December 2016 - KICTANet

Re: [kictanet] New Cabinet - Wish List ?
by Barrack Otieno 18 Jul '24

18 Jul '24

Listers, This is indeed good news. We have a lot of hope in Mucheru and Victor Kyalo industry veterans who have indeed worked their way through the trenches. Most importantly we hope to see the return of a multi stakeholder form of engagement in the sector which we have been yearning for in a while. I think as a sector we might need to prepare a wish list for our new leaders and most importantly commit to work with them towards achieving their mandate. The reshuffle is timely still it comes at the end of the year and will allow us to start 2016 on a new slate. Thank you Best Regards On 11/24/15, GG via kictanet <kictanet(a)lists.kictanet.or.ke> wrote: > +1 Grace. > > Sending them positive energy! And glad that the two were among the KICTANet > founders. > Rgds. > > --- Original Message --- > > From: "Grace Mutung'u (Bomu) via kictanet" <kictanet(a)lists.kictanet.or.ke> > Sent: 24 November 2015 22:35 > To: ggithaiga(a)hotmail.com > Cc: "Grace Mutung'u (Bomu)" <nmutungu(a)gmail.com> > Subject: Re: [kictanet] New Cabinet > > One of the issues (I think issue no.3) in the President's speech was > accessibility of leaders to wananchi. With Joe and Kyalo I think we shall > have better ears. > > Congratulations! > > May they pass the vetting. > > Regards, > On 24 Nov 2015 21:29, "Evans Ikua via kictanet" < > kictanet(a)lists.kictanet.or.ke> wrote: > >> @Ngigi you are right. But in the current dispensation, a CS is still >> expected to be a technocrat, as opposed to the days of yore when minister >> was politician. So they will both be at home in their respective >> positions. >> Especially Victor as the accounting officer with his many years in >> government. That's the right position. >> >> Evans >> On Nov 24, 2015 9:17 PM, "Waithaka Ngigi" <ngigi(a)at.co.ke> wrote: >> >>> Evans, >>> >>> Joe Mucheru & Victor Kyalo are old hands in. KE ICT. Both have been >>> entrepreneurs and then at some point moved on to various ventures. So we >>> shouldn't go wrong ‎with either. >>> >>> However, what's the better fit? Mucheru at CS, Victor at PS or the other >>> way round? Victor CS, Mucheru PS? >>> >>> Waithaka Ngigi >>> >>> Alliance Technologies >>> www.at.co.ke >>> *From: *Evans Ikua via kictanet >>> *Sent: *Tuesday, November 24, 2015 8:50 PM >>> *To: *Ngigi Waithaka >>> *Reply To: *KICTAnet ICT Policy Discussions >>> *Cc: *Evans Ikua >>> *Subject: *Re: [kictanet] New Cabinet >>> >>> Congrats Hon Joe! That's a great choice for the ICT industry. Well out >>> H.E. >>> >>> Ikua >>> On Nov 24, 2015 8:45 PM, "waudo siganga via kictanet" < >>> kictanet(a)lists.kictanet.or.ke> wrote: >>> >>>> Congratulations to Joe Mucheru! >>>> >>>> _______________________________________________ >>>> kictanet mailing list >>>> kictanet(a)lists.kictanet.or.ke >>>> https://lists.kictanet.or.ke/mailman/listinfo/kictanet >>>> >>>> Unsubscribe or change your options at >>>> https://lists.kictanet.or.ke/mailman/options/kictanet/ikua.evans%40gmail.com >>>> >>>> The Kenya ICT Action Network (KICTANet) is a multi-stakeholder platform >>>> for people and institutions interested and involved in ICT policy and >>>> regulation. The network aims to act as a catalyst for reform in the ICT >>>> sector in support of the national aim of ICT enabled growth and >>>> development. >>>> >>>> KICTANetiquette : Adhere to the same standards of acceptable behaviors >>>> online that you follow in real life: respect people's times and >>>> bandwidth, >>>> share knowledge, don't flame or abuse or personalize, respect privacy, >>>> do >>>> not spam, do not market your wares or qualifications. >>>> >>> >>> >> _______________________________________________ >> kictanet mailing list >> kictanet(a)lists.kictanet.or.ke >> https://lists.kictanet.or.ke/mailman/listinfo/kictanet >> >> Unsubscribe or change your options at >> https://lists.kictanet.or.ke/mailman/options/kictanet/nmutungu%40gmail.com >> >> The Kenya ICT Action Network (KICTANet) is a multi-stakeholder platform >> for people and institutions interested and involved in ICT policy and >> regulation. The network aims to act as a catalyst for reform in the ICT >> sector in support of the national aim of ICT enabled growth and >> development. >> >> KICTANetiquette : Adhere to the same standards of acceptable behaviors >> online that you follow in real life: respect people's times and >> bandwidth, >> share knowledge, don't flame or abuse or personalize, respect privacy, do >> not spam, do not market your wares or qualifications. >> > -- Barrack O. Otieno +254721325277 +254-20-2498789 Skype: barrack.otieno http://www.otienobarrack.me.ke/

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Kenyan Tech Engineer, Zak Muriuki, Died in Ethiopian Jail
by Ali Hussein 19 Jun '18

