- KICTANet - KICTANet

Re: [kictanet] Introducing the next facilitator :- Mwende Njiraini
by Florence Etta 18 Aug '08

18 Aug '08

Well done Walu. You do a fine job! Welcome mwalimu Mwende! Cheers, FE ----- Original Message ---- From: John Walubengo <jwalu(a)yahoo.com> To: florence.etta(a)gmail.com Cc: KICTAnet ICT Policy Discussions <kictanet(a)lists.kictanet.or.ke> Sent: Monday, 18 August, 2008 15:56:58 Subject: [kictanet] Introducing the next facilitator :- Mwende Njiraini I am pleased to introduce, Mwende Njiraini, an Electrical and Communications Engineer who happened to be my Supervisor when I undertook the 4months training on Internet Governance. You can check the rest of that story at http://www.diplomacy.edu/ig/IGCBP/display.asp?Topic=Team She has a wealth of information in Internet Governance issues but I have asked her to break it down in very small dozes to avoid over-saturation. She will facilitate the rest of the IG Discussion (Tue-Friday) where she will take us through the Economic and Socio-cultural Issues starting tomorrow. Over to you Mwende. walu. nb: I will now temporarily join the silent majority who are enjoying themselves lurking in the background ;-) _______________________________________________ kictanet mailing list kictanet(a)lists.kictanet.or.ke http://lists.kictanet.or.ke/mailman/listinfo/kictanet This message was sent to: florence.etta(a)gmail.com Unsubscribe or change your options at http://lists.kictanet.or.ke/mailman/options/kictanet/florence.etta%40gmail.… Send instant messages to your online friends http://uk.messenger.yahoo.com

1 0

Fwd: Draft of Cyber security law
by Brian Munyao Longwe 18 Aug '08

18 Aug '08

Hi all, Here is the Botswana Cybercrime and Computer Related Crimes Act of 2007. This is a clear example of a concise set of legislation dealing with the very unique and specific nature of computer/network related crimes. Any comments from our learned friends?

1 0

Day 5 of 10: IG Discussions, Legal Issues
by John Walubengo 18 Aug '08

18 Aug '08

Mornings, Today and next Monday, we intend to thrash out the legal dimensions of Internet Governance. The typical issues revolve around: -Jurisdiction & Arbitration (who resolves e-disputes) -Copyright & IPR (are they pro or anti-development?) -Privacy and Data Protection (how is the e-Citizens data abused/protected?) I do hope the 'learned' friends will chip in since I cannot pretend to be an expert here as I introduce the general legal principals. Basically, dispute resolutions can be done through, · Legislation; · Social norms (customs); · Self-regulation; · Regulation through code (software solution); · Jurisprudence (court decisions); · International law. There is however two broad conflicting schools of thought when it comes to resolving disputes occasioned by the Internet. One group claims that whatever happens online does have an equivalent ‘off-line’ characteristics and as such existing laws can easily be applied. E.g stealing money electronically is no different from stealing money physically and so Robbery charges and subsequent jurisdictional procedures could apply. However, the second group feels that electronic crimes have a totally different context and must have a separate and totally new set of legislation or methodologies for resolutions. The borderless nature of the Internet brings to fore the Challenges of Jurisdiction and Arbitration as in yesterday’s example, where content in one country may be illegal but is legal in another. Copyright and Intellectual Property Rights issues are also explosive as demonstrated by the Napster Case, where some young software engineers created software that facilitated sharing of (SONY) Music files across the Internet. Also related was the case of Amazon.com trying to Patent the ‘single-click’ method of buying goods online. Other cases touch on Data Privacy where Business Companies have been known to sell customer records to Marketing firms without express authority from the Customers. Other times customer data is simply hacked into and Businesses are unable to own up (going public) to the detriment of the Customer. Most of these issues are under discussion internationally at the Internet Governance Forum (IGF), World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) amongst other fora. They present emerging legal challenges and it would be interesting to know if stakeholders in the East African region are/should be involved in shaping the outcomes of any of these issues. 2days on this one, today and next Monday and feel free to belatedly respond to Day 1 through Day 5 issues. References: http://www.diplomacy.edu/ISL/IG/ http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Napster

