dispatch from Nairobi [wrote that the Kenya electoral crisis], "seems to have tapped into an atavistic vein of tribal tension that always lay beneath the surface in Kenya but until now had not provoked widespread mayhem." Gettleman was not exceptional among those covering the post-election violence in his stress on "tribe." But his terminology was unusually explicit in revealing the assumption that such divisions are rooted in unchanging and presumably primitive identities. However Africa Focus gives an update that since the Africa Focus Bulletin that covered Gettleman’s use of language: “Gettleman's coverage of Kenya in the New York Times has avoided the indiscriminate use of the word tribe in favor of "ethnic group," and has noted the historical origins and political character of the continued violence in the country, as well as its links to ethnic divisions”. But Peter Alegi from Michigan State University in an H- Net Africa posting says and then asks: “While Gettleman (Times' EastAfrica bureau chief) seems to have toned down his use of "tribe" thanks to our protests, but isn't substituting "ethnic group" for it a minor victory? Also, folks might be interested in this side story: the other day, I wrote a brief message to Bill Keller, Times' Executive Editor (ex NYT correspondent from Johannesburg [1992-1995]), alerting him to the H- Africa thread on his paper's handling of the Kenya crisis. Mr. Keller's insulting response included the following statement: "I get it. Anyone who uses the word "tribe" is a racist. [. . .] It's a tediously familiar mantra in the Western community of Africa scholars. In my experience, most Africans who live outside the comforts of academia (and who use the word "tribe" with shameless disregard for the political sensitivities of American academics) have more important concerns." So Gettleman's ignorance about African languages, history, and cultural identities doesn't seem to trouble his boss one bit. And the utter disregard Keller seems to have for what scholars is reinforced in a closing line dripping with condescension: "If you have a string that has something insightful to say about Kenya, I hope you'll pass it along." Kudos to AfricaFocus then, but it seems that the struggle for accuracy and informed analysis of Africa in US mainstream media is going to be a long and tortuous one. Carol Sicherman, a Professor Emerita. at Lehman College underlines Alegi’s point with the following post to H-net Africa: She says writes that “On January 12, I wrote to the Public Editor of the New York Times as follows (I did not get an answer): Reading recent dispatches from Kenya, I was pleased to notice that the Times has responded to years of complaints about the biased terms "tribe" and "tribal," replacing them with "ethnic group" and "ethnic." This editorial policy, however, seems to be confined to the news. Roberta Smith's article "Face Time: Masks, Animal to Video" in the Arts Section on Jan. 11 uses the egregiously offensive phrase "a tribal, almost animalistic ritual." It is exactly that equation that makes it necessary to remove "tribe" and its related words. In the case in question, removing "tribal" would have put the focus on "animalistic" without designating Africans as inherently animalistic. It is particularly odd to find such a cliché in a discussion of the work of Yinka Shonibare, a highly sophisticated, learned, and ironic artist. I don't know how copy editors are instructed at the Times, but the policy adopted for the news section needs to be adopted for all sections. And last but not least, in1997 Africa Action said the following of the word tribe: Tribe has no coherent meaning. What is a tribe? The Zulu in South Africa, whose name and common identity was forged by the creation of a powerful state less than two centuries ago, and who are a bigger group than French Canadians, are called a tribe. So are the !Kung hunter-gatherers of Botswana and Namibia, who number in the hundreds. The term is applied to Kenya's Maasai herders and Kikuyu farmers, and to members of these groups in cities and towns when they go there to live and work. Tribe is used for millions of Yoruba in Nigeria and Benin, who share a language but have an eight-hundred year history of multiple and sometimes warring city-states, and of religious diversity even within the same extended families. Tribe is used for Hutu and Tutsi in the central African countries of Rwanda and Burundi. Yet the two societies (and regions within them) have different histories. And in each one, Hutu and Tutsi lived interspersed in the same territory. They spoke the same language, married each other, and shared virtually all aspects of culture. At no point in history could the distinction be defined by distinct territories, one of the key assumptions built into "tribe." Tribe is used for groups who trace their heritage to great kingdoms. It is applied to Nigeria's Igbo and other peoples who organized orderly societies composed of hundreds of local communities and highly developed trade networks without recourse to elaborate states. Tribe is also used for all sorts of smaller units of such larger nations, peoples or ethnic groups. The followers of a particular local leader may be called a tribe. Members of an extended kin-group may be called a tribe. People who live in a particular area may be called a tribe. We find tribes within tribes, and cutting across other tribes. Offering no useful distinctions, tribe obscures many. As a description of a group, tribe means almost anything, so it really means nothing. If by tribe we mean a social group that shares a single territory, a single language, a single political unit, a shared religious tradition, a similar economic system, and common cultural practices, such a group is rarely found in the real world. These characteristics almost never correspond precisely with each other today, nor did they at any time in the past. Tribe promotes a myth of primitive African timelessness, obscuring history and change. The general sense of tribe as most people understand it is associated with primitiveness. To be in a tribal state is to live in a uncomplicated, traditional condition. It is assumed there is little change. Most African countries are economically poor and often described as less developed or underdeveloped. Westerners often conclude that they have not changed much over the centuries, and that African poverty mainly reflects cultural and social conservatism. Interpreting present day Africa through the lens of tribes reinforces the image of timelessness. Yet the truth is that Africa has as much history as anywhere else in the world. It has undergone momentous changes time and again, especially in the twentieth century. While African poverty is partly a product of internal dynamics of African societies, it has also been caused by the histories of external slave trades and colonial rule. In the modern West, tribe often implies primitive savagery. When the general image of tribal timelessness is applied to situations of social conflict between Africans, a particularly destructive myth is created. Stereotypes of primitiveness and conservative backwardness are also linked to images of irrationality and superstition. The combination leads to portrayal of violence and conflict in Africa as primordial, irrational and unchanging. This image resonates with traditional Western racialist ideas and can suggest that irrational violence is inherent and natural to Africans. Yet violence anywhere has both rational and irrational components. Just as particular conflicts have reasons and causes elsewhere, they also have them in Africa. The idea of timeless tribal violence is not an explanation. Instead it disguises ignorance of real causes by filling the vacuum of real knowledge with a popular stereotype. Images of timelessness and savagery hide the modern character of African ethnicity, including ethnic conflict. The idea of tribe particularly shapes Western views of ethnicity and ethnic conflict in Africa, which has been highly visible in recent years. Over and over again, conflicts are interpreted as "ancient tribal rivalries," atavistic eruptions of irrational violence which have always characterized Africa. In fact they are nothing of the sort. The vast majority of such conflicts could not have happened a century ago in the ways that they do now. Pick almost any place where ethnic conflict occurs in modern Africa. Investigate carefully the issues over which it occurs, the forms it takes, and the means by which it is organized and carried out. Recent economic developments and political rivalries will loom much larger than allegedly ancient and traditional hostilities. Ironically, some African ethnic identities and divisions now portrayed as ancient and unchanging actually were created in the colonial period. In other cases earlier distinctions took new, more rigid and conflictual forms over the last century. The changes came out of communities' interactions within a colonial or post-colonial context, as well as movement of people to cities to work and live. The identities thus created resemble modern ethnicities in other countries, which are also shaped by cities, markets and national states. Tribe substitutes a generalized illusion for detailed analysis of particular situations. The bottom-line problem with the idea of tribe is that it is intellectually lazy. It substitutes the illusion of understanding for analysis of particular circumstances. Africa is far away from North America. Accurate information about particular African states and societies takes more work to find than some other sorts of information. Yet both of those situations are changing rapidly. Africa is increasingly tied into the global economy and international politics. Using the idea of tribe instead of real, specific information and analysis of African events has never served the truth well. It also serves the public interest badly. *Please send comments to editor@pambazuka.org or comment online at http://www.pambazuka.org ****** THE POVERTY OF INTERNATIONAL JOURNALISM John Barbieri John Barbieri writes about the pervasive and dangerous myths that have characterized the coverage of Kenya's post election crisis in the US and elsewhere First, let me honorably mention that the title of this piece is borrowed from Kenyan journalist Rebecca Wanjiku [1]. As most others, I have watched in dismay and outrage at the events in Kenya following the announcement on Dec. 30th of the (manipulated) election results. I have been equally, if not more so, dismayed, outraged and disgusted by how the situation and violence there has been depicted and framed in the international media, especially here in the United States. In almost all of the recent coverage and commentary on Kenya in the mainstream U.S. media there have been three particularly dangerous and pervasive myths and misrepresentations that have appeared. All of these myths have been previously commented on by much more eminent figures than I, but perhaps it will help to restate and further comment on all of them in one place. Three Pervasive Myths and Misrepresentations First, this is not ‘ethnic conflict.’ Similar to the way that most African conflicts get reported, there is the ubiquitous framing of the situation as conflict solely being driven by ethnicity. This is most profoundly seen in the statements of ‘tribal conflict’; it must be made clear that this is an extremely racist, antiquated and inaccurate depiction of the situation. Though there has been an ethnic factor to some of the conflict, this factor is largely overemphasized at expense of the more pervasive factor of the rich/ poor and the gross inequities in resource distribution across and among ‘ethnic lines’ (that is as if such lines could be so clearly drawn). As many have more articulately said elsewhere the situation must be re-framed as a political conflict. More specifically, the organized violence following the elections must be framed as political elites manipulating their supporters (including paying and equipping armed militias and using the armed instruments of the State) to inflict violence on their behalf; it is so-called leaders fomenting hatred among their supporters all for their own personal benefit; and it is power-hungry politicians willing to do whatever it takes, literally willing to throw Kenyans’ lives away in their attempt to do it, and to be so disgustingly eager to use that violence as a mere pressure point on the national and international community to get/retain power. Both parties were guilty of this, but in particular the man sworn in as President has employed the disproportionate brutal force of the police and military, especially the General Service Unit. The repercussions of depicting the situation as solely ethnically- driven can be seen in the distorted sense of history and context for all conflicts in Africa and elsewhere. One of the most pervasive historical misconstructions is especially evident in the popular writings and collective memory of the Rwandan genocide, which continue to frame the genocide as being simply the result of primordial ‘tribal conflict.’ In so doing the context and history of the genocide is obfuscated by neglecting the ongoing role played by the brutal legacy of the colonial power (Belgium in the case of Rwanda) and of national, regional and international politics following ‘independence.’ Second, this is not a ‘shock.’ We need to attack the myths and claims being reported that the developments in Kenya are a great ‘shock,’ and that this is a great blow to a ‘beacon of stability, democracy and economic growth in Africa.’ For anyone who knows the history of Kenya, the history of colonialism and the history since ‘independence,’ they know that these developments are not a shock and that they have been long in the making. The developments are directly connected to the inability of the Kenyan government to come to terms with the brutal legacy and power distributions inherited from British rule, including the constitution itself. And specifically the developments were written all over the wall leading up to the election to anyone who was paying attention to the fomenting of ethnic tension by Kibaki/PNU and Odinga/ODM, yet too few seemed willing to acknowledge it. Anyone who claims that this is a ‘shock’ is either blatantly ignorant, dishonest or practices mere wishful thinking to be so naïve. And anyone who claims that Kenya is a grand ‘beacon of stability, democracy and economic growth in Africa’ misrepresents the hardships and injustices that the vast majority of Kenyans desperately face on a daily basis; they also inaccurately depict the past five years of the ‘booming economic growth’ witnessed under the Kibaki regime, which through exorbitant amounts of corruption and increasing income inequality has ensured that the benefits from that robust economic growth has by-and-large reached only the very elite. Third, and perhaps most importantly, is the role of the U.S. It must be made clear and people must fully understand the large role that the U.S. has been playing in Kenya and throughout eastern Africa. The U.S. has keenly been trying to build up allies in East Africa and the Horn of Africa to counterbalance other perceived ‘threat’ countries in the region. These key U.S. allies include Kenya, Tanzania, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Uganda and the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia. These allies are meant to act as a counter-balance to the ‘threats’ of Sudan (the Bashir regime), Eritrea and the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) in Somalia. The Bush administration has clearly supported incumbent Kibaki due to the fact that his government has been one of these key allies in the ‘war on terror’ in the East and the Horn of Africa. The Kibaki administration has allowed and worked closely with the U.S. on supposed ‘terrorist’ raids along the coast of Kenya. The Kenyan Anti-Terrorism Unit (with American and British support) has conducted these extralegal anti-terrorism operations along the Kenyan coast, targeting the sizeable Muslim population there. According to human rights organizations in Kenya these anti- terrorism operations have included the roundup, torture and extradition of Muslims (to Somalia, Ethiopia and elsewhere) without being charged or given a trial, similar to ‘war on terror’ operations elsewhere. The people, nearly all of whom are Muslims, being targeted are dubiously claimed to be Al Qaeda operatives or a part of other subversive terrorist organizations. Similarly, Kenya was an ally during the U.S.-supported invasion of Somalia by Ethiopian forces to overthrow the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) in southern Somalia exactly one year ago. What was, and still is, routinely missed in the story of the UIC is how they helped to implement order, stability and social services that had not been seen in southern Somalia for nearly 15 years; and how the UIC was primarily an effort to depose corrupt warlords (many of whom were being backed by the U.S.), not to impose an international Al Qaeda- like jihadist movement as many claim(ed). Kenya’s (i.e., the Kibaki administration’s) role in the military operations included working with U.S. forces along the Kenya-Somalia border and the ubiquitous sharing of ‘intelligence,’ but they also played a more direct role as well. At the onset of the invasion, the Kenyan military, seemingly at the behest of the U.S., closed off its border with Somalia and refused entry to all Somalis, including refugees, trying to flee southern Somalia. Soon after, the U.S. conducted air strikes in southern Somalia killing at least 30 people, most, if not all, of whom were probably fleeing civilians, not ‘Al Qaeda operatives’ as was alleged. In short, the Bush administration had clear ‘national security’ ambitions in seeking that Kibaki, as a key ‘war on terror’ ally in eastern Africa, stay in power. Also, add to this the vested American, UK and other European business interests in Kenya as well, who likely did not care for Odinga’s ‘social democratic’ platform which was posing the threat of more taxes and redistributive wealth. The biggest blow to U.S. credibility and neutrality in the matter, though, came immediately after the election results were announced. Incredulously, the U.S. State Department quickly came out and congratulated the man sworn in as President on his ‘victory.’ This was done despite the fact that every diplomat in the country clearly knew of the irregularities in the election and the hastily swearing in process of the President. Realizing its mistake the State Department quickly moved to retract this congratulatory statement, and then issued a statement calling an end to the violence and for the situation to be resolved through ‘constitutional and legal remedies.’ However, it is quite clear that these ‘remedies’ are blatantly weighted in the incumbent’s favor and thus will merely support the status quo: Kibaki and corruption. Since January 4th the U.S. has been pursuing the diplomacy route with Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Jendayi Frazer, who has now departed, and Ambassador Michael Ranneberger leading these attempts. However, it is was disturbing that despite Frazer’s close watch and ongoing separate talks with both sides, she (and therefore the U.S. in general) was not able to prevent Kibaki from disastrously going ahead and filling the most critical posts in the President’s cabinet. More recently it should be no surprise that the few Heads of State who have come out and congratulated Kibaki on his ‘victory’ are also key ‘war on terror’ allies of the Bush administration. These Heads of State include: President Yoweri Museveni of Uganda (who has received much aid from the Bush administration and has been crucial in supplying troops for the AU force in Somalia), transitional President Abdullahi Yusuf of Somalia (who the U.S., Ethiopia and Kenya helped reinstate after the overthrow of the UIC), Sheikh Sabah of Kuwait, King Mohammed VI of Morocco, and Prime Minister Themba Dlamini of Swaziland. An excerpt from Somali President Abdullahi Yusuf’s congratulatory message to President Kibaki is worth quoting: ‘…both our countries must remain strong partners on the global war on terror and steadfast Allies in protecting freedom.’ Further still, Uganda’s starch dependence on Kenyan supply routes and Museveni’s close relationship with Kibaki must be stressed, and therefore the widespread reports that the Uganda People’s Defense Force is masquerading as police, destroying property and killing people in western Kenya must be seriously addressed! As others have already made clear (e.g., Mukoma wa Ngugi [2], Wandia Njoya [3], etc.), it should not be assumed that Odinga/ODM is somehow inherently antithetical to the interests of the U.S. and of international capital; the extravagant fuss over Odinga’s Hummer was perhaps one highly illustrative example of his true nature as an elite who gladly enjoys connections to the West and living well above the rest of Kenyans. Also, it should not be believed that U.S. support for corrupt and autocratic Kenyan leaders started with Bush- Kibaki, it is well-documented how the U.S. had been keenly supporting and arming the preceding 24 year dictatorship of Daniel arap Moi during the final years of Cold War geopolitics and beyond. Lastly, all of this is not meant to suggest a direct U.S. connection to the manipulated election results, but still the overall interests and role of the U.S., and other international actors, in Kenya must be made clear. (For more facts and figures on the U.S.’s military ties to Kenya and incumbent Kibaki see Daniel Volman’s excellent short article <http://www.concernedafricascholars.org/080110_volman.php> [4].) The Poverty of International Journalism In all, it has been disgusting how reporters have been so eager to energetically document and provide inaccurate and inhumane commentary on the bloodshed, but have been too unconcerned in trying to actually understand the situation and report what Kenyans are really saying and thinking; although this should certainly come as no surprise. The inspiration and title for this article comes from Kenyan journalist Rebecca Wanjiku’s blog ‘The Poverty of International Journalism,’ and this excerpt about a broadcast on CNN is worth quoting at length: Understanding the local language is very important when reporting from foreign countries. For instance on Sunday [January 6th 2008], there was on television an injured man and those carrying him said in Swahili "tunampeleka hospitali" (we are taking him to hospital?) But the journalist's translation was that he had been asked "are you shot or cut?" with the response coming back that he was actually the victim of a shooting. It is unlikely that this was an innocent mistake, the journalist may simply not have cared what was true and what was not, and it is unlikely either that the world audience would have noticed, but using video like this to underline a story you are making up is dishonest reporting. I have faith that Kenyans will soon be embracing each other, and that we will soon get back to the urgent yet more mundane tasks of kujitafutia riziki – putting food on the table. I hope CNN will be around to cover that and not simply rush on to the next big story. By the way, how comes CNN does not cover American soldiers or civilians bleeding and writhing in pain, yet has no second thought for the dignity of the dead and dying from other countries? It has been Kenyan journalists and bloggers, like Rebecca, and other local reporters who have been the real champions of correctly depicting and analyzing the situation, and who are actually raising the real desperate concerns of Kenyans. Rather than condescendingly prescribing analysis and treatment from London, New York or even the U.S. embassy in Nairobi (which is, although not as geographically removed, as cognitively removed from the concerns of Kenyans), the mainstream media needs to listen, understand and make clear the history and context of the current situation, and stop speaking so ignorantly and arrogantly about it. And good journalists need to call out fellow journalists who are perpetuating the pervasive myths and stereotypes (e.g., Canadian journalist Arno Kopecky’s Daily Nation article [5]). I would like to take this opportunity, then, to call out CNN reporter Zain Verjee. Miss Verjee, as someone who grew up in Kenya, and therefore should know better, it is despicable how you have been playing up the ‘ethnic conflict’ angle in your TV reporting. Why are you doing this? Are you callously using the plight of your countrymen/women to simply boost your career ambitions? Why is it that you so seldom let other Kenyans actually speak, and rather choose to just speak ‘on their behalf?’ Why is it that as someone who has worked on campaigns to spread awareness of violence against women have you not been more vigorously reporting the disproportionate effect that the violence and displacement has had on women in Kenya? Why is it that I have not once heard you mention the role the U.S. is playing in Kenya? Miss Verjee I am sorry that you were hit by a teargas canister during your recent reporting (although it should not have been a surprise given your attempt to ‘get the story’), but perhaps you might now feel some of the brutality that so many Kenyans have endured and perhaps now you may start honestly speaking on their behalf and letting their voices be heard. The situation in Kenya, like all political conflicts (e.g., eastern Democratic Republic of Congo, Somalia, Darfur, eastern Chad, Iraq, Pakistan, Burma, Sri Lanka, etc.), should be vigorously reported, but it must be framed and depicted accurately by incorporating a proper historical context and the perspective of the people there. The perspectives/stories of people there must be told, but they must not be simply trivialized and sensationalized, as is so often done, particularly in the simplemindedness of televised ‘reporting.’ It is so sad that in the business that is U.S. TV reporting we seldom actually hear the voices of people telling their stories from around the world; rather we too often get a voice-over by some clearly intelligible Western (i.e., ‘white-sounding’) reporter. Why not use subtitles!?! Why must these people be robbed from having their voices heard, why must we be robbed from hearing them?!? Or why not find articulate English speakers (there certainly are an abundance of them in Kenya) to speak on their own behalf, and not demean their ‘foreignness’ by using unwarranted subtitles? And why do we have to wait for ‘crisis’ situations to hear these voices? Why do we hear, or rather really just see, only the bad? Why do we not hear and see good, fun, silly, playful, uplifting and empowering stories being told every day? Why do we not hear and see stories with depth about love and dreams as often as we superficially see stories about loss and despair? In conclusion, news without a proper sense of history and context is just a list of jumbled half-truths, and news without a proper respect for and input from the people who are actually affected is just a list of callous stereotypes. In the past week, now that the violence has slightly eased, the U.S. media seems to be losing interest in the situation in Kenya. Forgive the extreme vulgarity, but the mainstream U.S. media appears to send the following double message: we are not interested in Africans or African politics, that is unless there is a full out Rwanda-like bloodbath (with pictures of gruesome machete attacks and all, of course) so we can stereotype all Africans as the savages we think they are. I hope that all journalists, reporters and editors may heed these calls and start acting responsibly and start reporting the truth coming ‘out of Africa.’ * John Barbieri is an independent reporter who lived in Kenya from Jan.-June 2007, and is the founder of the US Coalition for Peace with Truth and Justice in Kenya. He can currently be reached at kenyanpeace@gmail.com *Please send comments to editor@pambazuka.org or comment online at http://www.pambazuka.org * Please click on the link for the article notes http://www.pambazuka.org/en/category/features/45590 ****** /\/\//\/\/\//\/\/\//\/\/\//\/\/\//\/\/\//\/\/\//\/\/\//\/\/\//\ 2 Comment and analysis FU MANCHU VERSUS DR LIVINGSTONE IN THE DARK CONTINENT? How British broadsheet newspapers represent China, Africa and the West Emma Mawdsley Emma Mawdsley examines the coverage of China's growing influence in Africa by the British print media The words and images we use do not describe ‘reality’, they create it. Language (terms, metaphors, and analogies) and images (such as films, news photos, maps and cartoons) are caught up in struggles over interpretation – which means that the language and images of the powerful are important tools in creating and maintaining particular points of view amongst politicians, policy-makers and the public. This paper explores the way in which six British broadsheet newspapers have covered China’s growing role in Africa over the past seven years. China’s impacts in Africa are complex and varied by country, sector and context, and most of the newspaper articles reflect that. Whether more critical or approving in tone, the articles invariably point to both benefits and problems associated with China’s rise. Even those which focus on specific issues or countries, tend to open or conclude with at least a sentence or two outlining a broader assessment of the prospects and problems associated with the growing relationship. Even so, a detailed analysis led us to identify five narrative tropes that recurred consistently and frequently, which tended to systematically endorse images of African weakness, Western trusteeship and Chinese ruthlessness: 1) a tendency to refer to ‘the Chinese’ or ‘China’, as if the various Chinese actors all shared the same interests; 2) a tendency to focus excessively on China’s interests in oil over other commodities; 3) a decided preference for focussing on China’s negative impacts on the continent, and within that, on issues and places of violence, disorder and corruption (e.g. Zimbabwe, Sudan, Angola) over other negative issues (e.g. trade imbalances, undermining domestic manufacturing sectors); 4) a tendency to