19 Jun '18

Listers Saddest news. It also appears that there are three more Kenyan ICT Practitioners who are still languishing in prison in Ethiopia. The main charge is that they are accused of installing communication equipment without a license. Mugo, was arrested with Zak (may the almighty rest his soul in peace) over a year ago and Osborne Otinda with his colleague Maxwell Odhiambo (according to today's Nation, Page 3) were arrested in October 2014 and are still in jail. Excerpts:- (Addis Standard) – The body of a Kenyan engineer who died while in an Ethiopian prison has arrived home on Thursday Dec. 11th. Zak Muriuki, a father of two girls (pictured) and a tech engineer by profession, arrived in Ethiopia nearly two years ago on January 9, 2015, according to information obtained by Addis Standard. He was arrested on January 10 along with another Kenyan, Jadrick Mugo, who is still in prison. Read on:- http://www.ayyaantuu.net/kenyan-tech-engineer-zak-muriuki/ It also appears that the government is doing what it can to get the Kenyans released. Ali Hussein Principal Hussein & Associates +254 0713 601113 Twitter: @AliHKassim Skype: abu-jomo LinkedIn: http://ke.linkedin.com/in/alihkassim "Discovery consists in seeing what everyone else has seen and thinking what no one else has thought". ~ Albert Szent-Györgyi Sent from my iPad

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Fwd:Defamatory Blog Publication by Moses Kuria & Demand For Apology
by Grace Mutung'u (Bomu) 20 Apr '17

20 Apr '17

Dear all, the suit between Muite & Others versus Moses Kuria, which I understand is proceeding to court, should be a very interesting one to watch. Hopefully it shall give some insights on content control vs freedom of expression. See below. ---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: Ngunjiri <ngunjiri(a)kikuyusforchange.com> Date: Mon, 10 Oct 2011 16:05:07 +0300 Subject: {K4c} Defamatory Blog Publication by Moses Kuria & Demand For Apology To: KC4 <kikuyusforchange(a)googlegroups.com> This will most probably interest some of us, and help all of us be careful about what we write on our blogs. --- Ngunjiri [image: Issa & Co Advocates] Our Ref: M/058/001/L**** **** Tuesday, October 4, 2011**** **** Moses Kuria**** P. O. Box 1838-00200 ‘*Advance copy by email*’**** *NAIROBI***** **** Dear Sir,**** **** *RE: DEFAMATORY PUBLICATION ***** ------------------------------ We have been instructed by our clients, Wambugu Ngunjiri, Paul Muite, Ndung’u Wainaina, Maina Kiai and Hassan Omar.**** **** Our instructions are that you published in your widely read blog the following words of and concerning our clients.**** **** *‘I have said Ocampo has no case. All he has are fake witnesses coached by Hassan Omar, Wambugu Ngunjiri, Paul Muite, Ndungu Wainaina, Njonjo Mue and Maina Kiai.’***** **** Your insinuations are unfounded and baseless and our clients’ professional respective standings, characters and reputations have been severely tarnished by your publication.**** **** Our instructions are to demand a retraction, an apology and an admission of liability on your part for the publication of the defamatory words. This we hereby do. We shall address the issue of the damages payable to our clients upon receipt of your apology and admission.**** **** *NOTE* that if you do not publish an apology and retraction on your blog within the next *Seven (7) Days* of the receipt of this letter we shall proceed to the law for redress at your risk as to costs. **** **** Yours faithfully,**** *ISSA & COMPANY ADVOCATES***** **** **** *MANSUR M. ISSA***** **** cc. Clients**** **** *Issa & Co Advocates* <info(a)issadvocates.co.ke>**** ------------------------------ 5th Floor, City House, Wabera Street P.O. Box *24210 - 00100*, Nairobi, Kenya *ph*: *+ 254 20 340 150 · * *fx*: *+ 254 20 340 151* *em*: *info(a)issadvocates.co.ke · ***** ------------------------------ *CONFIDENTIALITY NOTICE:* This email and any attachments may contain information that is confidential, legally privileged and protected by law. Access by the intended recipient is authorized. Any liability (in negligence or otherwise) arising from any third party acting, or refraining from acting, or any information contained in this email is hereby excluded. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender immediatelyand do not disclose the contents to any other person, use it for any purpose or store or copy the information in any medium.**** -- --- Fear makes men act even against their own interests- changing them from men of reason to blubbering fools. -- Grace L.N. Mutung'u (Bomu) Kenya Skype: gracebomu Twitter: GraceMutung'u (Bomu)

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KISERO: Kenya’s corruption tsars have perfected looting through Ifmis - Daily Nation
by Ali Hussein 14 Jan '17

14 Jan '17

Listers Related to to the discussion of 'reigning in' quacks in the ICT Sector how do you explain the fiasco that is IFMIS? Except from the article:- In theory, the Ifmis system we have is based on Oracle E-Business Suite, an accounting package developed by Oracle of the USA. In reality, what is in place is a product of conspiracies between crafty government officials and local rent-seeking software merchants. Through highly inflated and ill-conceived customisation and re-engineering projects, the merchants have colluded with public officials to create a mongrel of the original Oracle E-Business Suite. This is the system at the heart of corruption in the public sector. http://www.nation.co.ke/oped/Opinion/Kenya-corruption-tsars-have-perfected-… So if we were to talk this discussion a step further:- 1. The customization of an Oracle E-Business Suite cannot be done by a 'quack' who isn't a Certified Oracle Software Engineer. 2. The customization must be approved by the client and mapped with the business processes mutually agreed by the vendor and the customer. In this case the government. A pig is a pig even if you apply lipstick on it. Let's call this what it is - Corruption. Period. Perpetuated in this case by the client and using qualified IT Professionals. We in the industry must call out the ones who collude to fleece this country instead of chasing a red herring in the name of 'quacks'! Ali Hussein Principal Hussein & Associates +254 0713 601113 Twitter: @AliHKassim Skype: abu-jomo LinkedIn: http://ke.linkedin.com/in/alihkassim "Discovery consists in seeing what everyone else has seen and thinking what no one else has thought". ~ Albert Szent-Györgyi Sent from my iPad