6 9

[Fwd: Re: Day 6 of 10: IG Discussions, Legal Issues]
by alice 18 Aug '08

18 Aug '08

And more on DNS security http://blog.wired.com/27bstroke6/2008/08/experts-accuse.html Experts Accuse Bush Administration of Foot-Dragging on DNS Security Hole By Ryan Singel Email <mailto:ryan@ryansingel.net>August 13, 2008 | 3:44:24 PMCategories: Hacks and Cracks <http://blog.wired.com/27bstroke6/hacks_and_cracks/index.html>, Threats <http://blog.wired.com/27bstroke6/threats/index.html> Roots Despite a recent high-profile vulnerability that showed the net could be hacked in minutes, the domain name system -- a key internet infrastructure -- continues to suffer from a serious security weakness, thanks to bureaucratic inertia at the U.S. government agency in charge, security experts say. If the complicated politics of internet governance continue to get in the way of upgrading the security of the net's core technology, the internet could turn into a carnival house of mirrors, where no URL or e-mail address could be trusted to be genuine, according to Bill Woodcock, research director at the nonprofit Packet Clearing House <http://www.pch.net/home/index.php>. "The National Telecommunications and Information Administration, an agency of the Department of Commerce, is the show-stopper here," Woodcock said. At issue is the trustworthiness of the domain name system, or DNS, which serves as the internet's phone book <http://www.wired.com/science/discoveries/news/2008/06/dayintech_0623>, translating queries such as wikipedia.org into the numeric IP address where the site's server lives. Just weeks ago, security researcher Dan Kaminsky announced he'd discovered a way for hackers to feed fake info into DNS listings, which would allow hackers to redirect web traffic at will -- for example, routing every person attempting to log in to the Bank of America to a fake site controlled by the attacker. Kaminsky quietly worked with large tech companies to build patches for the net's name servers to make the attack more difficult. But security experts, and even the NTIA, say those patches are just temporary fixes; the only known complete fix is DNSSEC <http://www.dnssec-deployment.org/> -- a set of security extensions <http://www.dnssec-tools.org/> for name servers. Those extensions cryptographically sign DNS records, ensuring their authenticity like a wax seal on an letter. The push for DNSSEC has been ramping up over the last few years, with four regions -- including Sweden (.SE) and Puerto Rico (.PR) -- already securing their own domains with DNSSEC. Four of the largest top-level domains -- .org, .gov, .uk and .mil, are not far behind. But because DNS servers work in a giant hierarchy, deploying DNSSEC successfully also requires having someone trustworthy sign the so-called "root file" with a public-private key. Otherwise, an attacker can undermine the entire system at the root level, like cutting down a tree at the trunk. That's where the politics comes in. The DNS root is controlled by the Commerce Department's NTIA, which thus far has refused to implement DNSSEC. The NTIA brokers the contracts that divide the governance and top-level operations of the internet between the nonprofit ICANN and the for-profit VeriSign, which also runs the .com domain. "They're the only department of the government that isn't on board with securing the Domain Name System, and unfortunately, they're also the ones who Commerce deputized to oversee ICANN," Woodcock said. "The biggest difference is that once the root is signed and the public key is out, it will be put in every operating system and will be on all CDs from Apple, Microsoft, SUSE, Freebsd, etc," says Russ Mundy, principal networking scientist at Sparta, Inc, which has been developing open-source DNSSEC tools for years with government funding, He says the top-level key is "the only one you have to have, to go down the tree." A European networking group known as RIPE called in June 2007 for the root to be signed, with Swedish and British representatives echoing the call in October. But NTIA is not moving quickly enough to sign the root, given the looming threat, even after the final technical problems have been resolved, according to Woodcock and others. "A few years ago, there were still technical hurdles to actually signing and using DNSSEC, but in the past few years, a lot of software tools, both commercial and open-source, have come out, and now it's a completely solved problem," Woodcock said. "All that's left is the far less tractable, purely political problem." "Arguing over who gets to hold the cryptographic keys in the long run [should] wait until we're not facing a critical threat," Woodcock said. But the NTIA insists it is moving at just the right pace. "We are committed to taking no action that would have the potential to adversely affect the operational stability of the DNS," says spokesman Bart Forbes. "While there is increasing pressure to secure the DNS, NTIA must work with all stakeholders and consider all possible solutions." Olaf Kolkman, a Dutch networking export, says there's no time to waste. The only way for DNSSEC to work is for the top-level zone file -- which lists the specifics for top-level domains like .gov -- to be signed by a trusted authority. "Currently DNSSEC is the only mechanism known to protect against the Kaminsky attack," Kolkman said. "It is not clear that other solutions will provide the same level of protection as DNSSEC." Without such extensions, a hacker eager for trade secrets could hijack the DNS listing for Apple's e-mail server and insert the number for a server he controls instead. He could then keep a copy of every message sent to the company and forward them all. No one would likely to be any wiser until a human looked closely at the mail headers. Still, even DNSSEC's most fervent backers admit that signing the root won't instantly secure the net. Installing the extensions internet-wide will be costly and time-intensive, but proponents say that getting the root signed will turbocharge the process. The Internet Assigned Numbers Authority -- which coordinates the internet -- has been prototyping a system to sign the root-zone file for the last year, but they can't do the same for the internet's top servers without approval from the Department of Commerce. That's where the rub is, according to Kolkman. "Then the issue becomes political because there seems to be the perception that the introduction of a key guardian changes the current policies," Kolkman said That could also simplify how top-level zone files are created, according to Richard Lamb, a technical expert at IANA. Currently companies that manage top-level domains like .com submit changes to ICANN, which then sends them to NTIA for approval, before they're forwarded to VeriSign. VeriSign actually edits the root file and publishes it to the 13 root servers around the world. "We would want to bring the editing, creation and signing of the root zone file here," to IANA, Lamb said, noting that VeriSign would likely still control distribution of the file to the root servers, and there would be a public consultation process that the change was right for the net. But changing that system could be perceived as reducing U.S. control over the net -- a touchy geopolitical issue. ICANN is often considered by Washington politicians to be akin to the United Nations, and its push to control the root-zone file could push the U.S. to give more control to VeriSign, experts say. VeriSign did not respond to a request for comment, but its CTO said earlier this year that it was creating its own root-zone file-signing test bed. The root-zone file, which contains entries for the 300 or so top-level domains such as .gov and .com, changes almost every day, but the number of changes to the file will likely increase radically in the near future, since ICANN decided in June to allow an explosion of new top-level domain names. Woodcock isn't buying the assurances of NTIA that it is simply moving deliberatively. "If the root isn't signed, then no amount of work that responsible individuals and companies do to protect their domains will be effective," Woodcock said. "You have to follow the chain of signatures down from the root to the top-level domain to the user's domain. If all three pieces aren't there, the user isn't protected." Brian Munyao Longwe wrote: > So does Cyber War bring out any legal issues? This is a slightly > chilling summary of the current crisis in Georgia and the central role > that the internet had before the hostilities escalated. > > *Longtime Battle Lines Are Recast In Russia and Georgia's Cyberwar* > > By Kim Hart > Washington Post Staff Writer > Thursday, August 14, 2008; D01 > > As the violence unfolded between Russia and Georgia during the past > week, hackers waged war on another front: the Internet. > > The Georgian government accused Russia of engaging in cyberwarfare by > disabling many government Web sites, making it difficult to inform > citizens quickly of important updates. Russia said that it was not > involved and that its own media and official Web sites had suffered > similar attacks. Although a cease-fire has been ordered, major > Georgian servers are still down, hindering communication in the country. > > Some Georgian officials, bloggers and citizens were able to work > around the disruptions, sending text messages to friends in other > countries using Web sites hosted by servers in the United States, > Poland and Estonia that are less likely to fall victim to a cyberattack. > > Concerted