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Re: [kictanet] Planned amendments bode ill for Communications Authority
by Barrack Otieno 21 Oct '15

21 Oct '15

Oops, i had forgotten that we can Sosion the amendments. Thank you for that enlightenment Kivuva. Lets watch the next steps. Regards On 10/21/15, Mwendwa Kivuva <lordmwesh(a)gmail.com> wrote: > Barrack, these amendments will not be allowed to pass, even with tyranny > of numbers because any bills passed should be inline with the constitution. > Any laws enacted that contradict the constitution are null and void. We > have several precedence in case law where laws that were passed by > parliament were reversed by court. > > Regards > On Oct 21, 2015 9:57 AM, "Barrack Otieno via kictanet" < > kictanet(a)lists.kictanet.or.ke> wrote: > >> Ali, Colleagues, >> >> This is purely a leadership issue Ali, fortunately there is a time and >> season for everything. The current stewards of the sector will be >> remembered for their deeds or misdeeds. The same laws will be amended >> some day by another parliament that is full of wisdom not numbers. >> >> Regards >> >> On 10/21/15, Ali Hussein via kictanet <kictanet(a)lists.kictanet.or.ke> >> wrote: >> > Mwendwa >> > >> > Thanks for bringing this up. >> > >> > On a light note..Does my brother Walu still have a job at the Uni? :-) >> > >> > Seriously though, this sort of thing just takes us back 10+ years to >> > the >> > days of KANU. >> > >> > Ministry - Policy & Leadership >> > Regulator - Regulate >> > >> > How difficult is that? >> > >> > I recall that after the new constitution was promulgated the hopes of >> > the >> > industry was that we will have a more robust and independent Regulator >> > fashioned around the US Regulator - The Federal Communications >> Commission. >> > >> > It is my humble view that we owe it to the world to set the highest >> > standards for Regulation & Policy Formulation in the world as we are >> > now >> a >> > recognised leader in innovation in the mobile space. Instead of the >> > Executive looking to surround itself with more regulatorY powers they >> would >> > do better to recognise their role of formulating & guiding policy & >> > leadership to move this country forward in the ICT Sector. >> > >> > Thanks & Regards >> > >> > Ali Hussein >> > ali(a)hussein.me.ke >> > >> > +254 713 601113 >> > Twitter: @AliHKassim >> > Skype: Abu-Jomo >> > LinkedIn: http//ke.linkedin.com/in/alihkassim >> > Blog: www.alyhussein.com >> > >> >> On Oct 21, 2015, at 10:01 AM, Mwendwa Kivuva via kictanet >> >> <kictanet(a)lists.kictanet.or.ke> wrote: >> >> >> >> Greetings, >> >> >> >> Walubengo seems to have captured the controversial issues surrounding >> the >> >> new KICA amendments where the executive is unsurprising powers from >> >> the >> >> "independent" Communications Authority. The emphasis of the community >> >> is >> >> that these amendments are unconstitutional and will not be allowed to >> >> pass. >> >> >> >> read on ... >> >> >> http://www.nation.co.ke/oped/blogs/dot9/walubengo/-/2274560/2921856/-/xolkx… >> >> < >> http://www.nation.co.ke/oped/blogs/dot9/walubengo/-/2274560/2921856/-/xolkx… >> > >> >> >> >> There is a proposed bill, the Miscellaneous Amendment Bill 164 of 2015 >> >> < >> http://kenyalaw.org/kl/fileadmin/pdfdownloads/bills/2015/StatuteLaw__Miscel… >> > >> >> that proposes to move most of the communications regulatory powers to >> the >> >> Cabinet secretary. >> >> >> >> It is not clear why the Executive suddenly wants to become the >> >> regulator >> >> in a day and age when global practice seems to be to keep the two as >> >> separate as possible. >> >> >> >> In seeking to understand the rationale, one needs to look at the >> >> 'Memorandum of Objects and Reason’ section, which states as follows: >> >> >> >> ‘The Bill seeks to amend the Kenya Information And Communications Act, >> >> 1998 section 2 of 1998) so as firstly to align it with the >> >> Competitions >> >> Act, 2014 in respect of the criteria for being a dominant market >> >> >> >> undertaking and secondly to harmonize the regulation making power so >> that >> >> it is exercised by the Cabinet Secretary in consultation with the >> >> Authority’. >> >> >> >> Two aims seem to drive the new amendments. One is to put the >> >> contentious >> >> issue of dominance under the Competition Authority rather than the >> >> Communications Authority. The second is to enhance the Cabinet >> Secretary’s >> >> role in communication regulatory matters. >> >> >> >> For those with a little bit of communications history, it is easy to >> >> see >> >> the deliberate shift towards the old days when communications >> >> regulation >> >> was strictly under the Minister of Transport and Communications. >> >> >> >> In those days, prior to the Kenya Communications Act 1998, the then >> Kenya >> >> Posts and Telecommunications Corporation (KPTC), a fully-owned >> government >> >> parastatal, was the father, mother and grandparent of all regulatory >> >> matters in Kenya. >> >> >> >> The performance of regulation then is well documented and it was >> clearly a >> >> case study in ‘how not to regulate’. >> >> >> >> So it still beats all logic, despite the intended rationale for the >> >> amendments, why a modern, self-declared digital government would want >> >> to >> >> drag the whole country back to the so-called dark days. >> >> >> >> 'DEPARTMENT OF THE ICT MINISTRY' >> >> >> >> Indeed, the Kenyan Constitution (2010) anticipates and clearly states >> that >> >> we should have a more independent regulator than what we have always >> had. >> >> >> >> As stated in Article 34: Section (5)-: >> >> >> >> ‘ Parliament shall enact legislation that provides for the >> >> establishment >> >> of a body, which shall— >> >> >> >> (a) be independent of control by government, political interests or >> >> commercial interests; >> >> >> >> (b) reflect the interests of all sections of the society; and >> >> >> >> (c) set media standards and regulate and monitor compliance with those >> >> standards.’ >> >> >> >> Several court battles have recently been filed against the current >> >> regulator simply because their decisions, however well-intentioned >> >> were >> >> deemed not to have been undertaken by an independent regulator as >> >> envisioned in the new constitution. >> >> >> >> Why, then, would the government deliberately plan to set itself up for >> >> more of these court battles by proposing amendments that clearly make >> the >> >> regulator a department of the ICT Ministry and therefore not >> >> independent >> >> from the Executive? >> >> >> >> JUST WIND UP THE CA >> >> >> >> Most of the proposed amendments are about replacing the role of the >> >> regulator with that of the Cabinet secretary by inserting the words >> >> ‘The >> >> Cabinet secretary in consultation with the Communication Authority >> >> shall >> >> make regulations for…’ >> >> >> >> As an example, see Section 5(b)(5) on ‘Freedom of the media’. The >> >> new >> >> proposals say that ‘The Cabinet secretary in consultation with the >> >> Communication Authority shall make regulations for the better carrying >> out >> >> of the provisions in this section’. >> >> >> >> In Section 27(d) on ‘SIM cards’, the new proposals say that ‘The >> >> Cabinet >> >> secretary in consultation with the Communication Authority may make >> >> regulations with respect to SIM Card registration, storage, retention, >> >> transfers….’ >> >> >> >> There are many other amendments of similar a nature, and the clear >> message >> >> is that the regulator cannot make operational decisions unless in >> >> consultation with the minister. >> >> >> >> Indeed, one could argue that it is effectively the other way round - >> >> the >> >> Minister making the decision in consultation with the regulator. >> >> >> >> If the famous voting machine in Parliament, otherwise known as the >> >> "tyranny of numbers", is anything to go by, these amendments are >> >> likely >> to >> >> pass. >> >> >> >> However, the government should do Kenyans a favour thereafter and wind >> up >> >> the Communications Authority of Kenya, since its role will essentially >> >> have been absorbed by the Ministry. >> >> >> >> Mr Walubengo is a lecturer at the Multimedia University of Kenya's >> Faculty >> >> of Computing and IT. Twitter: @jwalu Email: jwalubengo(a)mmu.ac.ke >> >> <mailto:[email protected]> >> >> ______________________ >> >> Mwendwa Kivuva, Nairobi, Kenya >> >> >> >> "There are some men who lift the age they inhabit, till all men walk >> >> on >> >> higher ground in that lifetime." - Maxwell Anderson >> >> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> >> kictanet mailing list >> >> kictanet(a)lists.kictanet.or.ke >> >> https://lists.kictanet.or.ke/mailman/listinfo/kictanet >> >> >> >> Unsubscribe or change your options at >> >> >> https://lists.kictanet.or.ke/mailman/options/kictanet/info%40alyhussein.com >> >> >> >> The Kenya ICT Action Network (KICTANet) is a multi-stakeholder >> >> platform >> >> for people and institutions interested and involved in ICT policy and >> >> regulation. The network aims to act as a catalyst for reform in the >> >> ICT >> >> sector in support of the national aim of ICT enabled growth and >> >> development. >> >> >> >> KICTANetiquette : Adhere to the same standards of acceptable behaviors >> >> online that you follow in real life: respect people's times and >> bandwidth, >> >> share knowledge, don't flame or abuse or personalize, respect privacy, >> do >> >> not spam, do not market your wares or qualifications. >> > >> > >> >> >> -- >> Barrack O. Otieno >> +254721325277 >> +254-20-2498789 >> Skype: barrack.otieno >> http://www.otienobarrack.me.ke/ >> >> _______________________________________________ >> kictanet mailing list >> kictanet(a)lists.kictanet.or.ke >> https://lists.kictanet.or.ke/mailman/listinfo/kictanet >> >> Unsubscribe or change your options at >> https://lists.kictanet.or.ke/mailman/options/kictanet/kivuva%40transworldaf… >> >> The Kenya ICT Action Network (KICTANet) is a multi-stakeholder platform >> for people and institutions interested and involved in ICT policy and >> regulation. The network aims to act as a catalyst for reform in the ICT >> sector in support of the national aim of ICT enabled growth and >> development. >> >> KICTANetiquette : Adhere to the same standards of acceptable behaviors >> online that you follow in real life: respect people's times and >> bandwidth, >> share knowledge, don't flame or abuse or personalize, respect privacy, do >> not spam, do not market your wares or qualifications. > -- Barrack O. Otieno +254721325277 +254-20-2498789 Skype: barrack.otieno http://www.otienobarrack.me.ke/