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Manual Backup and Elections 2017: Is the CS ICT Honest
by Odhiambo Washington 03 Jan '17

03 Jan '17

Dear Listers, I am at that position where I feel very lost. In fact, I feel like I am quite detached from the reality. All along, I have keenly considered this matter that seems to have divided the country down the middle: *Manual Backup* during the 2017 voting process. From the Jubilee/govt side this is a do or die and so it must be there. This govt side seems hell-bent on confusing the masses, as well as the experts like the ICT Community. From the Opposition side, the agenda seems to be very clear - that of ensuring integrity of the Voters Register and stopping 'ghost voters' from ever casting their votes. That brings us to the famous acronyms - BVI (Biometric Voter Register) / BVI (Biometric Voter Identification). Having been to a Voter Registration Centre (later to become a Polling Station) to register as a voter, I did look at the equipment in use for the registration process. I saw the laptop which was fitted with a camera and fingerprints scanner. All these require power to run. I did not dwell on how they were powered, but probably there was a battery backup somewhere (besides the electricity) given that they needed to run for a whole day for several days during the voter registration process. When it comes to the Elections, they only need to run for about 11 hours. My point here is that of *Backup Power* should it be that there's electricity blackout and the built-in batteries can't last the whole day. That backup is very important. However, I did not see any piece of equipment which could suggest that the equipment in use required any form of connectivity back to some central server in order to function! Which now brings me to the currently national debate - Manual Backup during the Poll Day. What is it? Was the CS honest with his presentation before the Senate/Amos Wako committee yesterday? Does the CS himself really believe in the content of his presentation? I am asking that because I watched him and I don't believe him. I actually think he mislead the committee, and hence the nation at large. Someone please prove me wrong. I am at that point where I believe that the BVR/BVI does NOT require any form of connectivity and so this Manual Backup being touted by the ruling coalition side, strongly supported by the ICT CS is a big lie. WHY? My very first answer: Simply put, *when there was no requirement for a manual backup during voter registration, it goes without saying that there is NO NEED for on the polling day.* 1. For the issue that is in contention - BVR (used for BVI during polling) - this is a database that can be (and should be) statically stored on the equipment for each polling station. We are not supposed to rely on the Mobile Network to access this voters database. And every polling station can have two/three laptops/Biometrics scanner/Backup batteries to ensure that the voter identification doesn't fail. Some excuse has been fronted about some voters being mechanics, such that their fingerprints wouldn't be recognized by the BVI systems hence need for manual identification. My take on that is that every voter must carry their voter's card on that day. The clerks can check that card number against the electronic system - enter it, and it will bring the person's picture, ID number, etc and let him cast his ballot. 2. For electronics results transmission (ERT), this is not even necessary in the first place. We can have the results collated/announced at the tallying centres after being certified - forms 36A, and such. However, if the ERT must be done, the data footprint is so tiny that a 2G network can be used. Besides, it can be an SMS based system, which doesn't require 3G or VSAT. The results data isn't that large - it can't be in Megabytes to be sincere. Well, VSAT can be used if they MUST, but this is after the voting process itself is complete, has nothing to do with BVI. The ERT and the BVR/BVI are two distinct systems. That is what I want to believe. The ERT gets feedback from a manual process - of voters casting their vote, clerks/agents counting, verifying, and certifying, filling requisite forms then communicating the same via some customized phones which are programmed to communicate to a backend system. Am I right on that?? Now the big question here is, where do we need this much touted manual backup where network connectivity is being used as the major reason??? (a) Citing terrorism and the possibility of Al Shabaab knocking off base stations seems like well thought out lie meant to cover our eyes! If they attacked an area, I doubt there will be voting in the 1st place. And even so, the network connectivity is not required for BVI so there is no disenfranchising anyone if there is no manual backup (whatever that is). (b) Citing hacking is neither here nor there for a BVR/BVI system because it's not being accessed live during the voting. It's a static database, unique to the polling station, resident on the laptop used by the clerks. The only hacking that can be done then can only be by an "insider". Quoting Victor Kapiyo from Social Media, "*I guess it's a question of trust. Trust in systems and in trustworthy people to do the right thing. For M-Pesa, or KCSE results, we trust both. For IEBC, I guess the jury is still out*." The main issue is not allowing the dead voters to rise again to vote in the presidential vote, then disappear. So the important component here is the BVR/BVI, the credibility of the register and hence the vote. At what point does the BVI system require this connectivity they are talking about, which then necessitates the so called "manual backup"? Did the CS ICT lie to the Senate?? Did the CAK lie to the Senate in supporting the lie from the CS?? There is insincerity in this whole debate about 'manual backup' and the ICT community seems to either support it or is simply lost in the pool of confusion being peddled by politicians. -- Best regards, Odhiambo WASHINGTON, Nairobi,KE +254 7 3200 0004/+254 7 2274 3223 "Oh, the cruft."