online attacks have been a threat for years. But security > experts say the "cyberwar" between Russia and Georgia underscores the > havoc that can spread on a digital battlefield. It also highlights how > vulnerable Web-reliant countries are to assaults that could cripple > military communications or a national banking industry. > > The attacks against Georgia's Internet infrastructure began nearly two > months before the first shots were fired, according to security > researchers who track Internet traffic into and out of the countries. > Such attacks, known as "denial of service" attacks, are triggered when > computers in a network are simultaneously ordered to bombard a site > with millions of requests, which overloads a server and causes it to > shut down. > > "In terms of the scope and international dimension of this attack, > it's a landmark," said Ronald J. Deibert, director of the University > of Toronto's Citizen Lab, which has nearly 100 researchers mapping Web > traffic through several countries, including Russia and Georgia. He > said small-scale attacks have occurred between the countries since > June. "International laws are very poorly developed, so it really > crosses a line into murky territory . . . Is an information blockade > an act of war?" > > Cyberattacks can be launched cheaply and easily, with a few hundred > computers and a couple of skilled hackers. Simpler tactics are even > easier to mount by hacking into a server and deleting files, > reconfiguring settings and altering photos. Compared with expensive > military attacks, cyberwar tactics "seems like the kind of thing that > a sophisticated military would want to experiment with," said Ben > Edelman, assistant professor at Harvard Business School who has > studied cyberattacks. > > "Imagine how devastating it would be to a military commander to lose > access to a server that tells him where his troops are stationed and > where he has resources," he said, adding that "this is the first time > we've had such strong evidence of cyberwarfare." > > Instructions on how to mount such attacks are readily available on > blogs, making it easy for a grass-roots effort to quickly escalate > into a crippling assault, said Evgeny Morozov, a technology consultant > based in Berlin who has tracked blogs in Georgia and Russia. > > Figuring out who is behind the attacks has been difficult, Deibert > said, because of complex routing methods and a multitude of connection > exchanges. The Internet's infrastructure is a maze of lines laid by > different service providers traversing many countries, masking how > information is traveling -- or blocked. > > "It's an ongoing battle in documenting where it's coming from and > helping people get around it," he said. > > In Georgia, which is not as dependent on the Internet as other > nations, the cyberattack mainly hindered the government's ability to > communicate with its citizens and others during the fighting. The > Georgian Foreign Ministry's Web site, for example, was disabled except > for a collage that compared Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili to > Adolf Hitler. > > "Battles today are as much about ideas and images as they are > territories," Deibert said. "If you're a military and intelligence > agency, you're going to take down information that is in opposition > and control the message." > > To get around the blockade, Georgian officials relocated national Web > sites to addresses hosted by Google's Blogspot, whose U.S. servers are > more immune to attack. Citizens used blogging platforms such as > LiveJournal -- the dominant platform in Russia and Georgia -- to post > their own reactions during the fighting. > > For example, a Georgian refugee from Abkhazia who blogs under the name > Cyxymu on LiveJournal posted photos of Russian troops entering the > Georgian town of Gori. The blogger said the photos were taken after > Russia had announced its withdrawal, proving, he said, that fighting > continued. > > Morozov said only a few hundred Georgians used blogs to communicate > with people outside the country. Even that tool was threatened, he > said, when a group of Russian bloggers sent a letter asking Sup, the > Russian company that owns and manages LiveJournal, to censor posts > with pro-Georgian sentiment. Sup did not comply. > > Givi Bitsadze, in Tbilisi, used microblogging site Twitter to share > updates about the fighting in English and Russian. > > "Tbilisi is still safe, but other cities are under attack, bombs kinda > stopped, but Russian soldiers are breaking in a houses," one post read > yesterday. He also noted an Olympic victory: "Georgia beats Russia in > beach volleyball." > > The cyberwar will most likely serve as a Web security wake-up call, > Morozov said. > > "Georgia was completely unprepared to the fact that all this > information was on the Internet," he said. "I think it taught them -- > and a lot of people -- a lesson." > > > > > On Aug 18, 2008, at 9:00 AM, John Walubengo wrote: >> Hi all, >> >> Hpe u had a good weekend. Today is day 6 of 10, but the theme is >> still on legal issues. >> >> I still cant believe the learned friends have not spoken and left >> everything to Alex and Mike. If any of you runs into Evelyn R., >> Kihanya J., Omo J. or Clara R. just to mention a few, ask them if >> they can give us a shout without us having to 'open a file' >> >> We have only today for this since tomorrow we move into the Economic >> Issues to be facilitated by a renowned IG expert to be unveiled in >> due course. >> >> walu. >> >> --- On Sat, 8/16/08, Alex Gakuru <alex.gakuru(a)yahoo.com >> <mailto:alex.gakuru@yahoo.com>> wrote: >> >>> From: Alex Gakuru <alex.gakuru(a)yahoo.com <mailto:alex.gakuru@yahoo.com>> >>> Subject: Re: [kictanet] Day 5 of 10: IG Discussions, Legal Issues >>> To: jwalu(a)yahoo.com <mailto:jwalu@yahoo.com> >>> Cc: "KICTAnet ICT Policy Discussions" <kictanet(a)lists.kictanet.or.ke >>> <mailto:kictanet@lists.kictanet.or.ke>> >>> Date: Saturday, August 16, 2008, 11:17 AM >>> G8 links! >>> >>> The introduction to this topic was on the presumption that >>> consumers were the criminals proceeding to outline law >>> enforcement challenges. The most convenient and common form >>> of misrepresenting cyber crimes and law -- first take away >>> all their rights then they struggle to regain one after the >>> other... It is good that Mike presents both sides of the >>> story. >>> Telecommunication companies hold massive data on all >>> individuals and they ensure that their on their "Terms >>> of Use" and contracts users are "guilty until >>> proven innocent" and the companies are at liberty to do >>> whatever they please with our personal data. >>> >>> Consider below extract from a local telecommunication >>> company's Terms of Use: - >>> ------------ >>> 5. Use of your information >>> >>> (The Company) may hold and use information provided by you >>> for a number of purposes, which may include: >>> >>> (a) Carrying out any activity in connection with a legal, >>> governmental or regulatory requirement on (The Company) in >>> connection with legal proceedings or in respect of crime or >>> fraud prevention, detection or prosecution. >>> >>> (b) Monitoring or recording of your communications for (The >>> Company)’s business purposes such as marketing, quality >>> control and training, prevention of unauthorised use of >>> (The Company)’s telecommunications system and ensuring >>> effective systems operation in order to prevent or detect >>> crime. >>> >>> --------- >>> >>> "May include" does not mean "limited >>> to" - implying that they are allowed, for example, to >>> share, sell, etc private data to their partners... Exactly >>> what Mike points out to on the Business Week link. >>> >>> Framed in ways suggestive of company "law >>> enforcer" (illegal roles) onto "guilty" >>> users. Notice how "Intellectual Property" is >>> conveniently repeated. Or is it be assumed that consumers do >>> not have any "intellectual property" they would >>> wish protected? the companies should abide to also protect. >>> BTW, There is an IGF Dynamic Coalition movement calling for >>> a balance between Intellectual Property and development >>> which includes Access to Knwoledge >>> (A2K).