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Re: [kictanet] Africa Domain Name System Forum 4th to 6th March 2016, Marrakech, Morroco
by Barrack Otieno 21 Oct '15

21 Oct '15

Listers, The 4th Africa Domain Name System Forum will be held in Marrakech Morroco from 4th to 6th March 2016 prior to the ICANN 55 meeting. The Africa Domain name system is an annual open event for stakeholders in the Domain Name Industry in Africa organized by Africa Top Level Domains Organization, the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers and the Internet Society. The forum enables registries , registrars and other stakeholder in Africa to share experiences, interact and learn from each other about the domain name system. As a multi stakeholder forum ,the meeting seeks to foster cross border collaboration between registries , registrars and registrants as well as other stakeholders the objectives being inter alia to inspire and encourage local stakeholders (government, registrars, registries, and registrants in the domain name industry to interact at local and International level as well as equipping African Registries and Registrars with the requisite domain name industry business strategies. We will be providing further details regarding registration, sponsorship and exhibition opportunities. Thank you Best Regards -- Barrack O. Otieno +254721325277 www.aftld.org Skype: barrack.otieno

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Fwd: [AfrICANN-discuss] Africa Strategy session , Tuesday 20th, 11-12.15, Room L4 Foyer
by Barrack Otieno 20 Oct '15

20 Oct '15

Listers, You may want to join remotely. Time zone UTC+1 Regards ---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: Dandjinou Pierre <pdandjinou(a)gmail.com> Date: Tue, 20 Oct 2015 00:48:10 +0100 Subject: [AfrICANN-discuss] Africa Strategy session , Tuesday 20th, 11-12.15, Room L4 Foyer To: "africann(a)afrinic.net" <africann(a)afrinic.net> Dear Participants to ICANN 54 and listers, Chers Participants a ICANN 54 et listiers, As you already know, there will be an update on the implementation of ICANN's Africa Strategy at a session scheduled for Tuesday 20th, from 11-12.15 in Room L4 Foyer. Here is the proposed agenda : Comme vous le savez, il est prevu une mise a jour sur la mise en oeuvre de la strategie africaine de l'ICANN pour l'Afrique le Mardi 20 Octobre de 11 a 12.15 dans la salle L4 Foyer; Voici l'ordre du jour propose : - Welcome and presentation of the Africa Strategy (20mn) - Q/A (25mn) - Preparations for Marrakech (10mn) - Q/A (10mn) - AoB (a-Funding mechanisms for the Africa strategy; b-ICANN's presence in Africa..) (10mn) Remote participation will be possible at https://meetings.icann.org/en/dublin54/schedule/tue-africa-strategy Pierre Dandjinou Cotonou - 229 90 087784 / 66566610 Dakar 221 77 639 30 41 www.scg.bj skype : sagbo1953 -- Barrack O. Otieno +254721325277 +254-20-2498789 Skype: barrack.otieno http://www.otienobarrack.me.ke/

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Re: [kictanet] kictanet Digest, Vol 101, Issue 34
by Mose Karanja 16 Oct '15