portray Africans as victims or villains; and 5) a frequently complacent account of the role and interest of different western actors in Africa. Representations of Africa, China and the West First, most press reports tend to refer simply to “the Chinese”, often overlooking the fact that Chinese communities and actors in Africa are diverse in origins, roles and interests. The Chinese in Africa include longer standing and more recent diasporic communities, often engaged in small and medium business, but with a range of histories and relations with China and with their adopted African homes. Media accounts tend to focus much more strongly on Chinese state firms and agencies, as well as the more recent wave of large private enterprises (although the distinction can be blurred). But interests differ – longer term Chinese diasporic populations, the managers of Chinese companies, Chinese labourers employed by those companies, and different elements of the Chinese Government may have very different views on, for example, political stability, corporate transparency or democratic accountability. Different Chinese firms may have competing interests over what constitute desirable conditions for import/export trade or commodity extraction/ manufactures. The following quote indicates competing interests that are otherwise rarely reflected in the media accounts that were analysed: “Venturing into Africa is a superficially attractive option for Chinese enterprises with limited global experience, as they can avoid the kind of competition and rules they face in markets such as the US or the European Union. But Chinese companies are also under great pressure to invest in Africa to fulfil political commitments made by China’s leaders, who provide financial incentives, including cheap loans, for them to go overseas. “First we must listen to what the country says, but we have our own company considerations” says Mr Wang of Chico, an enterprise controlled by the provincial government of Henan …[Mr Wang says] they “get criticism” from officials back home if they miss business targets, which often involve expanding overseas investment” (Financial Times, 20 June 2006: “China ventures on rocky roads to trade with Africa”). Allied to this is a tendency to isolate Chinese firms as nationally discrete entities. In fact, joint enterprises with both African and western firms are becoming more common. The second theme identified is the focus on oil and, to a lesser extent, natural gas and ores, over other commodities. This reflects a wider focus on the geopolitics of oil, a subject that the Iraq war and massive oil price rises have brought to the fore of western public attention. Although oil is undeniably an important issue, and a major component of Sino-Africa trade and economic growth, this is concentrated in Angola, Sudan, Nigeria, Gabon and Guinea. For many African countries, exports of fish, timber and grain, or imports of relatively cheap manufactured goods are just as important. The focus on oil lends itself to a discourse of resource competition rather than the recognition that China and the West have a range of interests and relations in Africa, including potentially complementary ones. Third is a very uneven focus on China's interests and impacts in different African nations. More positive elements tend to get less attention (debt cancellation, investment, lower commodity prices for consumers, support for a greater international voice etc), with a preferred focus on problem issues. Moreover, we find that there is a preferred focus on zones and subjects of violent conflict, corruption, genocide and authoritarian leadership, rather than, say, the less gripping images of China’s impacts on trade imbalances or under-cutting of African manufacturing sectors. The overwhelming balance of articles is on Sudan, Zimbabwe and Angola, with far less attention paid to, for example, Lesotho, which is experiencing immense hardship competing with China in textile production; or Kenya which is struggling to compete with China in the manufactured goods sector. Fourth, within these accounts, Africans, tend to be reduced to villains (Mugabe, the Sudanese government) and victims (African populations, Darfur, the poor), an observation that fits with the findings of many other critical evaluations of the media. African agency, as leaders or ordinary citizens, workers and consumers, is rarely emphasised. Allusions to adolescence or childhood are common. Thus, discussing China’s effects on Chad: “Chad was supposed to establish a model of good practice. But, as a western observer in the country puts it: “The risk is [following China’s oil deals] it will become an example for the worst [African] pupils” [emphasis added]. (Financial Times, 23 January 2006: “The ‘resource curse’ anew”.) The paternalistic line that the West needs to save Africa from China’ depredations is something reflected elsewhere in the media. An extended Channel Four news report which was widely circulated and repeated, started: “To Tony Blair, Africa is somewhere which needs healing or saving and Sierra Leone gets a lot of British aid. But the Chinese are looking at the continent through different eyes. They see it as a source of raw materials, especially oil, which they need for their own development. And somewhere like Sierra Leone, fresh out of war – they think it’s ripe for trade and investment” (Lindsey Hillsum, Channel Four, 4 July 2005) Finally, Western actors – businesses, governments, national and international development NGOs – are typically portrayed as benign within the majority of these articles and accounts. Many articles imply or state that while the West did in the past have supported authoritarian leaders, or were party to corrupt business practices, it has learnt its lesson and reformed. While colonialism was economically exploitative and morally wrong, according to many of the articles exploring China’s ‘new African safari’ or ‘new scramble for Africa’, western colonialism is claimed to at least have had a paternalistic/developmental dimension and well-intentioned elements - an attitude that has translated into an ethical concern for Africa in the postcolonial period. Thus, in the contemporary setting, Western companies supposedly operate under a different ethical regime because of their own high convictions; labour laws; voluntary agreements as part of wider government and third sector pressure to improve business with Africa; consumer demands for more ethical production and trading; and/or shareholder pressure. None of these are said to apply to state-run or private Chinese companies. Above all, the dominant (although by no means universal, narrative) that runs through many of the articles is that the mistakes of the past have been addressed, and the West is now the architect and energiser of a new drive towards good governance and development, with aid now accompanied by ethical conditionalities, while reformed commercial practices promise investment, extraction and trade that will enhance development rather than line the pockets of kleptocratic elites. These faltering steps forward, which will be of mutual benefit to western companies and ordinary African people, are under threat from the unscrupulous Chinese. A few quotes give a flavour of these arguments: “But while the meeting [2006 FOCAC] is intended to fuel China’s global drive for resources, raw materials and markets, concerns are growing that the boosters of Beijing do not have Africa’s best interests at heart and that western countries will be cut out of future business”. (The Guardian, 1 November 2006: “Beijing’s Race for Africa”) “There are concerns too about soft loans leading to unsustainable debt and generous aid programmes that undermine efforts to improve governance, transparency and accountability. If the World Bank and IMF say no or attach conditions, Beijing always says yes…. The [2006] Beijing Summit is a big deal for China, a deliberately showy monument to its value-free strategy. It would be absurd to claim that western greed and interest did not do enormous damage in an earlier scramble for Africa. But the age of colonialism is over. It should be accepted today that global power brings global responsibilities. Tyranny, inequality and corruption offend universal values. In the countries where it now has the ability to make a difference, China should think twice about offering its help with no strings attached”. (The Guardian, 4 November 2006: “Scrambling to Beijing: China and Africa”) “That virtuous circle of increased assistance and better governance has been the hall mark of the approach taken, with varying degrees of success, by the West and Japan since the end of the Cold War. China now threatens to blow apart that consensus”. (The Telegraph, 26 April 2006: “The dragon in Africa”) “Soft Chinese loans to vulnerable and corrupt African regimes, arranged outside the painstakingly agreed Equator Principles for responsible lending, risk reversing progress towards extricating such regimes from debt. … And misconceived or badly executed civil engineering projects risk irreversible environmental damage … Such a critique is valid. Coming from the West it also has a hint of the hypocritical. China’s current scramble for African energy and resources is modest compared with Europe’s scramble for African territory a century and a half ago. And China’s sometimes reckless spending only mirrors gambles by Western banks and governments in the postwar era. But now Beijing risks repeating the West’s mistakes … when it allowed massive increases in overseas aid and investment with no commensurate adjustments to its foreign policy”. (The Times, 2 November 2006: “China and Africa”) There are undeniably elements of truth in some of this – some western companies are indeed bound by their charters, public pressure and voluntary agreements to abide by standards that can reduce their competitiveness with companies not thus circumscribed. Bilateral and multilateral initiatives on debt, trade and aid have made some advances towards greater equity and reparation of injustices. These efforts and advances should