<http://www.ipjustice.org>. Very resourceful! >>> >>> >>> Supposing earlier proposed M-Medicine went ahead in East >>> Africa? Sold ailments data to pharmaceutical companies, that >>> would hike medicines prices in outbreak zones at selected >>> locations... You go to a bank with a water-tight business >>> proposals and all bank turn you down. Reason? They have >>> shared your medical history and they think you will soon >>> "sleep in the shamba" your excellent business >>> proposals notwithstanding. >>> >>> In summary, unless Data Protection and Privacy Laws are >>> enacted, the default should be to deny all telecommunication >>> companies legal loophole to trade with personal information. >>> And it should be seen to be enforced. >>> >>> On a lighter note, should I sue a WiFi company for >>> trespassing when their signals enter my laptop, or should >>> they sue me for illegally access of their signal? Over to >>> Ben Shihanya. >>> >>> Thanks again Mike! >>> >>> >>> --- On Fri, 8/15/08, Mike Theuri >>> <mike.theuri(a)gmail.com <mailto:mike.theuri@gmail.com>> wrote: >>> >>>> From: Mike Theuri <mike.theuri(a)gmail.com >>>> <mailto:mike.theuri@gmail.com>> >>>> Subject: Re: [kictanet] Day 5 of 10: IG Discussions, >>> Legal Issues >>>> To: alex.gakuru(a)yahoo.com <mailto:alex.gakuru@yahoo.com> >>>> Cc: "KICTAnet ICT Policy Discussions" >>> <kictanet(a)lists.kictanet.or.ke <mailto:kictanet@lists.kictanet.or.ke>> >>>> Date: Friday, August 15, 2008, 2:11 PM >>>> Not a legal opinion: It would be very difficult to >>> apply >>>> existing common law >>>> (analogous to jurisprudence) to electronic crimes >>> committed >>>> in a new era, >>>> atleast within the local context. >>>> >>>> For these reasons it is necessary to define the crimes >>>> under distinct and >>>> separate legislation. Due to the borderless nature of >>> the >>>> Internet (see >>>> shared link), it is necessary for such legislation to >>> take >>>> a broad >>>> approach into account. >>>> >>>> For instance there ought to be provisions that allow >>> local >>>> authorities to >>>> seek the arrest and extradition of foreign based >>> suspects >>>> from other >>>> jurisdictions for electronic crimes committed against >>>> citizens or local >>>> infrastructure owned by individuals or entities even >>> though >>>> the suspects at >>>> the time of commission of the crime were present in >>> other >>>> jurisdictions. >>>> >>>> The same provision can allow private parties to pursue >>>> civil remedies in a >>>> similar matter and give them the basis where possible >>> to >>>> enforce the >>>> judgement in the defendant's jurisdiction. >>>> >>>> This for example would close the possible >>> jurisdictional >>>> loophole >>>> of individuals crossing borders so as to commit >>> electronic >>>> crimes from a >>>> country that lacks electronic crime laws. Current law >>> is >>>> ill equipped in >>>> ensuring civil remedies, prosecution or arrest of >>> local or >>>> international >>>> cyber criminals, 419ers, lurers of minors, harassers, >>>> electronically >>>> transmitted or created threats (threats to a person, >>>> threats to >>>> infrastructure by way of viruses, malaware, DoS etc) >>> etc >>>> neither is it >>>> likely to be in a position to ensure serious >>> consequences >>>> or deterents for >>>> the same or allow for the definition of crimes as >>>> distinguished here for an >>>> international gang of culprits: >>>> >>> http://www.secretservice.gov/press/GPA15-08_CyberIndictments_Final.pdf >>>> >>>> It was recently reported that a bill or regulations to >>>> protect the data of >>>> consumers would be brought about as a means of >>> regulating >>>> the CRBs. This >>>> could be model legislation/regulations to adopt to >>> ensure >>>> that the public >>>> has a say in the manner in which their private >>> information >>>> is used. >>>> >>>> At the same time consumers ought to be able to >>> instruct >>>> companies with whom >>>> they have business relationships with not to share >>> that >>>> same information >>>> with 3rd parties without their prior consent (ie >>>> opt-in/out). This is only >>>> effective if there are laws or regulations to provide >>> for >>>> consequences when >>>> businesses violate the same. >>>> >>>> As CRBs take root, there will be a likelihood that >>> similar >>>> bureaus or >>>> entities will eventually start sharing information in >>> real >>>> time, for example >>>> an underwriter of an insurance policy might want to >>> check >>>> an individual's >>>> claim history across the industry to determine the >>> level of >>>> risk the insured >>>> poses in determining policy premiums. Similarly an >>>> organization may want to >>>> conduct background checks for prospective employees in >>>> privately maintained >>>> electronic databases. >>>> >>>> It is important that instead of regulations or laws >>> being >>>> formed for sectors >>>> of the economy, that national data privacy laws and >>>> regulations be defined >>>> (or ammended) and on that basis refinement of specific >>>> regulations/laws >>>> could be made for sectors that require specific data >>>> requirements. Such >>>> regulatory foresight can reduce or avert the occurence >>> of >>>> issues such as >>>> those seen here: >>>> >>> http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/08_31/b4094000643943.htm?campa… >>>> >>>> >>>> On Fri, Aug 15, 2008 at 12:21 AM, John Walubengo >>>> <jwalu(a)yahoo.com <mailto:jwalu@yahoo.com>> wrote: >>>> >>>>> Mornings, >>>>> >>>>> Today and next Monday, we intend to thrash out >>> the >>>> legal dimensions of >>>>> Internet Governance. The typical issues revolve >>>> around: >>>>> -Jurisdiction & Arbitration (who resolves >>>> e-disputes) >>>>> -Copyright & IPR (are they pro or >>>> anti-development?) >>>>> -Privacy and Data Protection (how is the >>> e-Citizens >>>> data abused/protected?) >>>>> >>>>> I do hope the 'learned' friends will chip >>> in >>>> since I cannot pretend to be >>>>> an expert here as I introduce the general legal >>>> principals. Basically, >>>>> dispute resolutions can be done through, >>>>> · Legislation; >>>>> · Social norms (customs); >>>>> · Self-regulation; >>>>> · Regulation through code (software >>> solution); >>>>> · Jurisprudence (court decisions); >>>>> · International law. >>>>> >>>>> There is however two broad conflicting schools of >>>> thought when it comes to >>>>> resolving disputes occasioned by the Internet. >>> One >>>> group claims that >>>>> whatever happens online does have an equivalent >>>> 'off-line' characteristics >>>>> and as such existing laws can easily be applied. >>> E.g >>>> stealing money >>>>> electronically is no different from stealing >>> money >>>> physically and so Robbery >>>>> charges and subsequent jurisdictional procedures >>> could >>>> apply. However, the >>>>> second group feels that electronic crimes have a >>>> totally different context >>>>> and must have a separate and totally new set of >>>> legislation or methodologies >>>>> for resolutions. >>>>> >>>>> The borderless nature of the Internet brings to >>> fore >>>> the Challenges of >>>>> Jurisdiction and Arbitration as in >>> yesterday's >>>> example, where content in one >>>>> country may be illegal but is legal in another. >>>> Copyright and Intellectual >>>>> Property Rights issues are also explosive as >>>> demonstrated by the Napster >>>>> Case, where some young software engineers created >>>> software that facilitated >>>>> sharing of (SONY) Music files across the >>> Internet. >>>> Also related was the case >>>>> of Amazon.com trying to Patent the >>>> 'single-click' method of buying goods >>>>> online. >>>>> >>>>> Other cases touch on Data Privacy where Business >>>> Companies have been known >>>>> to sell customer records to Marketing firms >>> without >>>> express authority from >>>>> the Customers. Other times customer data is >>> simply >>>> hacked into and >>>>> Businesses are unable to own up (going public) to >>> the >>>> detriment of the >>>>> Customer. >>>>> >>>>> Most of these issues are under discussion >>>> internationally at the Internet >>>>> Governance Forum (IGF), World Intellectual >>> Property >>>> Organization (WIPO) >>>>> amongst other fora. They present emerging legal >>>> challenges and it would be >>>>> interesting to know if stakeholders in the East >>>> African region are/should be >>>>> involved in shaping the outcomes of any of these >>>> issues. >>>>> >>>>> 2days on this one, today and next Monday and feel >>> free >>>> to belatedly respond >>>>> to Day 1 through Day 5 issues. >>>>> >>>>> References: >>>>> http://www.diplomacy.edu/ISL/IG/ >>>>> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Napster >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> _______________________________________________ >>>>> kictanet mailing list >>>>> kictanet(a)lists.kictanet.or.ke <mailto:kictanet@lists.kictanet.or.ke> >>>>> >>> http://lists.kictanet.or.ke/mailman/listinfo/kictanet >>>>> >>>>> This message was sent to: mike.theuri(a)gmail.com >>>>> <mailto:mike.theuri@gmail.com> >>>>> Unsubscribe or change your options at >>>>> >>>> >>> http://lists.kictanet.or.ke/mailman/options/kictanet/mike.theuri%40gmail.com >>>>> >>>> _______________________________________________ >>>> kictanet mailing list >>>> kictanet(a)lists.kictanet.or.ke <mailto:kictanet@lists.kictanet.or.ke> >>>> http://lists.kictanet.or.ke/mailman/listinfo/kictanet >>>> >>>> This message was sent to: alex.gakuru(a)yahoo.com >>>> <mailto:alex.gakuru@yahoo.com> >>>> Unsubscribe or change your options at >>>> >>> http://lists.kictanet.or.ke/mailman/options/kictanet/alex.gakuru%40yahoo.com >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> _______________________________________________ >>> kictanet mailing list >>> kictanet(a)lists.kictanet.or.ke <mailto:kictanet@lists.kictanet.or.ke> >>> http://lists.kictanet.or.ke/mailman/listinfo/kictanet >>> >>> This message was sent to: jwalu(a)yahoo.com <mailto:jwalu@yahoo.com> >>> Unsubscribe or change your options at >>> http://lists.kictanet.or.ke/mailman/options/kictanet/jwalu%40yahoo.com >> >> >> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> kictanet mailing list >> kictanet(a)lists.kictanet.or.ke <mailto:kictanet@lists.kictanet.or.ke> >> http://lists.kictanet.or.ke/mailman/listinfo/kictanet >> >> This message was sent to: brian(a)caret.net <mailto:brian@caret.net> >> Unsubscribe or change your options at >> http://lists.kictanet.or.ke/mailman/options/kictanet/brian%40caret.net > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > > _______________________________________________ > kictanet mailing list > kictanet(a)lists.kictanet.or.ke > http://lists.kictanet.or.ke/mailman/listinfo/kictanet > > This message was sent to: alice(a)apc.org > Unsubscribe or change your options at http://lists.kictanet.or.ke/mailman/options/kictanet/alice%40apc.org >