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Re: [kictanet] Manual Backup and Elections 2017: Is the CS ICT Honest
by JImmy Gitonga 01 Jan '17

01 Jan '17

Thank you Odhiambo Washington, I have the same concerns myself. I reached the conclusion that it would be nice if "ICT Experts" could lay their hands on a BVI machine as well as a and show the rest of us what the problem really is. The ERT issue is a red herring. It has worked flawlessly in the bi-elections that have happened ever since. With PKI and 2 factor authentication, this can be solved for election day. I am sure Victor Kyalo and Joseph Mucheru could make this possible. Call it a "Kenyans as ICT stakeholders" meeting. All Listers with time will begin to be asked by their family or neighbours, what the issue really is. I, for one, do not want to echo the CS's words. I think the CS and the PS should help us help them. Otherwise they will be on their own when the political vultures come calling. Regards, Jimmy Gitonga > Message: 4 > Date: Fri, 30 Dec 2016 11:30:08 +0300 > From: Odhiambo Washington <odhiambo(a)gmail.com> > To: Kictanet <kictanet(a)lists.kictanet.or.ke> > Subject: [kictanet] Manual Backup and Elections 2017: Is the CS ICT > Honest > Message-ID: > <CAAdA2WPFoRvjF5Bodk+sHb-P4_rUp2AXpA9Q3zAk-UR57cqwGw@mail. > gmail.com> > Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" > > Dear Listers, > > I am at that position where I feel very lost. In fact, I feel like I am > quite detached from the reality. > > All along, I have keenly considered this matter that seems to have divided > the country down the middle: *Manual Backup* during the 2017 voting > process. From the Jubilee/govt side this is a do or die and so it must be > there. This govt side seems hell-bent on confusing the masses, as well as > the experts like the ICT Community. From the Opposition side, the agenda > seems to be very clear - that of ensuring integrity of the Voters Register > and stopping 'ghost voters' from ever casting their votes. > > That brings us to the famous acronyms - BVI (Biometric Voter Register) / > BVI (Biometric Voter Identification). > Having been to a Voter Registration Centre (later to become a Polling > Station) to register as a voter, I did look at the equipment in use for the > registration process. I saw the laptop which was fitted with a camera and > fingerprints scanner. All these require power to run. I did not dwell on > how they were powered, but probably there was a battery backup somewhere > (besides the electricity) given that they needed to run for a whole day for > several days during the voter registration process. When it comes to the > Elections, they only need to run for about 11 hours. My point here is that > of *Backup Power* should it be that there's electricity blackout and the > built-in batteries can't last the whole day. That backup is very important. > > However, I did not see any piece of equipment which could suggest that the > equipment in use required any form of connectivity back to some central > server in order to function! Which now brings me to the currently national > debate - Manual Backup during the Poll Day. What is it? Was the CS honest > with his presentation before the Senate/Amos Wako committee yesterday? Does > the CS himself really believe in the content of his presentation? I am > asking that because I watched him and I don't believe him. I actually think > he mislead the committee, and hence the nation at large. > > Someone please prove me wrong. I am at that point where I believe that the > BVR/BVI does NOT require any form of connectivity and so this Manual Backup > being touted by the ruling coalition side, strongly supported by the ICT > CS is a big lie. WHY? > > My very first answer: Simply put, *when there was no requirement for a > manual backup during voter registration, it goes without saying that there > is NO NEED for on the polling day.* > > > 1. For the issue that is in contention - BVR (used for BVI during polling) > - this is a database that can be (and should be) statically stored on the > equipment for each polling station. We are not supposed to rely on the > Mobile Network to access this voters database. And every polling station > can have two/three laptops/Biometrics scanner/Backup batteries to ensure > that the voter identification doesn't fail. > Some excuse has been fronted about some voters being mechanics, such that > their fingerprints wouldn't be recognized by the BVI systems hence need for > manual identification. My take on that is that every voter must carry their > voter's card on that day. The clerks can check that card number against the > electronic system - enter it, and it will bring the person's picture, ID > number, etc and let him cast his ballot. > > 2. For electronics results transmission (ERT), this is not even necessary > in the first place. We can have the results collated/announced at the > tallying centres after being certified - forms 36A, and such. However, if > the ERT must be done, the data footprint is so tiny that a 2G network can > be used. Besides, it can be an SMS based system, which doesn't require 3G > or VSAT. The results data isn't that large - it can't be in Megabytes to be > sincere. Well, VSAT can be used if they MUST, but this is after the voting > process itself is complete, has nothing to do with BVI. > > The ERT and the BVR/BVI are two distinct systems. That is what I want to > believe. The ERT gets feedback from a manual process - of voters casting > their vote, clerks/agents counting, verifying, and certifying, filling > requisite forms then communicating the same via some customized phones > which are programmed to communicate to a backend system. Am I right on > that?? > > Now the big question here is, where do we need this much touted manual > backup where network connectivity is being used as the major reason??? > > (a) Citing terrorism and the possibility of Al Shabaab knocking off base > stations seems like well thought out lie meant to cover our eyes! If they > attacked an area, I doubt there will be voting in the 1st place. > And even so, the network connectivity is not required for BVI so there > is no disenfranchising anyone if there is no manual backup (whatever that > is). > > (b) Citing hacking is neither here nor there for a BVR/BVI system because > it's not being accessed live during the voting. It's a static database, > unique to the polling station, resident on the laptop used by the clerks. > The only hacking that can be done then can only be by an "insider". Quoting > Victor Kapiyo from Social Media, "*I guess it's a question of trust. Trust > in systems and in trustworthy people to do the right thing. For M-Pesa, or > KCSE results, we trust both. For IEBC, I guess the jury is still out*." > > The main issue is not allowing the dead voters to rise again to vote in the > presidential vote, then disappear. So the important component here is the > BVR/BVI, the credibility of the register and hence the vote. > > At what point does the BVI system require this connectivity they are > talking about, which then necessitates the so called "manual backup"? > > Did the CS ICT lie to the Senate?? Did the CAK lie to the Senate in > supporting the lie from the CS?? > > There is insincerity in this whole debate about 'manual backup' and the ICT > community seems to either support it or is simply lost in the pool of > confusion being peddled by politicians. > > > -- > Best regards, > Odhiambo WASHINGTON, > Nairobi,KE > +254 7 3200 0004/+254 7 2274 3223 > "Oh, the cruft." >