not be belittled. However, there are three main sets of problems with the imagery of a benign west being undermined by a ruthless and unscrupulous China. The first is that, despite advances, many western companies remain mired in corrupt and exploitative business practices. Without losing sight of the importance and achievements of incremental improvements in western accountability and transparency, they remain inadequate. The second problem is that of scope and scale – the West’s impact on Africa cannot be reduced to the efforts of NGOs, aid agencies or companies. We must look beyond these limited horizons to debt, unjust trade regulations, uneven power in the institutions of global governance, the ‘war on terror’, and increasingly, perhaps, climate change, to develop a better understanding of the West’s impacts on Africa. Third, ‘development’ is almost invariably coded as apolitical and positive in these articles – although interestingly such partiality and complacency tended to be situational, apparent when framed within the specific China-Africa story. Newspapers and even individual journalists who in other reports may be very critical of, for example, the halting, late and inadequate provision of medical supplies, or debt, or trade inequalities, appear to become less critical when the West is framed in the same article as China. Thus, while the Australian, French and South African companies may also be condemned for working in Zimbabwe, in none of the articles analysed were these framed in the same space as a critique of China’s business interests. Running throughout, we can identify recurring words and phrases which are indicative of the images outlined above: China is ‘guzzling’, ‘aggressive’, an ‘economic juggernaut’, ‘insatiably’ ‘thirsty’ for oils and minerals, and ‘voraciously’ capitalist. “China is prowling the globe in search of energy sources” (Declan Walsh, 9 Nov. 2005, The Guardian, emphasis added) “As a voracious China scours the world for minerals, no regime is off limits” (Financial Times, 12 Jan 2006: “Insatiable Beijing scours the world for profit and power”) “[China] is ravenous for raw materials”. (The Telegraph, 26 April 2006: “The dragon in Africa”) In an article headlined “China’s goldmine: Tony Blair and Bono see Africa as a moral cause; China sees it as a business opportunity. But is Beijing’s interest based on economic partnership – or ruthless exploitation?”, we find: “The resurrection of Chambishi [a major Zambian copper mine] is just one small example of China’s explosion into Africa. From the barest foothold a decade ago an army of diplomats, technicians and entrepreneurs has kicked the continent’s door wide open, making Beijing a heavyweight investor and political player” (The Guardian, 28 March 2006: “China’s goldmine”, emphasis added) This position and language stands in contrast to accounts of western FDI, which is only presented as an unambiguously positive flow. Unlike the West, the Chinese have ‘insinuated’ their way into the continent. For example: “Quietly, while the attention of the world has been elsewhere, China has become a major player in Africa”. (The Independent, 7 September 2006: “The benefits and dangers of those gifts from the east”) “China, which now foresees annual trade with the world’s poorest continent totalling $100 billion (£50 billion) by 2010, began stepping up its presence stealthily in Africa in the early 1990s” (The Times, 25 April 2007: “From favoured patron to target of dissenters”, emphasis added) Dan Large, at SOAS, argues that these images are indicative of western defensiveness about ‘it’s backyard’, and can be seen as part of a wider reaction to an emerging power. The language of red dragons in the continent takes us back to the geopolitical discourses that characterised the Cold War. Conclusions To retiterate, amongst the database of articles reviewed there were alternative perspectives and stories, critical accounts of western roles and histories, and a recognition of the complex but also positive possibilities of greater Sino-African relations. However, the themes identified above emerged as strong and pervasive scripts in British reporting on the contemporary relationships between Africa, China and the West. Africa is one place in which China and western nations, notably the US, are likely to find themselves in a position of competition, and these images and languages, both popular and policy, are significant. In a recent analysis, Andrew Still (2005) urges the importance of maintaining moderate, pragmatic and respectful language and diplomatic ‘signals’ on both sides, if we are to avoid hardening ideological dividing lines between China and the US in particular – Still talks in terms of a potential degeneration of relations that could usher in the next Cold War. He suggests that: “ … some of the most difficult issues [between China and the US/West] lie in the realm of ideas and identity rather than the narrow economic and political interests, making them far less tractable. Not least of these will be the way in which the debate over ‘the rise of China’ is conducted in the public sphere. The limited repertoire of historical analogies on which it currently draws … creates a distorting prism through which the issue is viewed and provides a thin basis for more thoughtful analysis of how to ensure a peaceful power transition” (Still, 2005, p.3-4) In the context of what is certain to be growing economic and political competition between China and the US (with the UK and other nations playing bit parts), including over Africa, media images and representations will play an important role in shaping public understandings, debates and political pressures. These in turn will have consequences – however negotiated or contested – for different countries, actors and interests in Africa. * Dr. Emma Mawdsley is a lecturer in geography and Cambridge University. This article is a short version of a paper to be published in Political Geography in 2008. For a copy of the longer version, please refer to the journal, or contact the author on: eem10@cam.ac.uk *Please send comments to editor@pambazuka.org or comment online at http://www.pambazuka.org ****** KENYA: ETHNICITY, TRIBE, AND STATE John Lonsdale John Lonsdale argues that key to the post-election crisis in Kenya lies in the changing role of the post-colonial state in relation to the country's ethnic terms of political trade The extensive commentary on Kenya's troubles has tended to blame ancient tribal rivalry, cynical political calculation, or a combination of the two; with the corrupted electoral process seen as providing the unintended catalyst - or worse, the deliberate instigator that awakens latent tribal hostility. British imperialism has also received its expected share of criticism, for inventing the now-indigenous Kenyan practice of divide and rule (see Caroline Elkins, "What's Tearing Kenya Apart? History, for One Thing", Washington Post, 6 January 2008). While all such explanations have some merit they may also mislead the unwary, since they underplay the always slippery relations between ethnicity as a universal human attribute, politicised tribalism as a contingent process, and the state - any state, colonial or otherwise - as a cockpit of variously contested but always unequal power. How, then, can a focus on such factors illuminate Kenya's continuing turmoil? A colonial formation In the 19th century the area that became "Kenya" was stateless. Its peoples' civility, their ethnicity, was shaped by their subsistence: farming or herding, or some mixture of both. Such ethnic groups were not teams, not "tribes". Loyalties and rivalries were smaller than that - patriarchal lineages, marriage alliances, age-groups, trading partnerships, client-clusters, and the like. Ethnic groups were constituted more by internal debate over how to achieve honour in the unequal lives of patron or client, than by solidarity against strangers. Ethnic economies indeed were as often complementary as competitive, with different specialisms. But such inter-ethnicity - which was not without its frictions - was facilitated by the absence of any central power that might arrange groups in hierarchical relations. Sustained "tribal rivalry" could not exist under such decentralised, underpopulated, conditions. It was European rivalry that imported that modern Leviathan, the state, in the late 19th century. It was, like all states, assembled by force and driven by self-interest. Its British officials allied with African leaders too weak to be rivals; and occasionally did a little to rein in the otherwise self-destructive excesses of those potentially overmighty subjects, the white settlers. The colonial state, responsible to Westminster and at the same time nervous of India's viceroy and then (at independence) the country's first prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru - since British Indians far outnumbered white Britons in Kenya - stood to some extent athwart both Africans and settlers, trying to mediate the contradictions between them. Both settlers and Africans colonised the state and the facilities it provided. What had previously been a multi-polar mosaic of scattered nodes of socially productive energy became, within Kenya's new borders, a layered pyramid of profit and power, unequally divided between two key centres - one "white", one black - and many marginalised peripheries. White settlers got 20% of Kenya's high-potential farmland. As these settlers failed to provide enough state revenue and blocked African opportunity, the British increasingly encouraged African farming on the other 80%. So the second economic centre became Kikuyu-land: home of 20% of the population; close to the capital, Nairobi; cool and attractive to missionaries, with more schools than elsewhere. By geographical accident, then, Kikuyu had a head start in making money (essential to advance political ambitions) and in acquiring modern managerial skill. Most nationalisms start among those subjects who do best out of, and are most useful to, an ancien regime; their frustrations are keenest, their opportunity greatest. Yet