1 0

Re: [kictanet] Day 6 of 10: IG Discussions, Legal Issues
by alice 18 Aug '08

18 Aug '08

I am not a "learned friend" bus silence could also be because Kenya lacks a legal framework to address problems of say validity of electronic transactions, legal regime for protection of ideas, consumer privacy and protection, cyber crimes, among others. Then there is the greatest legal challenge presented by the internet; its lack of boundaries, the free flowing borderless nature of the net has revolutionised communication and commerce but also many lawsuits and its tough enough determining where the lawsuits should take place, which institutions should be mandated and tasked to regulate and govern some of these issues. The draft ICT bill 2007 (with stakeholder input) had touched on some of these issues. best alice > > > > Brian Munyao Longwe wrote: >> my experience is that our learned friends tend to "reserve comment" >> so that they are not "quoted out of context" or held personally >> liable for their remarks. Short of giving a legal opinion which would >> withstand the scrutiny of the entire LSK it is often very difficult >> to extract "feelings" out of this species without external (and >> sometimes internal influences). >> >> I also heard one learned friend saying that of late it has been so >> cold he has actually been putting his hands in his own pockets ;-) >> >> Anyway 'nuff said - but I would really love to hear even a simplified >> view of some of the issues that have been raised in this look at >> legal frameworks as pertain to internet, internet related >> technologies and more especially offenses that have had something to >> do with the internet. >> >> Note this example of a cross-border engagement: >> >> *1. Dutch Police and F.B.I. Rein in Large Botnet* >> By JEREMY KIRK, IDG News Service >> New York Times >> August 14, 2008 >> >> >> >> The botnet created by a teenager who was arrested by Dutch police in >> a sting operation is most notable for its total reliance on social >> engineering to spread, computer security experts said Thursday. >> >> >> >> The 19-year-old Dutch man was caught July 29 with his 16-year-old >> brother trying to sell a botnet to a 35-year-old Brazilian man, >> according to Dutch prosecutors. All were arrested by the Dutch >> High-Tech Crime Unit, with assistance from the U.S. Federal Bureau of >> Investigation. >> >> >> >> As is customary in the Netherlands, Dutch police have not released >> the names of those arrested. Few other details, such as how >> authorities became cued into the case, have been released. U.S. >> authorities are seeking the extradition of the Brazilian man. >> >> >> >> But experts from Russian security vendor Kaspersky Lab were called on >> by Dutch police to write up instructions for how to remove the botnet >> code from infected PCs, as well as aid in the continuing >> investigation, said Eddy Willems, one of Kaspersky's security >> evangelists. >> >> >> >> A botnet is a group of PCs that is infected with malicious code and >> controlled by a hacker. This particular botnet, which at one time had >> as many as 150,000 machines worldwide, is called "Shadow," the name >> bestowed on it by its creator. >> >> >> >> The code that enabled Shadow to work was distributed on Microsoft's >> Windows Live Messenger instant messaging network. Victims would >> typically get a message from someone who appeared to be one of their >> contacts. The message would contain a link to another Web site, where >> the victim was asked to download a file. >> >> >> >> If the file was executed on a PC, Shadow would collect other instant >> messaging contacts and send out more messages trying to enlarge the >> botnet. It appeared that Shadow was particularly successful in the >> Netherlands, since some messages were sent out in Dutch. >> >> >> >> The distribution method relied entirely on victims willingly >> downloading the code rather than trying to exploit a software >> vulnerability, which could result in an infection regardless of what >> the user does. >> >> >> >> It means that Internet surfers are just as susceptible to fall victim >> to scammy tricks. "Social engineering seems just as effective as it >> was 10 years ago," said Roel Schouwenberg, senior antivirus researcher. >> >> >> >> Shadow could also download other malicious code and may have been >> used to download advertising software and spyware programs, >> Schouwenberg said. The teenager who created Shadow appears to use >> bits of malware code already circulating on the Internet, as well >> writing his own code. >> >> >> >> The result was a fairly run-of-the-mill botnet, but one that could be >> considered large, Willems said. When the bust occurred, the >> 19-year-old was attempting to sell the botnet for €25,000 >> (US$37,290), a price Willems said is way too high in proportion to >> how botnets are currently priced. >> >> >> >> People who control a group of computers, called botnet herders, have >> been known to rent time to other scammers, who use the computers to >> send spam or conduct other malicious activity. The use of remote >> computers helps disguise who is actually using those machines to >> carry out crime. >> >> >> >> Dutch prosecutors could not immediately be reached for comment. >> >> >> >> >> On Aug 18, 2008, at 9:00 AM, John Walubengo wrote: >>> Hi all, >>> >>> Hpe u had a good weekend. Today is day 6 of 10, but the theme is >>> still on legal issues. >>> I still cant believe the learned friends have not spoken and left >>> everything to Alex and Mike. If any of you runs into Evelyn R., >>> Kihanya J., Omo J. or Clara R. just to mention a few, ask them if >>> they can give us a shout without us having to 'open a file' >>> >>> We have only today for this since tomorrow we move into the Economic >>> Issues to be facilitated by a renowned IG expert to be unveiled in >>> due course. >>> >>> walu. >>> >>> --- On Sat, 8/16/08, Alex Gakuru <alex.gakuru(a)yahoo.com >>> <mailto:alex.gakuru@yahoo.com>> wrote: >>> >>>> From: Alex Gakuru <alex.gakuru(a)yahoo.com >>>> <mailto:alex.gakuru@yahoo.com>> >>>> Subject: Re: [kictanet] Day 5 of 10: IG Discussions, Legal Issues >>>> To: jwalu(a)yahoo.com <mailto:jwalu@yahoo.com> >>>> Cc: "KICTAnet ICT Policy Discussions" >>>> <kictanet(a)lists.kictanet.or.ke <mailto:kictanet@lists.kictanet.or.ke>> >>>> Date: Saturday, August 16, 2008, 11:17 AM >>>> G8 links! >>>> >>>> The introduction to this topic was on the presumption that >>>> consumers were the criminals proceeding to outline law >>>> enforcement challenges. The most convenient and common form >>>> of misrepresenting cyber crimes and law -- first take away >>>> all their rights then they struggle to regain one after the >>>> other... It is good that Mike presents both sides of the >>>> story. >>>> Telecommunication companies hold massive data on all >>>> individuals and they ensure that their on their "Terms >>>> of Use" and contracts users are "guilty until >>>> proven innocent" and the companies are at liberty to do >>>> whatever they please with our personal data. >>>> Consider below extract from a local telecommunication >>>> company's Terms of Use: - >>>> ------------ >>>> 5. Use of your information >>>> >>>> (The Company) may hold and use information provided by you >>>> for a number of purposes, which may include: >>>> >>>> (a) Carrying out any activity in connection with a legal, >>>> governmental or regulatory requirement on (The Company) in >>>> connection with legal proceedings or in respect of crime or >>>> fraud prevention, detection or prosecution. >>>> >>>> (b) Monitoring or recording of your communications for (The >>>> Company)’s business purposes such as marketing, quality >>>> control and training, prevention of unauthorised use of (The >>>> Company)’s telecommunications system and ensuring >>>> effective systems operation in order to prevent or detect >>>> crime. >>>> --------- >>>> >>>> "May include" does not mean "limited >>>> to" - implying that they are allowed, for example, to >>>> share, sell, etc private data to their partners... Exactly >>>> what Mike points out to on the Business Week link. >>>> Framed in ways suggestive of company "law >>>> enforcer" (illegal roles) onto "guilty" >>>> users. Notice how "Intellectual Property" is >>>> conveniently repeated. Or is it be assumed that consumers do >>>> not have any "intellectual property" they would >>>> wish protected? the companies should abide to also protect. >>>> BTW, There is an IGF Dynamic Coalition movement calling for >>>> a balance between Intellectual Property and development >>>> which includes Access to Knwoledge >>>> (A2K).