16 Oct '15

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA256 We saw what the Kenyan government testing site was when they were thinking of getting Hacking Team surveillance software: kahawatungu, a website focused on reporting corruption. That is why the Kenyan judiciary should have oversight over the operations of security agencies especially when interception of communication is involved. There have been sustained efforts for the last 5 years by the NIS especially to bypass judicial warrants in their operations. Privacy online is not about something to hide. It is about something to lose. Freedom to be who you are. Freedom online is a continuation of freedom offline. Encrypt encrypt encrypt. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- wsFcBAEBCAAQBQJWIVtpCRD9FdIdFSlVLwAAUFwP/3FE2vsxH8v73OBB2fFr 1BGVXqkLAhJ0sPoHIaN0pFrLRjq9AjyShZGrq4UpJW+mgscN7babTA+WbB4O scTy+b1luOQFShQUIxhj45U1QUKylbnd9Aq21HilXQr7LaUKSRYmNl1IhKtH xcZDrJ/T/ukh2NE2QDMDNjutT3GSXfxIoVWK/zJZfljMUMUb7uSYXM2K/Up7 L8s8/VPAVVPKU/dh8OW3SdULtrwHAvR296Lm1pnNb/7ndYcTymtfZE9KHn+6 JP834IuYE/UJvzvklrYTlXvemetijEiPTp9d8jgwIzLyY6rxaZDVb/DsFOsN ss9kpnmFWUwS15sIfBU0K1ID77RvzY5E6tghTo2A71oZvBTZPQiQXv0ABwLB 3URn+IvPb6yhNPZnNyuoZ72jYh1CKMJTz2VrcuqmEpQc5DhfZv+NvNQWxHEO OSarF4NDnLt/zm3trlkR8Q9ZviRNWcLLw9SktiadQWXBxvjVYxgFdLDgRTUW aKdstOXazQh2C+8WhQosWXB7coyTvtyJMMV23zCluYQD965SzmtrtYerrl3A PQi5bgChDO6Ayy35C3v8xm/x6b2gZNVFpL6mfw1/0YpMswBagxoXf7asLAr1 AszKFGLmCZy/9JvFTRXvWRV8i/Pl+BUMb0e8fNQnVg1iyzcL62Xquozzqbre hR2f =wJgQ -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- On 16 October 2015 at 22:41, <kictanet-request(a)lists.kictanet.or.ke> wrote: > Send kictanet mailing list submissions to > kictanet(a)lists.kictanet.or.ke > > To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit > https://lists.kictanet.or.ke/mailman/listinfo/kictanet > or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to > kictanet-request(a)lists.kictanet.or.ke > > You can reach the person managing the list at > kictanet-owner(a)lists.kictanet.or.ke > > When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific > than "Re: Contents of kictanet digest..." > > Today's Topics: > > 1. FinFisher, how the government contacted a Germany company to > spy on its citizens (Mwendwa Kivuva) > 2. Re: FinFisher, how the government contacted a Germany company > to spy on its citizens (John Kieti) > > > ---------- Forwarded message ---------- > From: Mwendwa Kivuva <Kivuva(a)transworldafrica.com> > To: "Security Forum All information security discussions in Africa are > done here (Hacking, Decryptions, Security management, physical security, > Disastor Recovery, Security Assessments etc etc)" <security(a)lists.my.co.ke>, > KICTAnet ICT Policy Discussions <kictanet(a)lists.kictanet.or.ke> > Cc: > Date: Fri, 16 Oct 2015 20:59:18 +0300 > Subject: [kictanet] FinFisher, how the government contacted a Germany > company to spy on its citizens > > Whose communication is safe? It seems nobody if the research below by > CitizenLab is to go by. If you are a person of interest, the government > reads everything you read and write. > > Where is the threat if government uses hacking to safeguard it's citizens? > Here is a short answer; "research and revelations about Hacking Team’s > Remote Control System (RCS), a competitor product, have also made it clear > that some government customers used these tools to target their political > opponents, rather than security threats to their citizens." > > This is how the government is spying on you. > > https://citizenlab.org/2015/10/mapping-finfishers-continuing-proliferation/ > > This post describes the results of Internet scanning we recently conducted > to identify the users of FinFisher, a sophisticated and user-friendly > spyware suite sold exclusively to governments. We devise a method for > querying FinFisher’s “anonymizing proxies” to unmask the true location of > the spyware’s master servers. Since the master servers are installed on > the premises of FinFisher customers, tracing the servers allows us to > identify which governments are likely using FinFisher. In some cases, we > can trace the servers to specific entities inside a government by > correlating our scan results with publicly available sources. Our results > indicate 32 countries where at least one government entity is likely using > the spyware suite, and we are further able to identify 10 entities by > name. Despite the 2014 FinFisher breach, and subsequent disclosure of > sensitive customer data, our scanning has detected more servers in more > countries than ever before. > > *Executive Summary* > > FinFisher is a sophisticated computer spyware suite, written by > Munich-based FinFisher GmbH, and sold exclusively to governments for > intelligence and law enforcement purposes. Although marketed as a tool for > fighting crime,1 > <https://citizenlab.org/2015/10/mapping-finfishers-continuing-proliferation/…> the > spyware has been involved in a number of high-profile surveillance abuses. > Between 2010 and 2012, Bahrain’s government used FinFisher to monitor some > of the country’s top law firms, journalists, activists, and opposition > political leaders.2 > <https://citizenlab.org/2015/10/mapping-finfishers-continuing-proliferation/…> Ethiopian > dissidents in exile in the United Kingdom3 > <https://citizenlab.org/2015/10/mapping-finfishers-continuing-proliferation/…> and > the United States4 > <https://citizenlab.org/2015/10/mapping-finfishers-continuing-proliferation/…> have > also been infected with FinFisher spyware. > > In 2012 and 2013, Citizen Lab researchers and collaborators,5 > <https://citizenlab.org/2015/10/mapping-finfishers-continuing-proliferation/…>published > several reports analyzing FinFisher spyware, and conducted scanning that > identified FinFisher command and control (C&C) servers in a number of > countries. In our previous research, we were not yet able to differentiate > between FinFisher *anonymizing proxies *and *master* servers, a > distinction that we make in this work. > > When a government entity purchases FinFisher spyware, they receive a *FinSpy > Master*—a C&C server that is installed on the entity’s premises.6 > <https://citizenlab.org/2015/10/mapping-finfishers-continuing-proliferation/…> The > entity may then set up *anonymizing proxies* (also referred to as “ > *proxies*” or “*FinSpy Relays*” in the FinFisher documentation), to > obscure the location of their master. Infected computers communicate with > the anonymizing proxy, which is “usually”7 > <https://citizenlab.org/2015/10/mapping-finfishers-continuing-proliferation/…> set > up on a Virtual Private Server (VPS) provider in a third country. The > proxy then