while that may explain Kikuyu leadership of Kenya's anti-colonial nationalism, it does not account for their involvement in Mau Mau, its secretive, violent, offshoot. To that point I will return, as it is a key to understanding the present. A social transformation In the new circumstances, other and not-so-well-placed ethnic groups made the most of what they had. They were often driven by a local patriotism inspired by vernacular, mission-translated, Bibles that told of an enslaved people who became a tribal nation. They embarked, in combinations of hope and desperation, on chain-migrations out of pauper peripheries (not unlike the Scots or Irish in comparable circumstances) to colonise particular niches of employment: on the railway; on white farms and plantations; in domestic service; or in the police and army. Yet others came to dominate the livestock trade. Officials and employers exploited these various tendencies and stereotyped the supposed ethnic qualities of the group concerned. The British helped to harden ethnic divisions made greater by differing potentials for social mobility. Britain did not simply divide in order to rule. The emergence of ethnic consciousness also arose from local debates about how the genders, generations, rich and poor should relate, as older inequalities were transformed into new differentiations less sensitive to existing moral audits of honour. Nowhere was such differentiation so sharp as among Kikuyu. Its effects became politically acute after 1945 when settler employers in the Rift Valley's "white highlands" mechanised production, and the extensive Kikuyu diaspora of tenant-workers in the region refused the worsening conditions they were offered. These "ex-squatters", failing to recover a home in their increasingly populated, and property- protective, "reserves", had to make shift in Nairobi's slums. The insistent question, "how then can I live as an honourable Kikuyu?" was what separated the militants of Mau Mau from the politically conservative, propertied, patrons - led by Jomo Kenyatta - who first inspired them. A political competition The horrors of the Mau Mau "emergency" war of the 1950s that ensued proved the repressive potential of a colonial state too closely allied to the settlers, its strongest clients. But the relative calmness of decolonisation in 1963 similarly proved the advantages of an outgoing state power that was not solely dependent upon its local roots - a clear contrast with Rhodesia's fiery end. The post-colonial state - rooted in a competitive society, for good historical reasons - is once more different. For the state has been the sole agency by which Africans could aspire to climb the commanding heights of the economy against racially entrenched interests - in land, commerce and finance. In recent years it has continued this role by ever more devious means, to meet external demands for "liberalisation". Access to its power matters. It is concentrated in an executive presidency, now directly elected, capable of manipulating all public institutions, including a parliament elected from single-member constituencies that either singly or in contiguous groups coincide with what have become tribal territories. In consequence, the competition for a share in this power became governed by internal ethnic accountability and tribal rivalry. President Kenyatta and his Kikuyu elite soothed the frustrated honour of their Kikuyu poor with settlement schemes in the former "white highlands" (of which the bulk, historically, had belonged to less favoured Maasai and Kalenjin groups). His successor Daniel arap Moi, finding less room for the poor of own Kalenjin, did more to create for them an ethnic elite. Politicians generally justify their privilege by carving ethnic benefits from state largesse. But (in Kenya as elsewhere) this extractive approach faced increasing pressures. The ferocity of competition for a share of state power rose over time - as population has grown, as the fertilising rains of the post-colonial Africanisation of opportunity long ago dried up, as the terms of trade for primary commodities turned sour. It was fairly easy for Kenyatta to ensure that all, more or less, enjoyed a turn "to eat" in the ethnic coalitions on which a parliamentary majority relied. It was more difficult for Moi. As the political stakes rose, so it became more tempting to attract and reward one's ethnic followers with officially-deniable opportunities for thuggery at the expense of those who were now tribal rivals in land, urban property, or petty trade. With every "bought" election, popular anger grew among Kenyan citizens - to an extent that they created pressure for a constitutional change which would strengthen parliament at the expense of the presidency. A national transition? A new president, Mwai Kibaki, was elected in 2002 to clean the Aegean stables. But in that effort he has disappointed all but his Kikuyu cronies. Now, in the presidential election of 27 December 2007, he appears to many to have broken the tacit rules of national competition - the last straw. That the opposition was, it seems, merely less successful in rigging the ballot will not make reconciliation any easier. Some of the subsequent opposition violence is politically directed. But the worst, by Kalenjin "warriors" against Kikuyu "immigrants" into the Rift Valley, may have outrun such elite-engineered tribalism to become an eerie echo of Mau Mau - in being an internal, generational, ethnic revolt against the compromises by which its own recently-manufactured Kalenjin elite came to terms with the "old wealth" of Kenyatta's Kikuyu. There are, then, two very different dynamics currently at work in Kenya: internal ethnic dissidence and external tribal rivalry. Neither can be disarmed without rewriting the rules of political competition for the power of a rather different ("post-post- colonial") state. It would have to be less closely allied to its strongest clients, and offer its services more disinterestedly to all Kenyans. These might in consequence come to think of themselves more as citizens, less as ethnically-defined clients. It is a very great deal to ask. Kenya faces two possible futures. On the one hand, the normal inter- ethnicity of most daily lives may have been poisoned by the recent violence, forecasting a broken state. On the other, the shock may have persuaded Kenyan elites of the old, Burkean, truth that a state without the means of some change is without the means of its conservation. There is perhaps a glimmer of hope in the opposition's success in getting its man elected as the speaker of the new parliament. * John Lonsdale is emeritus professor of modern African history and fellow of Trinity College Cambridge. This article was first published in OpenDemocracy *Please send comments to editor@pambazuka.org or comment online at http://www.pambazuka.org ****** THE KENYA CASE AND MEDIA BIAS Antony Otieno Ong'ayo While the whole world is aware of the crisis is in Kenya, thanks to the international and local media, most of their reporting is accurate, however, there is need for an honest analysis of the situation in Kenya The media It is sad at this moment in time to apply outdated tactics of muzzling the people who are expressing a democratic right. In the case of Kenya, gagging the media would not help Kibaki and his cohorts, since the level of awareness and resolve among Kenyans not to return to the dark days of dictatorship is so high. The courage of the Kenyan media and journalists despite setbacks initiated by Internal security Minster (Michuki) is worth noting, but more so the way in which they reported events during the campaigns and eventful day of vote counting. However, there are problems with headlines (both local and international) that have appeared since the outbreak of post elections violence. The ethnic dimension is appearing to be the main focus of international press and they are also reporting that it is a Kikuyu- Luo issue but that is not true. Besides the fighting in the slums in Nairobi, Nakuru and Mombasa whose inhabitants are from all backgrounds though dominated by communities from western Kenya, Killings taking pace in the Rift Valley; Coast provinces are not perpetrated by the Luos. The fact that Raila is a Luo is not a justification enough to tag a whole community, just because one of them is a leading personality in the current stalemate. Such bias will direct attention in the wrong direction, and could be used to gang up against other communities, as has been the case in the past. There is no mention of killings taking place in Nyanza province especially in the Lake Town of Kisumu where Police has been shooting protesters at the orders of the internal Security Minister (Michuki). Condemnation of violence should be applied across the board. Victims of the violence are from all over especially in the slums, but where it is perpetrated by the state in a selective manner, condemnation should be focused on security forces and those who give such orders) These kinds of statements misinform the world of the actual facts on the ground and hinder insights that could help get Kenya out of the situation. Secondly reducing the current post election conflict to a Kikuyu-Luo affair is cheap analysis that is devoid of facts and reflections of what happens on the ground. Most of the current Western media analyses do not taken into account the underlying factors such as the failure of institutions of the state, such as the electoral commission of Kenya whose mediocre performance has plunged the country into bloodshed, a draconian constitutional framework that has been at the service of ethnic chauvinists and jingoist in power since 1963, the centralised power and networks that benefit from it, whose abuse and actions have led to marginalisation of certain groups from national resources, equitable public appointments, and the grand scheme involving local and international elites who exploit Kenya under the “old order”, interests/forces that want to keep the status quo and their role in the current problem. Bias and partisan analyses are also observed in