<http://www.ipjustice.org>. Very resourceful! >>>> >>>> Supposing earlier proposed M-Medicine went ahead in East >>>> Africa? Sold ailments data to pharmaceutical companies, that >>>> would hike medicines prices in outbreak zones at selected >>>> locations... You go to a bank with a water-tight business >>>> proposals and all bank turn you down. Reason? They have >>>> shared your medical history and they think you will soon >>>> "sleep in the shamba" your excellent business >>>> proposals notwithstanding. >>>> >>>> In summary, unless Data Protection and Privacy Laws are >>>> enacted, the default should be to deny all telecommunication >>>> companies legal loophole to trade with personal information. >>>> And it should be seen to be enforced. >>>> >>>> On a lighter note, should I sue a WiFi company for >>>> trespassing when their signals enter my laptop, or should >>>> they sue me for illegally access of their signal? Over to >>>> Ben Shihanya. >>>> Thanks again Mike! >>>> >>>> --- On Fri, 8/15/08, Mike Theuri >>>> <mike.theuri(a)gmail.com <mailto:mike.theuri@gmail.com>> wrote: >>>> >>>>> From: Mike Theuri <mike.theuri(a)gmail.com >>>>> <mailto:mike.theuri@gmail.com>> >>>>> Subject: Re: [kictanet] Day 5 of 10: IG Discussions, >>>> Legal Issues >>>>> To: alex.gakuru(a)yahoo.com <mailto:alex.gakuru@yahoo.com> >>>>> Cc: "KICTAnet ICT Policy Discussions" >>>> <kictanet(a)lists.kictanet.or.ke <mailto:kictanet@lists.kictanet.or.ke>> >>>>> Date: Friday, August 15, 2008, 2:11 PM >>>>> Not a legal opinion: It would be very difficult to >>>> apply >>>>> existing common law >>>>> (analogous to jurisprudence) to electronic crimes >>>> committed >>>>> in a new era, >>>>> atleast within the local context. >>>>> >>>>> For these reasons it is necessary to define the crimes >>>>> under distinct and >>>>> separate legislation. Due to the borderless nature of >>>> the >>>>> Internet (see >>>>> shared link), it is necessary for such legislation to >>>> take >>>>> a broad >>>>> approach into account. >>>>> >>>>> For instance there ought to be provisions that allow >>>> local >>>>> authorities to >>>>> seek the arrest and extradition of foreign based >>>> suspects >>>>> from other >>>>> jurisdictions for electronic crimes committed against >>>>> citizens or local >>>>> infrastructure owned by individuals or entities even >>>> though >>>>> the suspects at >>>>> the time of commission of the crime were present in >>>> other >>>>> jurisdictions. >>>>> >>>>> The same provision can allow private parties to pursue >>>>> civil remedies in a >>>>> similar matter and give them the basis where possible >>>> to >>>>> enforce the >>>>> judgement in the defendant's jurisdiction. >>>>> >>>>> This for example would close the possible >>>> jurisdictional >>>>> loophole >>>>> of individuals crossing borders so as to commit >>>> electronic >>>>> crimes from a >>>>> country that lacks electronic crime laws. Current law >>>> is >>>>> ill equipped in >>>>> ensuring civil remedies, prosecution or arrest of >>>> local or >>>>> international >>>>> cyber criminals, 419ers, lurers of minors, harassers, >>>>> electronically >>>>> transmitted or created threats (threats to a person, >>>>> threats to >>>>> infrastructure by way of viruses, malaware, DoS etc) >>>> etc >>>>> neither is it >>>>> likely to be in a position to ensure serious >>>> consequences >>>>> or deterents for >>>>> the same or allow for the definition of crimes as >>>>> distinguished here for an >>>>> international gang of culprits: >>>>> >>>> http://www.secretservice.gov/press/GPA15-08_CyberIndictments_Final.pdf >>>>> >>>>> It was recently reported that a bill or regulations to >>>>> protect the data of >>>>> consumers would be brought about as a means of >>>> regulating >>>>> the CRBs. This >>>>> could be model legislation/regulations to adopt to >>>> ensure >>>>> that the public >>>>> has a say in the manner in which their private >>>> information >>>>> is used. >>>>> >>>>> At the same time consumers ought to be able to >>>> instruct >>>>> companies with whom >>>>> they have business relationships with not to share >>>> that >>>>> same information >>>>> with 3rd parties without their prior consent (ie >>>>> opt-in/out). This is only >>>>> effective if there are laws or regulations to provide >>>> for >>>>> consequences when >>>>> businesses violate the same. >>>>> >>>>> As CRBs take root, there will be a likelihood that >>>> similar >>>>> bureaus or >>>>> entities will eventually start sharing information in >>>> real >>>>> time, for example >>>>> an underwriter of an insurance policy might want to >>>> check >>>>> an individual's >>>>> claim history across the industry to determine the >>>> level of >>>>> risk the insured >>>>> poses in determining policy premiums. Similarly an >>>>> organization may want to >>>>> conduct background checks for prospective employees in >>>>> privately maintained >>>>> electronic databases. >>>>> >>>>> It is important that instead of regulations or laws >>>> being >>>>> formed for sectors >>>>> of the economy, that national data privacy laws and >>>>> regulations be defined >>>>> (or ammended) and on that basis refinement of specific >>>>> regulations/laws >>>>> could be made for sectors that require specific data >>>>> requirements. Such >>>>> regulatory foresight can reduce or avert the occurence >>>> of >>>>> issues such as >>>>> those seen here: >>>>> >>>> http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/08_31/b4094000643943.htm?campa… >>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Fri, Aug 15, 2008 at 12:21 AM, John Walubengo >>>>> <jwalu(a)yahoo.com <mailto:jwalu@yahoo.com>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> Mornings, >>>>>> >>>>>> Today and next Monday, we intend to thrash out >>>> the >>>>> legal dimensions of >>>>>> Internet Governance. The typical issues revolve >>>>> around: >>>>>> -Jurisdiction & Arbitration (who resolves >>>>> e-disputes) >>>>>> -Copyright & IPR (are they pro or >>>>> anti-development?) >>>>>> -Privacy and Data Protection (how is the >>>> e-Citizens >>>>> data abused/protected?) >>>>>> >>>>>> I do hope the 'learned' friends will chip >>>> in >>>>> since I cannot pretend to be >>>>>> an expert here as I introduce the general legal >>>>> principals. Basically, >>>>>> dispute resolutions can be done through, >>>>>> · Legislation; >>>>>> · Social norms (customs); >>>>>> · Self-regulation; >>>>>> · Regulation through code (software >>>> solution); >>>>>> · Jurisprudence (court decisions); >>>>>> · International law. >>>>>> >>>>>> There is however two broad conflicting schools of >>>>> thought when it comes to >>>>>> resolving disputes occasioned by the Internet. >>>> One >>>>> group claims that >>>>>> whatever happens online does have an equivalent >>>>> 'off-line' characteristics >>>>>> and as such existing laws can easily be applied. >>>> E.g >>>>> stealing money >>>>>> electronically is no different from stealing >>>> money >>>>> physically and so Robbery >>>>>> charges and subsequent jurisdictional procedures >>>> could >>>>> apply. However, the >>>>>> second group feels that electronic crimes have a >>>>> totally different context >>>>>> and must have a separate and totally new set of >>>>> legislation or methodologies >>>>>> for resolutions. >>>>>> >>>>>> The borderless nature of the Internet brings to >>>> fore >>>>> the Challenges of >>>>>> Jurisdiction and Arbitration as in >>>> yesterday's >>>>> example, where content in one >>>>>> country may be illegal but is legal in another. >>>>> Copyright and Intellectual >>>>>> Property Rights issues are also explosive as >>>>> demonstrated by the Napster >>>>>> Case, where some young software engineers created >>>>> software that facilitated >>>>>> sharing of (SONY) Music files across the >>>> Internet. >>>>> Also related was the case >>>>>> of Amazon.com trying to Patent the >>>>> 'single-click' method of buying goods >>>>>> online. >>>>>> >>>>>> Other cases touch on Data Privacy where Business >>>>> Companies have been known >>>>>> to sell customer records to Marketing firms >>>> without >>>>> express authority from >>>>>> the Customers. Other times customer data is >>>> simply >>>>> hacked into and >>>>>> Businesses are unable to own up (going public) to >>>> the >>>>> detriment of the >>>>>> Customer. >>>>>> >>>>>> Most of these issues are under discussion >>>>> internationally at the Internet >>>>>> Governance Forum (IGF), World Intellectual >>>> Property >>>>> Organization (WIPO) >>>>>> amongst other fora. They present emerging legal >>>>> challenges and it would be >>>>>> interesting to know if stakeholders in the East >>>>> African region are/should be >>>>>> involved in shaping the outcomes of any of these >>>>> issues. >>>>>> >>>>>> 2days on this one, today and next Monday and feel >>>> free >>>>> to belatedly respond >>>>>> to Day 1 through Day 5 issues. >>>>>> >>>>>> References: >>>>>> http://www.diplomacy.edu/ISL/IG/ >>>>>> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Napster >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> _______________________________________________ >>>>>> kictanet mailing list >>>>>> kictanet(a)lists.kictanet.or.ke <mailto:kictanet@lists.kictanet.or.ke> >>>>>> >>>> http://lists.kictanet.or.ke/mailman/listinfo/kictanet >>>>>> >>>>>> This message was sent to: mike.theuri(a)gmail.com >>>>>> <mailto:mike.theuri@gmail.com> >>>>>> Unsubscribe or change your options at >>>>>> >>>>> >>>> http://lists.kictanet.or.ke/mailman/options/kictanet/mike.theuri%40gmail.com >>>> >>>>>> >>>>> _______________________________________________ >>>>> kictanet mailing list >>>>> kictanet(a)lists.kictanet.or.ke <mailto:kictanet@lists.kictanet.or.ke> >>>>> http://lists.kictanet.or.ke/mailman/listinfo/kictanet >>>>> >>>>> This message was sent to: alex.gakuru(a)yahoo.com >>>>> <mailto:alex.gakuru@yahoo.com> >>>>> Unsubscribe or change your options at >>>>> >>>> http://lists.kictanet.or.ke/mailman/options/kictanet/alex.gakuru%40yahoo.com >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> _______________________________________________ >>>> kictanet mailing list >>>> kictanet(a)lists.kictanet.or.ke <mailto:kictanet@lists.kictanet.or.ke> >>>> http://lists.kictanet.or.ke/mailman/listinfo/kictanet >>>> >>>> This message was sent to: jwalu(a)yahoo.com <mailto:jwalu@yahoo.com> >>>> Unsubscribe or change your options at >>>> http://lists.kictanet.or.ke/mailman/options/kictanet/jwalu%40yahoo.com >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> _______________________________________________ >>> kictanet mailing list >>> kictanet(a)lists.kictanet.or.ke <mailto:kictanet@lists.kictanet.or.ke> >>> http://lists.kictanet.or.ke/mailman/listinfo/kictanet >>> >>> This message was sent to: brian(a)caret.net <mailto:brian@caret.net> >>> Unsubscribe or change your options at >>> http://lists.kictanet.or.ke/mailman/options/kictanet/brian%40caret.net >> >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >> >> _______________________________________________ >> kictanet mailing list >> kictanet(a)lists.kictanet.or.ke >> http://lists.kictanet.or.ke/mailman/listinfo/kictanet >> >> This message was sent to: alice(a)apc.org >> Unsubscribe or change your options at >> http://lists.kictanet.or.ke/mailman/options/kictanet/alice%40apc.org >> > >