forwards communications between a victim’s computer and the > Master server. > > We first describe how we scanned the Internet for FinFisher servers and > distinguished masters from proxies (*Part 1: Fishing for FinFisher*). We > then outline our findings regarding 32 governments and 10 specific > government entities that we believe are using FinFisher (*Part 2: Country > Findings*). Finally, we highlight several cases that illuminate > connections between different threat actors (*Part 3: A Deeper Analysis > of Several Cases*), before concluding (*Conclusion*). > > *Kenya* > > *National Intelligence Service* > > We found a FinFisher server in a range of IP addresses registered to a > Kenyan user named “National Security Intelligence.” Kenya’s National > Intelligence Service (NIS) was formerly known as the National Security > Intelligence Service (NSIS). > > Kenya’s NSIS replaced the former Directorate of Security Intelligence > (DSI), commonly known as the “Special Branch”.52 > <https://citizenlab.org/2015/10/mapping-finfishers-continuing-proliferation/…>The > NIS is known as one of Kenya’s security institutions with the biggest > budgetary allocation—along with the Kenya National Defence Forces and the > National Police Service—and considered to be among the country’s critical > security organs in the new constitution.53 > <https://citizenlab.org/2015/10/mapping-finfishers-continuing-proliferation/…> In > 2014, Human Rights Watch named the NIS, as well as the Anti-Terrorism > Police Unit and other Kenyan intelligence agencies, as being implicated in > abuses including torture, disappearances, and extrajudicial killings.54 > <https://citizenlab.org/2015/10/mapping-finfishers-continuing-proliferation/…> > > The powers of the NIS were expanded significantly in December 2014 when > the Parliament of Kenya rushed to pass the controversial Security Laws > (Amendment) Bill.55 > <https://citizenlab.org/2015/10/mapping-finfishers-continuing-proliferation/…> The > amendments came following a series of deadly terrorist attacks by the > militant group al-Shabab, including the 2013 killing of 67 people at the > Westgate shopping mall in Nairobi.56 > <https://citizenlab.org/2015/10/mapping-finfishers-continuing-proliferation/…>This > bill expanded the powers of the NIS to monitor communications without a > warrant, as well as expanding their powers to search and seize private > property.57 > <https://citizenlab.org/2015/10/mapping-finfishers-continuing-proliferation/…> Article > 62 of the amended bill authorized NIS agents to “do anything necessary to > preserve national security” and to detain individuals on simply the > suspicion of engaging in acts which pose a threat to national security.58 > <https://citizenlab.org/2015/10/mapping-finfishers-continuing-proliferation/…> Section > 66 of the bill amended the National Intelligence Services Act, permitting > the Director General of the NIS to monitor communications or “obtain any > information, material, record, document or thing” in order to protect > national security, without court oversight, leading rights organization > Article 19 to argue that the amendment “effectively [gives]*carte blanche* to > the Director-General to order mass surveillance of online communications”. > 59 > <https://citizenlab.org/2015/10/mapping-finfishers-continuing-proliferation/…> While > a court ruling in February 2015 struck down some provisions of the > amendment, the provisions enhancing the powers of the NIS remained.60 > <https://citizenlab.org/2015/10/mapping-finfishers-continuing-proliferation/…> > > More here: > https://citizenlab.org/2015/10/mapping-finfishers-continuing-proliferation/ > > > ---------- Forwarded message ---------- > From: John Kieti <jkieti(a)gmail.com> > To: KICTAnet ICT Policy Discussions <kictanet(a)lists.kictanet.or.ke> > Cc: > Date: Fri, 16 Oct 2015 22:25:32 +0300 > Subject: Re: [kictanet] FinFisher, how the government contacted a Germany > company to spy on its citizens > Use of sophisticated spy-ware software by NIS will invite commensurate > effort among researchers, developers and others of the profession to offer > anti-spyware solutions that work - all in the name of human rights and > fundamental privacy protection. > > On Fri, Oct 16, 2015 at 8:59 PM, Mwendwa Kivuva via kictanet < > kictanet(a)lists.kictanet.or.ke> wrote: > >> Whose communication is safe? It seems nobody if the research below by >> CitizenLab is to go by. If you are a person of interest, the government >> reads everything you read and write. >> >> Where is the threat if government uses hacking to safeguard it's >> citizens? Here is a short answer; "research and revelations about Hacking >> Team’s Remote Control System (RCS), a competitor product, have also made it >> clear that some government customers used these tools to target their >> political opponents, rather than security threats to their citizens." >> >> This is how the government is spying on you. >> >> >> https://citizenlab.org/2015/10/mapping-finfishers-continuing-proliferation/ >> >> This post describes the results of Internet scanning we recently >> conducted to identify the users of FinFisher, a sophisticated and >> user-friendly spyware suite sold exclusively to governments. We devise a >> method for querying FinFisher’s “anonymizing proxies” to unmask the true >> location of the spyware’s master servers. Since the master servers are >> installed on the premises of FinFisher customers, tracing the servers >> allows us to identify which governments are likely using FinFisher. In >> some cases, we can trace the servers to specific entities inside a >> government by correlating our scan results with publicly available >> sources. Our results indicate 32 countries where at least one government >> entity is likely using the spyware suite, and we are further able to >> identify 10 entities by name. Despite the 2014 FinFisher breach, and >> subsequent disclosure of sensitive customer data, our scanning has detected >> more servers in more countries than ever before. >> >> *Executive Summary* >> >> FinFisher is a sophisticated computer spyware suite, written by >> Munich-based FinFisher GmbH, and sold exclusively to governments for >> intelligence and law enforcement purposes. Although marketed as a tool for >> fighting crime,1 >> <https://citizenlab.org/2015/10/mapping-finfishers-continuing-proliferation/…> the >> spyware has been involved in a number of high-profile surveillance abuses. >> Between 2010 and 2012, Bahrain’s government used FinFisher to monitor some >> of the country’s top law firms, journalists, activists, and opposition >> political leaders.2 >> <https://citizenlab.org/2015/10/mapping-finfishers-continuing-proliferation/…> Ethiopian >> dissidents in exile in the United Kingdom3 >> <https://citizenlab.org/2015/10/mapping-finfishers-continuing-proliferation/…> and >> the United States4 >> <https://citizenlab.org/2015/10/mapping-finfishers-continuing-proliferation/…> have >> also been infected with FinFisher spyware. >> >> In 2012 and 2013, Citizen Lab researchers and collaborators,5 >> <https://citizenlab.org/2015/10/mapping-finfishers-continuing-proliferation/…>published >> several reports analyzing FinFisher spyware, and conducted scanning that >> identified FinFisher command and control (C&C) servers in a number of >> countries. In our previous research, we were not yet able to differentiate >> between FinFisher *anonymizing proxies *and *master* servers, a >> distinction that we make in this work. >> >> When a government entity purchases FinFisher spyware, they receive a *FinSpy >> Master*—a C&C server that is installed on the entity’s premises.6 >> <https://citizenlab.org/2015/10/mapping-finfishers-continuing-proliferation/…> The >> entity may then set up *anonymizing proxies* (also referred to as “ >> *proxies*” or “*FinSpy Relays*” in the FinFisher documentation), to >> obscure the location of their master. Infected computers communicate with >> the anonymizing proxy, which is “usually”7 >> <https://citizenlab.org/2015/10/mapping-finfishers-continuing-proliferation/…> set >> up on a Virtual Private Server (VPS) provider in a third country. The >> proxy then forwards communications between a victim’s computer and the >> Master server. >> >> We first describe how we scanned the Internet for FinFisher servers and >> distinguished masters from proxies (*Part 1: Fishing for FinFisher*). >> We then outline our findings regarding 32 governments and 10 specific >> government entities that we believe are using FinFisher (*Part 2: >> Country Findings*). Finally, we highlight several cases that illuminate >> connections between different threat actors (*Part 3: A Deeper Analysis >> of Several Cases*), before concluding (*Conclusion*). >> >> *Kenya* >> >> *National Intelligence Service* >> >> We found a FinFisher server in a range of IP addresses registered to a >> Kenyan user named “National Security Intelligence.” Kenya’s National >> Intelligence Service (NIS) was formerly known as the National Security >> Intelligence Service (NSIS). >> >> Kenya’s NSIS replaced the former Directorate of Security Intelligence >> (DSI), commonly known as the “Special Branch”.52 >> <https://citizenlab.org/2015/10/mapping-finfishers-continuing-proliferation/…>The >> NIS is known as one of Kenya’s security institutions with the biggest >> budgetary allocation—along with the Kenya National Defence Forces and the >> National Police Service—and considered to be among the country’s critical >> security organs in the new constitution.53 >> <https://citizenlab.org/2015/10/mapping-finfishers-continuing-proliferation/…> In >> 2014, Human Rights Watch named the NIS, as well as the Anti-Terrorism >> Police Unit and other Kenyan intelligence agencies, as being implicated in >> abuses including torture, disappearances, and extrajudicial killings.54 >> <https://citizenlab.org/2015/10/mapping-finfishers-continuing-proliferation/…> >> >> The powers of the NIS were expanded significantly in December 2014 when >> the Parliament of Kenya rushed to pass the controversial Security Laws >> (Amendment) Bill.55 >> <https://citizenlab.org/2015/10/mapping-finfishers-continuing-proliferation/…> The >> amendments came following a series of deadly terrorist attacks by the >> militant group al-Shabab, including the 2013 killing of 67 people at the >> Westgate shopping mall in Nairobi.56 >> <https://citizenlab.org/2015/10/mapping-finfishers-continuing-proliferation/…>This >> bill expanded the powers of the NIS to monitor communications without a >> warrant, as well as expanding their powers to search and seize private >> property.57 >> <https://citizenlab.org/2015/10/mapping-finfishers-continuing-proliferation/…> Article >> 62 of the amended bill authorized NIS agents to “do anything necessary to >> preserve national security” and to detain individuals on simply the >> suspicion of engaging in acts which pose a threat to national security.58 >> <https://citizenlab.org/2015/10/mapping-finfishers-continuing-proliferation/…> Section >> 66 of the bill amended the National Intelligence Services Act, permitting >> the Director General of the NIS to monitor communications or “obtain any >> information, material, record, document or thing” in order to protect >> national security, without court oversight, leading rights organization >> Article 19 to argue that the amendment “effectively [gives]*carte >> blanche* to the Director-General to order mass surveillance of online >> communications”.59 >> <https://citizenlab.org/2015/10/mapping-finfishers-continuing-proliferation/…> While >> a court ruling in February 2015 struck down some provisions of the >> amendment, the provisions enhancing the powers of the NIS remained.60 >> <https://citizenlab.org/2015/10/mapping-finfishers-continuing-proliferation/…> >> >> More here: >> https://citizenlab.org/2015/10/mapping-finfishers-continuing-proliferation/ >> >> _______________________________________________ >> kictanet mailing list >> kictanet(a)lists.kictanet.or.ke >> https://lists.kictanet.or.ke/mailman/listinfo/kictanet >> >> Unsubscribe or change your options at >> https://lists.kictanet.or.ke/mailman/options/kictanet/jkieti%40gmail.com >> >> The Kenya ICT Action Network (KICTANet) is a multi-stakeholder platform >> for people and institutions interested and involved in ICT policy and >> regulation. The network aims to act as a catalyst for reform in the ICT >> sector in support of the national aim of ICT enabled growth and development. >> >> KICTANetiquette : Adhere to the same standards of acceptable behaviors >> online that you follow in real life: respect people's times and bandwidth, >> share knowledge, don't flame or abuse or personalize, respect privacy, do >> not spam, do not market your wares or qualifications. >> > > > > -- > > John Kieti > Phone: +254-735-764242 // +254-722-764242 > Twitter: @johnKieti // Skype: jkieti > Blog: gmeltdown.com <http://www.gmeltdown.com> // LinkedIn: > https://ke.linkedin.com/in/*kieti* <https://ke.linkedin.com/in/kieti> > > The ordinary just won't do > > _______________________________________________ > kictanet mailing list > kictanet(a)lists.kictanet.or.ke > https://lists.kictanet.or.ke/mailman/listinfo/kictanet > > -- Mose Karanja +254 724 162536 | @Mose_Karanja <https://twitter.com/Mose_Karanja> PGP: 0x1529552F <https://twitter.com/Mose_Karanja>