the local media especially the media owners association, Kenya broadcasting corporation, Kenyan citizens in the diaspora through various blog sites and debaters in the local Newspapers where intellectuals, opinion and church leaders have taken sides, instead of guiding the debate in a more honest way so that all Kenyans can identify where the problem lies (draconian laws, out-dated political system, poverty, inequality, corruption, unequal distribution of resources countrywide and lack of access to essential services among others). Kenyans suffer under these conditions regardless of their tribe, and that is why those who live in the slums are from all tribes, even though previously marginalized by earlier regimes such as the Luo, Luhya and other minority groups make up the majority in those dwellings. Leadership and national interest The question that people need to ask is why did Kibaki sought to be Kenya’s president, in 1992, 1997, and finally became one in 2002? Was it because he lacked money? Was he someone with an agenda for the “whole “ nation? And if he had one, what was the agenda? Was that agenda realised between 2003 and 2007? Why are Kenyans having a problem with his agenda presented during the campaigns and the people around him majority of whom have been rejected in their own backyards? Why did most Kenyans have a problem with giving him another mandate? Why would someone who is a billionaire and aged 76, not want to leave a legacy that would be remembered in positive terms? What is so painful to forego that Kibaki would not want a clean election? More important to ask is why the current “elite” and morons around Kibaki are afraid of change of the current system and/or leadership to go into the hands of “lesser” communities? And lastly, why was the current regime rejected by majority of provinces and communities? Even though there are arguments that Kenya’s economy has grown at 6% over the past two years, the gap between the rich and poor has widened, with more people falling below the poverty line. The slums did not get smaller, nor did North Eastern and North-Eastern provinces get piped water from lake Victoria, the Samburus did not receive hospitals and tarmac roads, no fish industry was built along Lake Victoria and loans given to fishermen. 40 years is a long time for the Samburu, Turkana, Rendile and Somalis to wait for basic and essential services to reach them, it is a long time for Kamba people to wait for water and receive food hand outs during starvation, it is a long time before the fishermen along Lake Victoria receive funding through a fishing Board to take care of their interests in agriculture as done to coffee, tea, pyrethrum and dairy farmers; it is along time to wait for any major industry in Western Kenya; it too long time for Mijikenda to have resources from Coastal investments recycled back to alleviate their poverty, thirst for water, better schools and hospitals. Obstacle to dialogue In my view Kibaki is hostage to a number of factors that seems to contradict his call for putting the nation first. First and foremost are the networks of buddies and business comrades and elite form Mt Kenya who have been on the Gravy train since 2003. For what explains the refusal to find a middle ground while knowing so well that the outcome of the elections are not acceptable to everyone including their own people? The people holding Kibaki hostage are the ones Kenyans need to address in their quest for finding a peaceful solution to the current crisis. These people have a lot to loose if the man goes, thus the reason they are against recount, judicial review or re-run of presidential elections. Kenyans regardless of their ethnic background come distant in their priority of needs and actions. The opposition also has a role to play in the process and that will depend on the kind of proposal they put on table, which should be scrutinised by Kenyans since the issue at hand is about how Kenyans are governed and therefore Kibaki or Raila are just but people they expect to govern them through their mandate which includes listening to their views and respecting their will as expressed through the social contract via the vote and representative democracy. A Government of National Unity, or a recount of ballots papers will not solve any problem. It is a well-known fact that ballot papers especially those used for tallying presidential votes were already tampered with and might mot be traced. Secondly Keep never keeps any promise. He did not keep his promise to Kenyans after he made promises upon election in 2002; he never honoured agreements with his comrades upon enthronement, he renegade on the fight against corruption, poverty and tribalism. He does not have the will to keep his promises therefore arrangements such as a government of national unity will just be a soft landing for him, it will be a process that legitimises his hold onto power at the expense of democracy and the will of Kenyans who came out to vote on the 27^th December 2007. Kibaki and his handlers, do not care about democracy, it is a word they use at their convenience. The best arbitrator in this case is the voter. All mediators coming to Kenya should not let Kenyans down by proposing frameworks that will maintain the status quo. It will be a mockery to democracy and great betrayal to the many Kenyans who have lots their lives since the 50s, to liberate the country from colonial yokes but also from the yokes of fellow Kenyans such as Kenyatta, Moi and Kibaki. The Killings Kenyans should stop Killing each other. The culprits are few people who are out busy with self-aggrandisement at the expense of a whole nation. Although the current killings are unacceptable since they are an outcome of a stupidity of failure by Kenyan politicians to grasp the communality interest, Kenyans and more so those who abuse the political system and state institutions and resources should know that "Kenya belongs to all who belong in it" and all should be given equal treatment. There is no justification for the minister of internal security to use outdated and counterproductive tactics of targeting specific ethnic groups with paramilitary force and orders to kill. The images on television screens, shows that most of these people could be apprehended and taken to court. Senseless beating and shooting based on orders of a politician with colonial hangovers will exacerbate acts of revenge instead of resorting to the rule of law to settle disputes or address acts pf violence that are currently being perpetrated by some Kenyans who exploit the chaotic situation. The paramilitary police used by Michuki on the Luo (historical tactic, used by Kenyatta, in the 60s and early seventies) is selective and directed in one direction towards a group of people but that too will create more anger and feelings for revenge. Struggles in the Rift Valley are also about past wrongs against the minority communities like Ogieks who were chased out of the forest and the places given to the central province groups. Maasai and Kalenjin whose prime land were taken by the British, and later by the elite around Kenyatta. These grievances have never been addressed and due to the complex nature of ethnic blend in those regions, Moi for instance exploited this mix to cause chaos in order to vilify the onset of multiparty in Kenya. Ethnic clashes in 1992 and 1997, produced suffering and anger which have been kept low, but now fully exploited in the face of a dashed hope for change. These people thought there could be some equity with change of government but that hope is gone, so we expect anger, but also revenge as result of past clashes that were instigated by Moi prior to 1992, and 97 elections. Democratic test What I fear most is that if Kibaki is allowed to rule, Kenya will return to the dark ages, all the democratic gains will be lost. They will know that they can always rig elections and get away with it no matter what people do including protest, they don’t mind whether people die or not, since they will be able to get away with it. Kibaki’s behaviour in relation to vote tallying and results in the 2007 elections makes democracy look sick in Africa. It brings to mind the question whether there are free and fair elections? Or whether franchise or high voter turn out as witnessed in Kenya can turn a regime out of office? What about the role of institutions to support such a process like an independent police, electoral commission, judiciary and a parliament that is sensitive to the needs of the country, free and non-partisan media, respect for the rule of law by all parties involved in the electoral process? Even though democracy has never been perfect although being adopted by nations and peoples, its institutionalisation depend more on local history, culture and geography and not analyses and prescription as it is applied in other contexts. In the case of Kenya, the political, economic and social systems are complex and full of nuances, combined with other forces/ vested interests/pressure groups that exert more power, thus making the ordinary voter appear to be a pawn rather than a "king" maker. Therefore if Kenya is to build on the already made gains on the democratic front, a solution to the current crisis must be found in tandem with the reality on the ground. The reality that the “presidential election was rigged” and the incumbent is hell-bent on hanging to power no mater what cost, but also the reality that the opposition is making claims which have been proved right by the electoral commission itself and the various poll observers that Kibaki did not win the elections”. Although, calling for peace or on the major players to urge their supporters to clam down is a first step, but the call for peace should not water down the main cause of the problem which is “rigged elections” which is a threat to democratic gains. Being soft on this point would embolden the antagonists especially the “winners” and based on their history of arrogance and lack of decorum in addressing national issues, they will brush aside the issue at stake and this will fuel anger which is not