1 0

Kenya 2007 Telecommunications Sector Performance Review
by David Otwoma 17 Aug '08

17 Aug '08

2007 Kenya Telecommunications Sector Performance Review By Prof. Timothy Mwololo Waema see Executive Summary at http://www.aganoconsulting.com/businessnews/archives/32

1 0

[Fwd: [Kenic-board] Cost of .KE Domain Names down to Kshs. 500.00 p.a]
by alice 15 Aug '08

15 Aug '08

Dear Registrars/Stakeholders, Today’s KENIC AGM ratified the KENIC Board’s decision to reduce the cost of SC.KE, AC.KE and GO.KE domain names to Kshs. 500.00 per year. The AGM also ratified the review of the dot KE discount policy to further the incentive on the .KE name space. Further, the Board proposed a sliding window on the cost of the all other .KE second levels with the aim of bringing the cost down to Kshs. 500.00 per year in the next 3 years. This will however depend on the uptake of .KE domain names given the new fees structure. Details of these changes will be contained in a press release that will be published both on our website and in the press. Let’s all work towards our vision of “a dot KE for Every Name in Kenya” Kind Regards, *----------- Vincent Ngundi Administrative Manager KENIC - The Kenya Network Information Center http://www.kenic.or.ke vincent(a)kenic.or.ke [T] +254 20 4450057/8 [C] +254 20 2398036 [M] +254 733 790073 [F] +254 20 4450087 /"dot KE for Every Name in Kenya!"/* _______________________________________________ Kenic-board mailing list Kenic-board(a)ole.kenic.or.ke http://ole.kenic.or.ke/mailman/listinfo/kenic-board

1 0

Re: [kictanet] Day 4 of 10:- IG Discussions, Internet Security.
by tyrus＠icsit.jkuat.ac.ke 15 Aug '08

15 Aug '08

I totally agree with Mich on this one. Internet security(or insecurity) is at very best blamed on uneducated users who fall prey of pretty obvious scams. Social Engineering is what its called and i believe this is even extended to our offices and workplaces. If you have noticed, most establishments have taken necessary steps to curb perpetrators by "installing" necessary security mechanisms and also survenrance cams. Now what they dont know is that to an educated and sly intruder he will no go in bradishing a gun or whatever weaponary but will be abit subtle. Actin like a lost user, confused visitor while all the time the guards assist him/her into the bellows of the building. Other techniques like tail-gating through secure entrances have been witnessed in our offices and this gives a lee way to intruders who may not be tech-savvy . In my opinion, i think user-education on the need to identify potential threats and also how to thwart them is what it takes to take a step towards securing our Intellectual Property, Data centers etc etc.

1 0

KeNIC AGM Today
by Alex Gakuru 15 Aug '08

15 Aug '08

Hi, I hope to meet up at the AGM at the Sarova Panafric from 9.00 am today. Regards,

1 0

Re: [kictanet] USA FIRST PRESIDENT ANSWER AND LINK WITH BOARD
by charles nduati 14 Aug '08