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FinFisher, how the government contacted a Germany company to spy on its citizens
by Mwendwa Kivuva 16 Oct '15

16 Oct '15

Whose communication is safe? It seems nobody if the research below by CitizenLab is to go by. If you are a person of interest, the government reads everything you read and write. Where is the threat if government uses hacking to safeguard it's citizens? Here is a short answer; "research and revelations about Hacking Team’s Remote Control System (RCS), a competitor product, have also made it clear that some government customers used these tools to target their political opponents, rather than security threats to their citizens." This is how the government is spying on you. https://citizenlab.org/2015/10/mapping-finfishers-continuing-proliferation/ This post describes the results of Internet scanning we recently conducted to identify the users of FinFisher, a sophisticated and user-friendly spyware suite sold exclusively to governments. We devise a method for querying FinFisher’s “anonymizing proxies” to unmask the true location of the spyware’s master servers. Since the master servers are installed on the premises of FinFisher customers, tracing the servers allows us to identify which governments are likely using FinFisher. In some cases, we can trace the servers to specific entities inside a government by correlating our scan results with publicly available sources. Our results indicate 32 countries where at least one government entity is likely using the spyware suite, and we are further able to identify 10 entities by name. Despite the 2014 FinFisher breach, and subsequent disclosure of sensitive customer data, our scanning has detected more servers in more countries than ever before. *Executive Summary* FinFisher is a sophisticated computer spyware suite, written by Munich-based FinFisher GmbH, and sold exclusively to governments for intelligence and law enforcement purposes. Although marketed as a tool for fighting crime,1 <https://citizenlab.org/2015/10/mapping-finfishers-continuing-proliferation/…> the spyware has been involved in a number of high-profile surveillance abuses. Between 2010 and 2012, Bahrain’s government used FinFisher to monitor some of the country’s top law firms, journalists, activists, and opposition political leaders.2 <https://citizenlab.org/2015/10/mapping-finfishers-continuing-proliferation/…> Ethiopian dissidents in exile in the United Kingdom3 <https://citizenlab.org/2015/10/mapping-finfishers-continuing-proliferation/…> and the United States4 <https://citizenlab.org/2015/10/mapping-finfishers-continuing-proliferation/…> have also been infected with FinFisher spyware. In 2012 and 2013, Citizen Lab researchers and collaborators,5 <https://citizenlab.org/2015/10/mapping-finfishers-continuing-proliferation/…>published several reports analyzing FinFisher spyware, and conducted scanning that identified FinFisher command and control (C&C) servers in a number of countries. In our previous research, we were not yet able to differentiate between FinFisher *anonymizing proxies *and *master* servers, a distinction that we make in this work. When a government entity purchases FinFisher spyware, they receive a *FinSpy Master*—a C&C server that is installed on the entity’s premises.6 <https://citizenlab.org/2015/10/mapping-finfishers-continuing-proliferation/…> The entity may then set up *anonymizing proxies* (also referred to as “*proxies*” or “*FinSpy Relays*” in the FinFisher documentation), to obscure the location of their master. Infected computers communicate with the anonymizing proxy, which is “usually”7 <https://citizenlab.org/2015/10/mapping-finfishers-continuing-proliferation/…> set up on a Virtual Private Server (VPS) provider in a third country. The proxy then forwards communications between a victim’s computer and the Master server. We first describe how we scanned the Internet for FinFisher servers and distinguished masters from proxies (*Part 1: Fishing for FinFisher*). We then outline our findings regarding 32 governments and 10 specific government entities that we believe are using FinFisher (*Part 2: Country Findings*). Finally, we highlight several cases that illuminate connections between different threat actors (*Part 3: A Deeper Analysis of Several Cases*), before concluding (*Conclusion*). *Kenya* *National Intelligence Service* We found a FinFisher server in a range of IP addresses registered to a Kenyan user named “National Security Intelligence.” Kenya’s National Intelligence Service (NIS) was formerly known as the National Security Intelligence Service (NSIS). Kenya’s NSIS replaced the former Directorate of Security Intelligence (DSI), commonly known as the “Special Branch”.52 <https://citizenlab.org/2015/10/mapping-finfishers-continuing-proliferation/…>The NIS is known as one of Kenya’s security institutions with the biggest budgetary allocation—along with the Kenya National Defence Forces and the National Police Service—and considered to be among the country’s critical security organs in the new constitution.53 <https://citizenlab.org/2015/10/mapping-finfishers-continuing-proliferation/…> In 2014, Human Rights Watch named the NIS, as well as the Anti-Terrorism Police Unit and other Kenyan intelligence agencies, as being implicated in abuses including torture, disappearances, and extrajudicial killings.54 <https://citizenlab.org/2015/10/mapping-finfishers-continuing-proliferation/…> The powers of the NIS were expanded significantly in December 2014 when the Parliament of Kenya rushed to pass the controversial Security Laws (Amendment) Bill.55 <https://citizenlab.org/2015/10/mapping-finfishers-continuing-proliferation/…> The amendments came following a series of deadly terrorist attacks by the militant group al-Shabab, including the 2013 killing of 67 people at the Westgate shopping mall in Nairobi.56 <https://citizenlab.org/2015/10/mapping-finfishers-continuing-proliferation/…>This bill expanded the powers of the NIS to monitor communications without a warrant, as well as expanding their powers to search and seize private property.57 <https://citizenlab.org/2015/10/mapping-finfishers-continuing-proliferation/…> Article 62 of the amended bill authorized NIS agents to “do anything necessary to preserve national security” and to detain individuals on simply the suspicion of engaging in acts which pose a threat to national security.58 <https://citizenlab.org/2015/10/mapping-finfishers-continuing-proliferation/…> Section 66 of the bill amended the National Intelligence Services Act, permitting the Director General of the NIS to monitor communications or “obtain any information, material, record, document or thing” in order to protect national security, without court oversight, leading rights organization Article 19 to argue that the amendment “effectively [gives]*carte blanche* to the Director-General to order mass surveillance of online communications”.59 <https://citizenlab.org/2015/10/mapping-finfishers-continuing-proliferation/…> While a court ruling in February 2015 struck down some provisions of the amendment, the provisions enhancing the powers of the NIS remained.60 <https://citizenlab.org/2015/10/mapping-finfishers-continuing-proliferation/…> More here: https://citizenlab.org/2015/10/mapping-finfishers-continuing-proliferation/

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Proposed Amendments to KICA in Statute Law Misc. Amendment Bill 2015
by Victor Kapiyo 15 Oct '15

15 Oct '15

Dear all, Pls see below, link to the Statute Law Misc. Amendment Bill 2015, which proposes to amend several laws, including KICA. According to the objects and reasons: Kenya Information And Communications Act, of 1998 - Firstly to align it with the Competitions Act, 2014 in respect of the criteria for being a dominant market undertaking and secondly to harmonize the regulation making power so that it is exercised by the Cabinet Secretary in consultation with the Authority. The Competition Act (No. 12 of 2010 - The Bill seeks to amend the Competition Act so as to clarify that the power to Prescribe, as specified in the Act is to be exercised by the Cabinet Secretary in consultation with the Authority. http://kenyalaw.org/kl/fileadmin/pdfdownloads/bills/2015/StatuteLaw__Miscel… Victor Kapiyo ==================================================== *“Your attitude, not your aptitude, will determine your altitude” Zig Ziglar*

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Fwd: Freedom on the Net 2015 Report Launch
by Mose Karanja 14 Oct '15