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We're living through the first world cyberwar – but just haven’t called it that | Martin Belam | Opinion | The Guardian
by Ali Hussein 01 Jan '17

01 Jan '17

Listers The job of the historian is often to pull together broad themes and trends, then give them a snappy title that people will easily recognise and understand. That’s how we end up with labels like “The decline and fall of the Roman Empire” or “The Rise of Hitler and the Third Reich”. As someone who studied history, I’ve had this lingering curiosity about how historians of the future will view our times. It is easy to imagine textbooks in a hundred years with chapters that start with Reagan and Thatcher and end with the global financial crisis and called something like The Western Neoliberal Consensus 1979-2008. Read on https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/dec/30/first-world-cyberwar-… Ali Hussein Principal Hussein & Associates +254 0713 601113 Twitter: @AliHKassim Skype: abu-jomo LinkedIn: http://ke.linkedin.com/in/alihkassim "Discovery consists in seeing what everyone else has seen and thinking what no one else has thought". ~ Albert Szent-Györgyi Sent from my iPad

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Re: [kictanet] Manual Backup and Elections 2017: Is the CS ICT Honest (Collins Areba)
by Dennis Muthuri 31 Dec '16

31 Dec '16

Thanks for the clarification. > On 31 Dec 2016, at 13:20, kictanet-request(a)lists.kictanet.or.ke wrote: > > Send kictanet mailing list submissions to > kictanet(a)lists.kictanet.or.ke > > To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit > https://lists.kictanet.or.ke/mailman/listinfo/kictanet > or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to > kictanet-request(a)lists.kictanet.or.ke > > You can reach the person managing the list at > kictanet-owner(a)lists.kictanet.or.ke > > When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific > than "Re: Contents of kictanet digest..." > > > Today's Topics: > > 1. Re: Manual Backup and Elections 2017: Is the CS ICT Honest > (Collins Areba) > > > ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > > Message: 1 > Date: Sat, 31 Dec 2016 13:18:35 +0300 > From: Collins Areba <arebacollins(a)gmail.com> > To: Waithaka Ngigi <ngigi(a)at.co.ke> > Cc: KICTAnet ICT Policy Discussions <kictanet(a)lists.kictanet.or.ke>, > JImmy Gitonga <jimmygitts(a)gmail.com> > Subject: Re: [kictanet] Manual Backup and Elections 2017: Is the CS > ICT Honest > Message-ID: > <CAFb6RxBu3x2jTrk8FYeyNA2=13EOaVB3R3ohzjm_WvomV6d6QA(a)mail.gmail.com> > Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" > > Listers, > Allow me to share these wise words from a friend, Ben Ngumi Chege, who has > had extensive on the field doing exactly this kind of work in more places > than I can remember. Will paste the long text after the link in case its > not visible to everyone. > > https://web.facebook.com/notes/ben-chege/manual-vs-electronic-elections/101… > > ?Manual? vs ?Electronic? Elections >> BEN CHEGE <https://web.facebook.com/masukuma>?FRIDAY, 30 DECEMBER 2016 >> <https://web.facebook.com/notes/ben-chege/manual-vs-electronic-elections/101…> >> Every 5 years Kenyans queue to vote, this is an exercise that we have >> engaged in passionately for as long as I can remember and when each round >> of elections is done and dusted we as a nation learn a couple of lessons >> which we then reuse in succeeding election cycles in an attempt to make >> them better. However, looking at the current debate on the use of >> technology and witnessing what is happening, I suspect that there might >> have been an important lesson to be learnt in the 2007-08 when compared to >> the 2013 election cycle that has been missed and this lesson is that Having >> consensus among all players beforehand regarding the electoral process >> generally leads to widespread acceptance of the results of the process. >> Electoral process should be seen as contests, where groups of people with >> various interests engage willingly in order to not only determine political >> representation but also wield the power of the state, and just like any >> reputable contest it has its rules. These rules are well known and >> understood by all players and are accepted from the onset. These rules are >> deterministic in that they are predictable and must be seen by all parties >> to be fair. For a country to have a credible election - we need everyone to >> feel like they have a chance in this contest since from the onset the rules >> of the game do not favour their opponent(s). >> In 2007 ODM did not agree to the way the commissioners were picked after >> the terms of some expired as they felt it contravened the IPPG agreement >> and after the contest was done they did not accept the results announced by >> the commission. When the same commission asked them they refused! We all >> remember the situation the country found itself after the opposition >> refused to engage in a process they felt was flawed and disadvantageous to >> them. The 2017 election process is slowly mirroring the 2007 pre-election >> period especially when it comes to the role of technology on voting day. We >> are witnessing an emotive debate regarding the use of technology and the >> disregard of the voices of political players who hold contrary opinions. If >> lessons from the past hold true, this threatens the expectation of a >> peaceful electoral process and at the very least a credible one. >> On voting day there are 4 core activities that happen within a polling >> station, these are: >> 1) Voter identification/Verification ? this answers the question ? ?Are >> you registered to vote in this polling station?? >> 2) Voting by secret ballot ? you are given a ballot paper and then you >> mark it in secret and the cast the said ballot into a transparent ballot >> box. >> 3) Counting of results and declaration ? counting of all votes cast in the >> polling station for each race and the declaration of the votes cast in >> favour of each candidate. >> 4) Results transmission ? forwarding these results to the next level >> namely the constituency tally center for ?tallying? and dispute resolution >> just in case there were any. >> The ?Manual? vs ?Electronic? debate is really touching on activities 1) >> and 4) and therefore at the core of this debate are 2 questions namely: >> 1) Can we solely verify/identify voters electronically using biometrics >> that they submitted? >> 2) Can we solely transmit results to the next level using electronic means? >> Fortunately, these two are not really new initiatives as the IEBC has been >> using technology in these two areas over the last 4 years. No one doubts >> the credibility boost that well executed technology has on elections. An >> example of this is the by-election in Kibwezi West where the winner won the >> race by the narrowest of margins - a paltry 175 votes and the loser did not >> file a petition challenging the