14 Aug '08

Hi All, I am sure all of you thought the obvious answer is George Washington. The first USA president was called John Hunson, who was known as the president of the confederation. George Washing ton became president 13 years after declaration of independence when the Constitution was ratified by the original states. For those who have been bashing ICT Borad , You should now know some things are not as obvious as you might think, and my own experience in setting up a parastatal from scratch has shown me that it can take more than 3 years just to get the systems going. The main reason for this is so as to have a transparent system, which turns out to be counter productive. If you you indeed want to help ICT board have rapid results, lobby the MP's to change the archaic business processes in the public sector cheers All Charles CHARLES N. NDUATI BUSINESS MANAGER JKUAT ENTERPRISES LTD JOMO KENYATTA UNIVERSITY OF AGRICULTURE AND TECHNOLOGY JUJA MAIN CAMPUS, THIKA P. O. BOX 79324-00200 NAIROBI, KENYA TEL: 254-067-52420 OR 254-067-52711 FAX: 254-067-52438 MOBILE:254-722728815 EMIAL:charlesnduati2002@yahoo.co.uk www.jkuat.ac.ke ----- Original Message ---- From: Brian Longwe <blongwe(a)gmail.com> To: charlesnduati2002(a)yahoo.co.uk Cc: kictanet(a)lists.kictanet.or.ke Sent: Thursday, 14 August, 2008 10:52:06 Subject: Re: [kictanet] Day 3 of 10:-IGF Discussions, Internet Interconnection Charges Alex, The term is not "announcing" it is known as "peering" http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peering which is defined as " is voluntary interconnection of administratively separate Internet networks for the purpose of exchanging traffic between the customers of each network. The pure definition of peering is settlement-free or "sender keeps all," meaning that neither party pays the other for the exchanged traffic, instead, each derives revenue from its own customers. " Underlying the ability to peer is the ability to access affordable infrastructure, otherwise most operators settle for transit arrangements where the inherent costs of the underlying transport is too high. Regards, Brian On Wed, Aug 13, 2008 at 9:47 PM, Gakuru, Alex <alexgakuru.lists(a)gmail.com> wrote: Alongside we should also consider the IXP concept where ISPs mutually accept one another traffic without international transit (the concept is called "announcing"). Simply put, such traffic never incurs international transit costs. Question: Should this "part" of internet cost consumers the same as costly international satellite? This becomes more apparent when a lot of popular sites get locally hosted, and for example where local content woes and comprises most traffic. Besides that, East (and all of) Africa should embrace solutions that "keep Africa traffic in Africa" such as RASCOM 1 - the satellite now in space that was designed by Kenya's own Engineer James Rege;) potentially saving Africa a sizable chunk of the US$ 800 million annual spending on transit traffic. Also more local and regional IXPs would assist (and less NATs please) Network neutrality is a very hot one I dare not touch much except affirm that whatever obstructs "the end-to-end principle"<http://web.mit.edu/Saltzer/www/publications/endtoend/endtoend.txt> should be removed from the network. They include privacy invading techniques known as Deep Packet Inspection (or DPI).<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deep_packet_inspection> Trust me to sneak in consumer issues;) But it is an important aspect when determining through whom your traffic passes. Regards, Alex On Wed, Aug 13, 2008 at 5:04 PM, mwende njiraini <mwende.njiraini(a)gmail.com> wrote: > In traditional telephony call termination revenues are shared between > operators and are based on negotiated interconnection rates, in a regulated > environment, rather than the size and number of subscribers on the network. > (I stand to be corrected) Developing countries for a long time have > benefited from revenues generated from this international settlement > scheme. However, these revenues are rapidly being eroded by VoIP, which is > encouraged by 'loosely regulated' flat rate pricing of internet bandwidth. > The issue internet interconnection is based on the fact that international > ISPs have no incentive to enter shared-cost peering with ISPs developing > countries thus forcing them to incur the full cost of transmitting > international traffic. What incentives need to be put in place to encourage > shared-cost peering? Content development? > > > There is raging debate on "network neutrality"; with network operators > seeking to price network access on the basis of utilization in a bid to > manage network congestion. In the US, for example the recent Comcast case > has resulted in the regulator, FCC, ruling that Comcast 'discriminatory' > network management practices were illegal. To overcome the challenge of > network congestion several proposals have been made including the > introduction of bandwidth metered services. Vint Cerf, Google's chief > internet evangelist, has proposed that ISPs should "introduce transmission > caps allowing users to purchase access to the Internet at a given minimum > data rate, which would be guaranteed even during times of congestion." Net > neutrality is definitely an issue we may need to consider with reference to > the current developments in national and international fibre optic > projects. > > References: > > http://news.cnet.com/8301-1023_3-10007079-93.html > > Regards > > Mwende > > Disclaimer: Comments are author's own. > > On 8/13/08, John Walubengo <jwalu(a)yahoo.com> wrote: >> >> Plse feel free to belatedly contribute on Day 1 or 2 themes, jst remember >> to pick the correct subject line. Meanwhile today we should discuss one of >> IG issues that touch squarely on the retail cost of Internet Service in >> developing countries- the Internet Interconnection Charges (IIC, in short) >> >> This issue is fairly complex and explosive but we could try and understand >> if we used a simplified model for Mobile Phone Interconnection Charges and >> Relationships. Consider mobile phone company, X with 8million customers and >> mobile phone company, Y with 2 million customers. Each company is supposed >> to compensate (pay) the other for terminating calls originating from the >> other. In such a relationship, the bigger company X, can chose to dictate >> how much the smaller company, Y pays it to terminate the 'Y' calls to its >> bigger 'X' network/customers. >> >> This is losely similar to what is called Transit relationship on the >> Internet. The big internet networks (Tier 1 and 2 Internet Backbone >> Providers) in US/Europe get to dictate how much the smaller networks in >> developing countries need to pay in order to terminate their internet >> requests for email, web, dns, voip and other services into their Network. >> Even our much celebrated TEAMS, EASsy and other projects cannot escape these >> Transit Interconnection Costs. Ofcourse if you do not like their >> Interconnection Charges you are free to take a walk into nowhere (read: stay >> offline). >> >> Another relationship does exist, the Peer-to-Peer relationship which is >> equivalent to Mobile phone company Y and company X both having equal or >> similar number of customers/value e.g. 5million each. In such a >> relationship, the two Internet Backbone/Service providers chose NOT to >> charge each other anything. Traffic between the two is exchanged >> reciprically for free but below each of this big Networks are the smaller >> networks (read African networks), that must pay Transit Charges. Put >> bluntly, Africa and other developing countries are subsidizing Internet >> Costs for the rich nations in the North. >> >> Many studies have been carried out to get us out of this fix such as the >> Halfway-propositions, the ICAIS, etc but todate the status quo remains. The >> standard response has remained 'If it current interconnection models are >> working, why should you try and fix them?' >> >> 1 day for comments, corrections and/or proposals on this theme. >> >> walu. >> >> Ref: for some of the Studies: >> International Charging Arrangements for Internet Services, Module I, >> ICAIS, p.3 >> http://www.tmdenton.com/pub/reports/icais_mod1_ch1.pdf >> >> The Half-Way Proposition. >> http://www.balancingact-africa.com/news/back/balancing-act_130.html >> >> >> >> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> kictanet mailing list >> kictanet(a)lists.kictanet.or.ke >> http://lists.kictanet.or.ke/mailman/listinfo/kictanet >> >> This message was sent to: mwende.njiraini(a)gmail.com >> Unsubscribe or change your options at >> http://lists.kictanet.or.ke/mailman/options/kictanet/mwende.njiraini%40gmai… > > > _______________________________________________ > kictanet mailing list > kictanet(a)lists.kictanet.or.ke > http://lists.kictanet.or.ke/mailman/listinfo/kictanet > > This message was sent to: alexgakuru.lists(a)gmail.com > Unsubscribe or change your options at > http://lists.kictanet.or.ke/mailman/options/kictanet/alexgakuru.lists%40gma… > > _______________________________________________ kictanet mailing list kictanet(a)lists.kictanet.or.ke http://lists.kictanet.or.ke/mailman/listinfo/kictanet This message was sent to: blongwe(a)gmail.com Unsubscribe or change your options at http://lists.kictanet.or.ke/mailman/options/kictanet/blongwe%40gmail.com -- Brian Munyao Longwe e-mail: blongwe(a)gmail.com cell: + 254 722 518 744 blog : http://zinjlog.blogspot.com meta-blog: http://mashilingi.blogspot.com Send instant messages to your online friends http://uk.messenger.yahoo.com

2 1