14 Oct '15

The Freedom House Internet Freedom report will be released two weeks from now. Our very own Grace Githaiga will be Hanging Out with the launch team. You can stream it live using the link provided. Moses ---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: Freedom House <fhevents(a)freedomhouse.org> Date: 13 October 2015 at 20:48 Subject: Freedom on the Net 2015 Report Launch Email not displaying correctly? View it in your browser <http://org2.salsalabs.com/dia/track.jsp?v=2&c=i%2FBKfMSKmfV1J01VIDxA1I8qOD5…> . Freedom House Events *Freedom on the Net 2015* *Wednesday, October 28, 2015 9:00 a.m. - 10:30 a.m. * Please join us for the launch of* Freedom on the Net 2015*, the latest edition of Freedom House’s annual assessment of internet access, censorship, and internet user rights in 65 countries around the world. This year’s event will highlight the advances and setbacks in internet freedom over the past year, emerging threats to digital media, and the challenges these trends pose to U.S. foreign policy. *Breakfast and registration will begin at 8:30 a.m.* <http://org2.salsalabs.com/dia/track.jsp?v=2&c=2l%2FP4dxU6Daqwxl3Il1TwI8qOD5…> *Google Washington, D.C. 25 Massachusetts Ave, NW Suite 900 Washington, DC 20001* *CLICK HERE TO WATCH LIVE* <http://org2.salsalabs.com/dia/track.jsp?v=2&c=nePkvi0lWjF2JDWV4HRBK%2Fp55ns…> *Program* *Introductory Remarks *The Honorable Brian Schatz (D-HI) United States Senate Ross LaJeunesse Global Head of Free Expression & International Relations, Google Daniel Calingaert Executive Vice President, Freedom House Sanja Kelly *Freedom on the Net* Project Director, Freedom House *Panelists *Chinmayi Arun Research Director, Centre for Communication Governance National Law University, Dehli Eileen Donahoe Director of Global Affairs, Human Rights Watch Former U.S. Ambassador to the UN Human Rights Council Gady Epstein Media Editor, *The Economist * *Google Hangout Participants* Grace Githaiga Associate, Kenya ICT Action Network Tetyana Lokot Contributing Editor for RuNet Echo <http://org2.salsalabs.com/dia/track.jsp?v=2&c=CXWdbSomfR5upLasEcqFJI8qOD5Hq…> Ukraine Special thank you to Google for sponsoring the launch of *Freedom on the Net 2015.* Follow on Twitter <http://org2.salsalabs.com/dia/track.jsp?v=2&c=PXm5x1CiJlVWs4zMW0wMeY8qOD5Hq…> Friend on Facebook <http://org2.salsalabs.com/dia/track.jsp?v=2&c=qa7eU3emw4Y%2FlxYitbBwfI8qOD5…> fhevents(a)freedomhouse.org *Our mailing address is:* 1850 M Street NW, Suite 1100 Washington, DC 20036 unsubscribe from this list <http://org2.salsalabs.com/dia/track.jsp?v=2&c=DZzByMBO059cpj8YBpV7So8qOD5Hq…> update subscription preferences <http://org2.salsalabs.com/dia/track.jsp?v=2&c=mUB7g%2FEyIQz6nZ8LUUhX1I8qOD5…> [image: empowered by Salsa] <http://www.salsalabs.com/?email> -- Mose Karanja +254 724 162536 | @Mose_Karanja <https://twitter.com/Mose_Karanja> PGP: 0x1529552F <https://twitter.com/Mose_Karanja>

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Fwd: [Internet Policy] NYT: Data Transfer Pact Between U.S. and Europe Is Ruled Invalid
by Barrack Otieno 12 Oct '15

12 Oct '15

---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: Joly MacFie <joly(a)punkcast.com> Date: Tue, 6 Oct 2015 13:46:23 -0400 Subject: [Internet Policy] NYT: Data Transfer Pact Between U.S. and Europe Is Ruled Invalid To: "internetpolicy(a)elists.isoc.org" <InternetPolicy(a)elists.isoc.org> http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/07/technology/european-union-us-data-collect… Europe’s highest court on Tuesday struck down an international agreement that allowed companies to move people’s digital data between the European Union and the United States, leaving the international operations of companies like Google and Facebook in a sort of legal limbo. The ruling, by the European Court of Justice, said the so-called safe harbor agreement was flawed because it allowed American government authorities to gain routine access to Europeans’ online information. The court said leaks from Edward J. Snowden, the former contractor for the National Security Agency, made it clear that American intelligence agencies had almost unfettered access to the data, infringing on Europeans’ rights to privacy. The court said data protection regulators in each of the European Union’s 28 countries should have oversight over how companies collect and use online information of their countries’ citizens. Many European countries have widely varying stances towards privacy. Data protection advocates hailed the ruling. Industry executives and trade groups, though, said the decision left a huge amount of uncertainty for big companies. They called on the European Commission to complete a new safe agreement with the United States, a deal that has been negotiated for more than two years. Some European officials and many of the big technology companies, including Facebook and Microsoft, tried to play down the impact of the ruling, saying side agreements with the European Union should allow the companies to continue moving data across borders. But some of Europe’s national privacy watchdogs are expected to make it hard for large companies like Facebook to transfer Europeans’ information overseas under the current data arrangements. And the ruling appeared to leave smaller companies with fewer legal resources vulnerable to potential privacy violations. “We can’t assume that anything is now safe,” Brian Hengesbaugh, a privacy lawyer with Baker & McKenzie in Chicago who helped to negotiate the original safe harbor agreement. “The ruling is so sweepingly broad that any mechanism used to transfer data from Europe could be under threat.” At issue is the sort of personal data that people create when they post something on Facebook or other social media; when they do web searches on Google; or when they order products or buy movies from Amazon or Apple. Such data is hugely valuable to companies, which use it in a broad range of ways, including tailoring advertisements to individuals and promoting products or services based on users’ online activities. The data-transfer ruling does not apply solely to tech companies. It also affects any organization with international operations, such as when a company has employees in more than one region and needs to transfer payroll information or allow workers to manage their employee benefits online. Frans Timmermans, the first vice president for the European Commission, which will be charged with carrying out the ruling, tried to ease the concerns of companies on Tuesday. He said businesses could still move European data to the United States through other existing treaties. He added that the European Commission would work with national privacy regulators to ensure that the court’s decision was carried out in a uniform fashion across the entire region. “Citizens need robust safeguards,” said Mr. Timmermans. “And companies need certainty.” But it was unclear how bulletproof those treaties would be under the new ruling, which cannot be appealed and went into effect immediately. Europe’s privacy watchdogs, for example, remain divided over how to police American tech companies. France and Germany, where companies like Facebook and Google have huge numbers of users and have already been subject to other privacy rulings, are among the countries that have sought more aggressive protections for their citizens’ personal data. Britain and Ireland, among others, have been supportive of Safe Harbor, and many large American tech companies have set up overseas headquarters in Ireland. “For those who are willing to take on big companies, this ruling will have empowered them to act,” said Ot van Daalen, a Dutch privacy lawyer at Project Moore, who has been a vocal advocate for stricter data protection rules. The safe harbor agreement has been in place since 2000, enabling American tech companies to compile data generated by their European clients in web searches, social media posts and other online activities. Under the deal, more than 4,000 European and American companies had been expected to treat the information moved outside the European Union with the same privacy protections the data had inside the region. The United States government had lobbied aggressively in Brussels in recent months to keep the agreement in place. The United States and the European Union have worked for roughly two years on a new safe harbor agreement. The court’s ruling now puts pressure on negotiators to complete an agreement, but it may also complicate matters. Any new deal had already been expected to give Europeans greater say over how their online information is collected, transferred and managed by tech companies. But the talks have stalled over what type of access to European data American intelligence agencies should be given, according to several people with direct knowledge of the matter, who spoke on the condition of anonymity. In addition, legal experts said that even if a new deal is reached, the court’s decision would would still give the national privacy regulators some say over the transfer of data. Penny Pritzker, the American secretary of commerce, said she was disappointed about the European court’s decision, adding she would work with the European Commission to finalize the new safe harbor agreement.In its ruling, the European court noted that the region’s 500 million citizens did not have the right to bring legal cases in United States courts if they believed their privacy had been infringed by American companies or by the United States government. A bill to provide this legal recourse is being debated in Congress, though analysts said it was unlikely to become law before the American elections next year. The legal ruling “puts at risk the thriving transatlantic digital economy,” she said in a statement on Tuesday. The lengthy negotiations have highlighted the different approaches to online data protection. In the United States, privacy is viewed as a consumer protection issue; in Europe, privacy is almost on a par with such fundamental rights as freedom of expression. Last year, Europe’s top court ruled that anyone with connections to the region could ask search engines like Google to remove links about themselves from online results. European campaigners said this so-called right to be forgotten ruling would help protect people’s online privacy, while many in the United States said the decision would curtail online freedom of speech. Those differences became more pronounced after Mr. Snowden revealed how American and British intelligence agencies had seemingly unfettered access to people’s online activities. “The United States safe harbor scheme thus enables interference, by United States public authorities, with the fundamental rights of persons,” the judges said in a statement on Tuesday, referring to access to European data by American intelligence agencies. The case reviewed by the European Court of Justice related to a complaint brought by Max Schrems, a 27-year-old Austrian graduate student, who argued that Europeans’ online data was misused when Facebook was said to have cooperated with the N.S.A.’s Prism program. That program is reported to have given the American agency significant access to data collected by several American tech companies. Facebook denies that the United States government had unlimited access to its users’ data. Mr. Snowden on Tuesday, after the court ruling, posted a message on Twitter praising Mr. Schrems: ‘‘Congratulations, @maxschrems. You’ve changed the world for the better.’’ In a statement on Tuesday, Mr. Schrems, who is pursuing a separate civil class-action lawsuit against Facebook in an Austrian court, praised the decision. “Governments and businesses cannot simply ignore our fundamental right to privacy,” he said, “but must abide by the law and enforce it.” -- --------------------------------------------------------------- Joly MacFie 218 565 9365 Skype:punkcast -------------------------------------------------------------- - -- Barrack O. Otieno +254721325277 +254-20-2498789 Skype: barrack.otieno http://www.otienobarrack.me.ke/