results. This was unheard of in previous >> elections. >> Why then do we have a debate around it? Previously, the use of technology >> was not explicitly dictated by the Elections Act but rather the stipulation >> to use one form of it was found in regulations. Until now the official >> Electoral process has been manual where technology had been added for >> efficiency and confidence building. The latest Election Amendment Act 2016 >> has raised the profile of the said technologies from just being tools to be >> used in boosting confidence to be the exclusive means of conducting voter >> identification and results transmission. >> They say once stung ? twice shy and thus it?s understandable that the IEBC >> is jittery in embracing technology full throttle without a fallback >> especially because it had technology failures in the said areas during the >> 2013 General elections. Technology is playing an increasing role in our >> lives and for us to move forward on the electoral field - I feel that this >> discussion needs to be informed by a mindset from big technology companies >> have when it comes to failure. Companies like Google, Yahoo and Facebook >> plan for failure more than they plan for success. They have a culture that >> says ?failure is OK?, a culture where people are encouraged to ask: >> 1) What do we do if our technology fails? >> 2) How do we continue fulfilling our core business that is serving our >> customers and users when the systems around us fail? >> So as Kenyans we need to ask ourselves the same set of questions and ask >> how it affects the core business of elections. But for that to happen we >> need to synthesize what our core business on election day is. It?s said >> that ?Election Day is still the one day when we strive to give equal >> voice to every eligible voter; the day when the woman working in the market >> stall has as much of a say as any wealthy banker, and the illiterate menial >> laborer has a voice that speaks as eloquently as any university professor. >> It is our shared responsibility to strive for processes and systems that >> ensure that every voter is given the opportunity to make their will known, >> and that every vote is counted.? If we agree that this is the core >> business of elections and everything on election day must support this, we >> should ask ourselves a couple of questions, namely: >> 1) What happens WHEN we place a piece of technology as a prerequisite to >> the recording of this voice and the said technology fails and thus affects >> the ?core business?? What are the fallbacks available to us? >> 2) Since this is a contest, which out of the array of fallbacks available >> is most acceptable to all players? >> The issues around the failure of technology have been well documented. The >> IEBC conducted an internal audit of the March 2013 election and rather >> candidly highlighted these failures. I will try and address them and >> possibly give recommendations in question form that should advise our >> choice of an acceptable fallback or perhaps a list of fallbacks to be >> executed in when certain scenarios playout. When it came to the >> identification of voters electronically, the issues fell broadly into 3 >> categories namely: >> 1) Technology problems ? some voters could not be found on some EVIDs but >> were present on the manual register. Some devices run out of power, some >> even exploded during charging >> 2) Procurement problems ? getting the wrong device because procurement >> requirements were not met. >> 3) Rollout problems ? some devices were not charged, insufficient training >> due to late delivery and lack of manuals e.t.c. >> With proper planning and time to go through the procurement procedures >> most of these can be sorted out. The new Elections amendment act stipulates >> that the IEBC should have procured and set in place technology 8 months to >> an election and then have it tested 60 days to an election. Even with this >> in place some of the problems categorized as ?Technology problems? may not >> disappear or may only manifest themselves on polling day. In order to >> address them we need to ask ourselves what are the real risk factors >> related to technology? If the approach to voter verification is similar to >> what was employed in 2013 ? then the disruption of telecommunication is not >> a potential failure point ? why? The devices were self-contained ? the >> register was loaded on the device and thus the device really had no need to >> communicate with external systems after rollout. If this is the model >> envisaged in the new KIEMs Rollout ? we should not concern ourselves with >> telecommunication availability in the matters of voter verification. What >> should concern us is the issue of availability of power as the devices will >> be constantly in use throughout the day. The devices used for verification >> conduct a one-to-one match of voters against their biometrics ? >> computationally ? it can be a costly affair especially if a potential voter >> has to submit multiple fingers to get identified if one fails and so we >> need to have devices that can work for 18 hours or have capability to >> accept external power in the form of portable power cells. Can the software >> be written in such a way that it alerts the users well beforehand that it >> has X number of hours of charge left and that the clerks at the polling >> station need to make arrangement to keep the electronic means working? >> Ghana deployed a solution that utilized dry cells and they put in place an >> operational plan to replace them within 4 hours. >> The issue of some voters not being found on the EVIDs yet being found on >> the manual roll was puzzling, this may be aggravated in 2017 this is >> because the bulk of the current set of fingerprints were collected in 2013 >> and it will not be farfetched to expect that the quality of fingerprints >> submitted for verification in this election cycle by an eligible voter who >> work with their hands to be lower and thus this may require multiple >> passes. The current setup is one which a subset of the fingerprints >> collected is used to verify voters electronically. If we are to go full >> throttle ? we will need to ensure that all fingerprints are available for >> matching on polling day to increase the chances of matching. An exercise to >> get fingerprints resubmitted for persons who fall in this category and also >> for all those that had their biometrics lost during the mass registration >> drive when BVR machines crashed and did not have backed up properly. >> Another reason that could explain why some voters were not found on the >> EVIDs and were found on the printed register is data corruption during >> copying polling station data into the SD cards that the devices used. How >> can we ensure that databases are not corrupted during saving into the >> machines? I propose that each device should have a way of hashing a file >> and checking the hash against a verified