only expressed by the opposition, but the very people the winners want to “rule” at all cost. Way out Asking Raila or Kenyans to forget this and forge ahead, and wait for another 5 years by many partisan authors in various local dailies and international blogs is not sincere and honest since such calls are directed at one party and not the other two. Why are people not asking Kibaki to resign? Why not ask for recount and audit of the votes? If the Electoral commission is not honest, how sure can we be of the courts in Kenya? Kenyans know that the system is rotten thus the overwhelming vote and a clear message that they want something different. They should not be denied this difference by hiding behind discourses that keeps on mystifying the problem. If Kibaki goes on without the approval of Kenyans, he is not making it better for those already hurt in one way or the other through killings and destruction seen in the past days. These things will haunt the nation after he is long gone and people around him or groups supporting him will not escape blame and demands to be held accountable. Peace can only come when the two parties agree to talk, engage and get into a process that will heal wounds on both sides of the divide (the people, the Opposition and PNU politicians). Allowing Kibaki to go ahead and bury his head as if nothing serious has happened will only exacerbate the arrogance of the group around him as witnessed during a recent press conference and the exchange between PNU Ministers and the press. Such one sided approach and attack on the opposition will only help strengthen the status quo, the exploitation, discrimination and inequality along tribal lines, which will exacerbate problems even if calmness would return today. What is urgently needed are; Curfew in Opposition areas to be lifted and regular police patrols with a humane face be initiated in hot spots to give people confidence in the state institutions for their safety. The general service unit has no role in the process since it is a catalyst instead of providing safety. The Kenya Pipeline Corporation should immediately resume pumping oil to western Kenya and Uganda. Cutting this supply is not different from scorched earth policy and if someone in the government has ordered such action, which was observed already before the election days then he/she or they are fueling the crisis instead of solving it. This should apply to other services like electricity, food items among others Kenyan civil society organisations, Law Society, The Kenya National Human Rights Commission and invited institutions to help in the process of reconciliation and putting in place a framework that would bring back the credibility of the electoral process and an acceptable conclusion A re-run of presidential election supervised by a team of independent observers and representatives of the two parties (ODM and PNU) within an agreed time frame. It is now clear from ECK that they did not know who won. The ECK had put aside funds for a run off, and that money can be used to SAVE KENYA. * Antony Otieno Ong'ayo is a Researcher in the New Politics Programme at the Transnational Institute *Please send comments to editor@pambazuka.org or comment online at http://www.pambazuka.org ****** /\/\//\/\/\//\/\/\//\/\/\//\/\/\//\/\/\//\/\/\//\/\/\//\/\/\//\ 3 Pan-African Postcard PARACHUTE JOURNALISM AND THE KENYAN CRISIS George Ogola George Ogola decries the simplistic western approach to covering news on Africa, as exemplified by the reporting of the Kenyan post- election crisis They were probably the longest days of my life. Red-eyed from lack of sleep and desperate for updated information on the Kenyan elections, I meticulously watched international TV networks and spent hours surfing the net for relevant sites covering the elections. I could sense curiosity turn into anxiety then fear before an unprecedented implosion. Kenya was at war with itself. The Economist called it ‘a very African coup’ while Raila Odinga called it ‘a civilian coup’. Both PNU and ODM claimed victory. Confusion reigned as chaos erupted. Months of excitement had turned into uncertainty for some and distress for others. But as I agonised with my people, there was a parallel drama unfolding. When controversy over the presidential elections threatened to destroy our fragile nation-state, ‘parachute’ journalists descended on Nairobi eager to cover yet another ‘trouble spot’ in the blighted continent. As the country went to the polls, Africa collectively had no more than tickers in the major international news channels. A week prior to the election, only Al-Jazeera had taken some trouble to tell the Kenyan story. Reuters Africa proved another notable exception. But the familiar would soon follow, vicious and unrelenting. When protests met the announcement of the presidential results, CNN, BBC 24 and Sky News sent some of their finest to Nairobi. But the frame of reference had been pre-determined. A narrative had been established. Kenya had descended into tribal anarchy reminiscent of the Rwanda genocide. Neighbours had turned onto each other just because they belonged to different tribes. ‘Tribal violence’ became the definitive mantra and was the basis for reports across the world. I recall a BBC 24 news anchor asking a reporter when the results were announced whether a military coup was an immediate possibility. Meanwhile, pundits were carefully selected. As a rule, they were middle class white folk mostly ex-diplomats previously based in Africa and ‘respected’ London-based Africanists working with the city’s many ‘Think-Tanks’. There was the occasional African interviewed on a late night show. The frames of reference could not be destabilised. People were being targeted and killed indiscriminately by tribal mobs. The savagery both in the deed as well as coverage was taken to new heights when a Church was set ablaze in Eldoret killing more than 40 people. International reporters flew to the town and milked the tragedy. They reconstructed the gory scenes, the savagery unbeknown to man since Rwanda. Footage of rotting corpses in maize fields and overflowing morgues were aired without reservation. The dead were denied dignity. If you were Kenyan, you cried; and I wept. But I cried for my country as well as the job I love. The kind of coverage I saw on Sky, BBC 24, Euro News and a host other channels was not magnanimity. I was convinced it was not a desire by a section of the international media to tell the world the true story about the conflict that was slowly consuming Kenya. This was about a good story; it was about the exploitation of a people crying out for help. It was equally about a western anthropology that figures conflict in Africa only in tribal terms; an Africa whose existence is so basic it must not be understood beyond the discourse of the tribe. I witnessed the power of a selective morality that tends to view Africa from a paradigm of difference, a unique rationality that embraces the kind of savagery the world was witnessing. Feature stories, commentaries and editorial pieces revelled in descriptions of gore; of eyes gorged, bodies burnt beyond recognition, of limbs severed with machetes. The description sounded more like a sport. Context and detail was ignored as the number of deaths became fodder for good stories. Highbrow newspapers suddenly became tabloids with pictures of fleeing Kenyans, children sleeping rough and lines of women with bowls queuing for food making the cover pages. TV news anchors asked reporters on the ground how many were starving, how many more had been killed, and how many more villages had been razed. Helicopters were more useful flying over burnt out villages to capture footage of frightened villagers than provide assistance. When many news channels heard whiff of planned protests, the question was not what it was about but how violent it would be. The threshold of death was continuously being revised, indeed rewritten. Amid this, the obvious was deliberately being negated. Why was violence in Nairobi largely restricted to the slums of Kibera and Mathare? Was it possible that the Kenyan poor were at war with the rich and with themselves, though speaking in a voice that is anathema to a revolution? Why was violence so seductive? Why were the middle classes marooned in their suburbs, silent and invisible? Why was the violence so vicious in the rural areas and especially in the Rift Valley? Was it really possibly that because of disputed presidential elections, Kenya would suddenly implode? Was there a historical trajectory to this conflict? No, the unambiguity of Africa as a problem continent could not be challenged at a time when it was such a good story. The assumption that informs the continent’s interpretation is that this is a continent whose civilisation cannot be so sophisticated as to have class wars; neither can it justifiably fight for anything remotely democratic. I’m still torn between weeping for my country and an institution I still love dearly. * Dr. George Ogola teaches at the University of Central Lancashire *Please send comments to editor@pambazuka.org or comment online at http://www.pambazuka.org ****** /\/\//\/\/\//\/\/\//\/\/\//\/\/\//\/\/\//\/\/\//\/\/\//\/\/\//\ Fahamu - Networks For Social Justice http://www.fahamu.org © Unless otherwise indicated, all materials published are licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 Unported License. For further details see: http:// www.pambazuka.org/en/about.php Pambazuka news can be viewed online: http://www.pambazuka.org/ RSS Feeds available at http://www.pambazuka.org/en/newsfeed.php Pambazuka News is published with the support of a number of funders, details of which can be obtained at http://www.pambazuka.org/en/ about.php To SUBSCRIBE or UNSUBSCRIBE go to: http://pambazuka.gn.apc.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/pambazuka-news or send a message to editor@pambazuka.org with the word SUBSCRIBE or UNSUBSCRIBE in the subject line as appropriate. The views expressed here are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of Pambazuka News or Fahamu. ISSN 1753-6839