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Re: [kictanet] court ends Konza city land trials
by Barrack Otieno 09 Oct '15

09 Oct '15

Edith, The Court cases were stumbling blocks, my hope is their dismissal paves way for next steps in the project. Looking at what has become of the Sameer Business Park, i am confident Konza can actually be a reality sooner than later. Regards On 10/9/15, Edith Ofwona <eofwona(a)idrc.ca> wrote: > Barrack, > > What progress has been made in Konza? Everything has gone quiet! > > White elephant? Or I'm wrong. Any updates? > > Edith > _______________ > Edith Ofwona > Senior Program Specialist > Agriculture and Environment > International Development Research Centre|Centre de recherches pour le > développement international > Regional Office for Sub-Saharan Africa | Bureau Régional de l'Afrique > Subsaharienne > Physical Address: 3rd Floor, Eaton Place, United Nations Crescent, Gigiri > +254-20-2713161/0 | Fax: +254-20-2711063|Ext: 3406 > eofwona(a)idrc.ca |eofwona(a)crdi.ca |www.idrc.ca |www.crdi.ca > > @IDRC_CRDI > Subscribe | Abonnement IDRC Bulletin Bulletin du CRDI > > > -----Original Message----- > From: kictanet [mailto:[email protected]] > On Behalf Of Barrack Otieno via kictanet > Sent: October-09-15 12:39 PM > To: Edith Ofwona > Cc: Barrack Otieno > Subject: Re: [kictanet] court ends Konza city land trials > > This is good, it paves way for further developement. I remember the words of > former President Mwai Kibaki during the launch of Konza that it will be > similar to the Free Primary Education Program which was billed to be an > non-starter but proved critics wrong. > > Best Regards > > On 10/9/15, Mwendwa Kivuva via kictanet <kictanet(a)lists.kictanet.or.ke> > wrote: >> http://mobile.nation.co.ke/news/Reprieve-for-Ndemo-Muthama-as-court-st >> ops-Konza-trial/-/1950946/2903536/-/format/xhtml/-/rx2mbkz/-/index.htm >> l >> >> It was a big win for nine individuals yesterday when the High Court >> stopped their prosecution over alleged theft of Sh179 million in the >> Konza City land deal. >> >> Judge George Odunga trashed the prosecution of National Police >> Commission member Ronald Leposo Musengi, Machakos Senator Johnson >> Muthama and former Information Permanent Secretary Bitange Ndemo. >> >> The others were the former directors of the Malili Ranch Company >> Limited, who have been accused of stealing over Sh179 million from >> Malili Ranch Shareholders. >> >> Judge Odunga prohibited Director of Public Prosecutions Keriako Tobiko >> from trying the individuals. >> >> Mr Musengi, Mr Muthama, Dr Ndemo and six others had been charged with >> theft of the millions from the shareholders of the private company >> which sold the land to the government at Sh1 billion. >> >> In his judgement, the judge said the trial of the Malili Techno City >> land deal suspects was an abuse of the criminal justice process >> > > > -- > Barrack O. Otieno > +254721325277 > +254-20-2498789 > Skype: barrack.otieno > http://www.otienobarrack.me.ke/ > > _______________________________________________ > kictanet mailing list > kictanet(a)lists.kictanet.or.ke > https://lists.kictanet.or.ke/mailman/listinfo/kictanet > > Unsubscribe or change your options at > https://lists.kictanet.or.ke/mailman/options/kictanet/eadera%40idrc.ca > > The Kenya ICT Action Network (KICTANet) is a multi-stakeholder platform for > people and institutions interested and involved in ICT policy and > regulation. The network aims to act as a catalyst for reform in the ICT > sector in support of the national aim of ICT enabled growth and > development. > > KICTANetiquette : Adhere to the same standards of acceptable behaviors > online that you follow in real life: respect people's times and bandwidth, > share knowledge, don't flame or abuse or personalize, respect privacy, do > not spam, do not market your wares or qualifications. > -- Barrack O. Otieno +254721325277 +254-20-2498789 Skype: barrack.otieno http://www.otienobarrack.me.ke/

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court ends Konza city land trials
by Mwendwa Kivuva 09 Oct '15

09 Oct '15

http://mobile.nation.co.ke/news/Reprieve-for-Ndemo-Muthama-as-court-stops-K… It was a big win for nine individuals yesterday when the High Court stopped their prosecution over alleged theft of Sh179 million in the Konza City land deal. Judge George Odunga trashed the prosecution of National Police Commission member Ronald Leposo Musengi, Machakos Senator Johnson Muthama and former Information Permanent Secretary Bitange Ndemo. The others were the former directors of the Malili Ranch Company Limited, who have been accused of stealing over Sh179 million from Malili Ranch Shareholders. Judge Odunga prohibited Director of Public Prosecutions Keriako Tobiko from trying the individuals. Mr Musengi, Mr Muthama, Dr Ndemo and six others had been charged with theft of the millions from the shareholders of the private company which sold the land to the government at Sh1 billion. In his judgement, the judge said the trial of the Malili Techno City land deal suspects was an abuse of the criminal justice process

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