hash of a working copy and where >> it differs transferring data to this device should be repeated. Backups of >> these registers on verified SD cards should also accompany each EVID to the >> field. We should explore how to keep the logs of the persons who have voted >> safe when devices get technology issues. There is also an inconvenient >> reality that in any given population there will always be some persons >> whose fingerprints are difficult or impossible to capture or verify. This >> raises a fundamental ideological question of whether a person should be >> disenfranchised because of limitations of a technology. >> The issues around the provisional transmission of results were also well >> documented, these also fell into 3 broad categories namely: >> 1) Technology problems ? the server?s well documented issue with system >> logs and it running out of space due to server misconfiguration; The >> failover issues that followed this. Network coverage issues; Erroneous >> display of tallied votes due to late integration and limited retesting. >> 2) Procurement/Acquisition problems ? there was no time to really develop >> the transmission application. >> 3) Rollout problems ? late delivery of phones and specially configured >> simcards; issues with user credentials; versioning issues between server >> and phone; Lack of proper training. >> As with electronic voter identification, most of these can be sorted out >> with proper planning and following procedures, why do I say so? the IEBC >> has transmitted 100% of the results from all the by-elections that it has >> conducted since 2013. While in terms of scale these by-elections pale when >> compared to the general election, it?s my considered opinion that there >> have been numerous lessons learnt ? these can be documented and used to >> inform the training and rollout process. >> What should happen in the event that result transmission fails for >> whatever reason? The IEBC still needs to have a fallback for electronic >> results transmission. Can some other technology offer a fallback? e.g. If >> results transmission from a primary device fails, should we have an >> electronic fallback using a different technology? Can the current election >> transmission system be used as a backup of whatever fancy results >> transmission system the IEBC procures? The IEBC has used satellite phones >> with success to transmit results for the Kalolol and Mosiro by-elections, >> why can this be used as a fallback on the telecommunication side. I think >> we can have all these fallbacks in place and these would be totally >> acceptable to all stakeholders. >> These questions are by no means comprehensive but should act as a starting >> point in deciding what the fallback(s) should be and when to fallback. It >> has always been my opinion that leaving the determination of important >> electoral matters at the polling station level to the discretion of people >> there without a trail of documentation that guides their decision making >> and a trail of accountability to why they took the action they did exposes >> the election operation to credibility questions. In 2012 Ghana went into >> their election with the NVNV (No [biometric] Verification, No Voting) >> mantra and they had to extend the voting period and also had many people >> disenfranchised because of the inadequacies of the technology they rolled >> out. In 2015 they rolled back and then introduced a manual verification >> fallback. The manual verification process required the presiding officer >> fill a manual verification form for each voter who is manually verified. >> The only way we can come up with this list of scenarios is if we carried >> out a proper and candid risk assessment and management process. This >> process should inform the IEBC on what to do to ensure that the ?core >> business? on election day remains unaffected. From my perspective, human >> beings should always play the role of final "exception handlers" to ensure >> that during electronic voter identification no voter is ever >> disenfranchised by technology malfunction or it?s limitation. Indeed, if >> the electoral process must err, then it must err on the side of inclusion. >> However, these errors must be accounted for and thus the most appropriate >> role of technology is to ensure a level of transparency and accountability >> that allows for review of any of those human decisions on how to handle >> exceptions. As noted earlier on this paper, the process used for >> verification involves a one-to-one match of voters against their >> biometrics. The voter gets his ID No. captured by the verification device >> in a bid to ?identify? them and once their records are loaded on the screen >> of the device an additional fingerprint scan is required to ?verify? this >> person. i.e. answering the question ? are you really the person who you >> claim to be? So, for example, if the validation device is unable to verify >> the fingerprint of a voter who the presiding officer knows or strongly >> believes to be a legitimate voter, and his/her particulars are on the voter >> register, the presiding officer should have the authority to override the >> device and allow the person to vote. In order to trigger the manual >> verification process, the presiding officer should collect as much >> information about the person being excluded from being electronically >> verified as possible. This information should include a photo of this >> person and the Serial Number not ID No. found on their National Identity >> card. Manual verification should not be misconstrued to mean manual >> verification using the physically printed out register or green books. This >> process should be endorsed by all party agents present at the polling >> station. It is important to have this information both in physical and >> electronic form. At the end of the day, any final reconciliation should >> include the number of decisions the presiding officer made contrary to the >> technology. This allows for review of the decisions of the presiding >> officer, and provides a deterrent since that officer knows that there will >> be an accounting of how many decisions he made of this nature. It also >> allows for reporting on anomalies where a polling station or ward has an >> inordinately high number of human exceptions. This information can be >> transmitted periodically so that during the course of the day to all >> stakeholders and thus all players are able to identify polling stations >> that have inordinately high numbers of human exceptions and vigilance can >> be increased to ensure only legitimate cases are excluded from electronic >> verification. >> Once this discussion has been held and we have a product that this has the >> blessing of all players contesting in the election. When accepted by all >> stakeholders the post-election process of massaging bruised egos and >> selling peace i.e. the 'accept and move on' message will be much easier. >> >

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Re: [kictanet] BVR, EVID & Transmission of Electoral Results
by John Kieti 30 Dec '16

30 Dec '16

Dear Listers, In my understanding, the use of electronic means to identify voters and to transmit results is more about the integrity of the election than efficiency of the process. Therefore, when we say we need a fall back system, we should look at a solution that not only safeguards fulfilment of the bill of rights as regards the right to vote. The solution should also have in itself a fallback mechanism that safeguards the integrity of the electoral process as envisaged by the notion of "electronic means". Simply reverting to "manual" appears a little too simplistic. This is because the spirit behind the law's insistence on "electronic" is that of safeguarding the voter identification process by way of biometric technology for instance. As technologists we will easily have consensus that biometric person identification is much more fool proof as regards positive identification than its manual alternatives (therefore not letting in the so called ghosts. Likewise, the spirit behind electronic transmission of presidential vote tallies from the polling station is to safeguard the integrity of the tallying and aggregation process. This ostensibly reduces chances of crooks tampering with signed tally forms (form 34s and form 36s) later on, after the tallies have been announced at the polling stations. Therefore as we consider the matter of "what if the system fails?", it may be that to maintain the spirit and intention of safeguarding the integrity of the vote, a fall back process needs to ensure that the integrity of the vote is not compromised. For instance, why would we insist on a manual back up when both the primary system and the redundant system could be electronic. As it may have been said, in the case of presidential tally transmission, GSM technology could constitute the primary system. Then in areas where GSM connectivity is absent or doubtful, a small deployment of vsat or satellite phones could provide redundancy. It could even be a temporary Wimax arrangement in specific geographical locations. It could also be that a extra government supported investment in GSM for areas of doubt between now and June 2017 is possible. Of course commercial viability is an issue but the bill of rights argument also appears to invoke the essence of the Universal Access Fund. As one may argue, the general election is one of the crucial activities where every citizen can exercises article 1 and article two of the constitution, and it happens once every five years. Arguably there might be no better use of the Universal Access Fund than for facilitating the exercise of article 1 and article 2 of the constitution. As regards voter identification (for EVIDs), there is people with very sweaty fingers. Others may have had accidents in the period preceding the election, causing amputation of the fingers linking them to the biometric register. Therefore such identification failure is plausible. Notwithstanding the possibility of EVID failure, if incidences of such failure exceed 5% or say a certain threshold in a polling station, then something would be amiss and should raise a red flag. It could either be a cultural / environmental challenge in the geography of that polling station, or it could be a case of power issues with the gadgets, or as some would say, it might be "artificial" failure to facilitate "ghost" voters. Regardless of the cause of EVID failure, and in the spirit of safeguarding the integrity of the election, it will help that every EVID failure instance triggers a sequence of well documented steps that can guarantee verifiability of a positive "manual" identification of the voter. The easy one of EVID failures to solve is the instance of power (battery) failure. It should not be impossible to eliminate this through better training of IEBC staff and pre-charging devices. More so, increased rural electrification in the last 4 years might contribute more to alleviation of this challenge. In conclusion, it seems important for those dealing with the Election Law Amendment to separate the two issues (1) The bill of rights and the right of every Kenyan (who has registered as a voter) to vote. (2) Safeguarding the integrity of the vote through ensuring we have up non corruptible, verifiable and auditable electoral systems. More specifically, voter identification and presidential tally transmission appear to be areas of enhancement. That's my 2016 five cent opinion on this electoral law matter. Happy 2017 everyone!.. On Dec 30, 2016 11:59, "Mutemi wa Kiama via kictanet" < kictanet(a)lists.kictanet.or.ke> wrote: Hi Listers, In the debates I have seen raging online and elsewhere about need for a non-IT based backup system, the ICT Ministry and Communications Authority are quoted talking about the 3G coverage in the country or lack thereof. No one is talking about 2G and Satellite phone coverage. Isn't most of the country covered by 2G? Does it mean we suddenly can't transmit data over 2G which we used to before 3G? Interesting that the same Safaricom whose Mpesa can't be hacked by Al Shabaab can have electoral results transmission hacked (According to CS Joe Mucheru)! Are we suddenly analogue because elections are approaching? Could experts here appear before the senate committee on Elections Act next week and save this country from an impending calamity driven by ignorance around ICT? a bewildered Edwin Kiama! Thoughts become things... choose the good ones! *-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------**Social Justice Entrepreneur, Human Rights Defender, * *#DevolutionIsRevolution Champion* *The Wanjiku Agenda Kenya Foundation (WAKenya)*Ordinary, fearless Kenyans. https://www.facebook.com/wanjikurevolutionkenya https://twitter.com/WanjikuRevolt https://plus.google.com/u/1/+WanjikuMapinduzi/posts http://www.scribd.com/wmkenya "Never doubt that a small group of thoughtful, committed people can change the world. Indeed, it is the only thing that ever has." *~Margaret Mead* _______________________________________________ kictanet mailing list kictanet(a)lists.kictanet.or.ke https://lists.kictanet.or.ke/mailman/listinfo/kictanet Unsubscribe or change your options at https://lists.kictanet.or.ke/ mailman/options/kictanet/jkieti%40gmail.com The Kenya ICT Action Network (KICTANet) is a multi-stakeholder platform for people and institutions interested and involved in ICT policy and regulation. The network aims to act as a catalyst for reform in the ICT sector in support of the national aim of ICT enabled growth and development. KICTANetiquette : Adhere to the same standards of acceptable behaviors online that you follow in real life: respect people's times and bandwidth, share knowledge, don't flame or abuse or personalize, respect privacy, do not spam, do not market your wares or qualifications.

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Internet Censorship in Kenya: An Assessment
by Moses Karanja 30 Dec '16

30 Dec '16

Hello KICTANet Find a blog post we did with Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI) based on our tests of Internet censorship in Kenya for the last 5 months. https://ooni.torproject.org/post/kenya-study/ If you are based outside Nairobi, and would like to run tests from your vantage point, please reach out. With censorship mutating to regional level (as compared to the national-level), it is important that we capture wider experiences. Nairobi is NOT Kenya so our measurements in Nairobi do not necessarily represent the country. -- Moses Karanja www.moseskaranja.com/blog

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